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By
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ABSTRACT
This dissertation analyzes the technical work and social milieu of mining
engineers to understand the daily negotiations by which private U.S. capital reached up to
and across the southwestern border as part of an ongoing project of American territorial
and economic expansion. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
American mining engineers traveled all over the world as expert consultants and labor
managers. The business negotiations, elite social networks, and gendered discourse of
“expertise” invoked by these technocratic professionals were critical influences in
bringing the hard-rock mining districts of North America into the economic system of the
United States. By integrating the history of technical experts into the history of the
transnational mining industry, my research contributes to an understanding of the process
by which American economic hegemony was established in a border region peripheral to
the federal governments of both Washington, D.C. and Mexico City.
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Introduction
“Are you still a candidate for the superintendency of a mine?” James D. Hague
inquired of his colleague, Ellsworth Daggett, in 1885, before proceeding to bombard
Daggett with details of the project he had in mind. The mine in question was actually a
group of silver mines, owned by the Cusihuiriachic Mining Company, an Americanowned company with offices in Boston. Hague was a consulting mining engineer;
Daggett, who was Hague’s choice to be the on-site superintendent of the Cusihuiriachic
mines, was also an American mining engineer. The mines themselves were in
Chihuahua, Mexico. Daggett accepted Hague’s proposal, and moved to Mexico to
oversee the project of getting the mines up and running. Previous management had made
some minor improvements to the site – there was a 40-stamp mill and a lixiviation (or
washing) plant in operation -- but Hague thought they needed significant technological
intervention to begin paying dividends. He offered $500 a month to Daggett for the
position, explaining that “the whole thing needs clever management, and the mine
especially wants to be taken in hand by an experienced man.”1
Hague and Daggett exchanged hundreds of letters over the next two years while
working for the Cusihuiriachic Mining Company. They discussed all aspects of the
mining company’s operations, including the number of letters Daggett was required to
produce for the investors in Boston, describing how work proceeded in Chihuahua; the
1

James D. Hague to Ellsworth Daggett, 23 November 1885; James D. Hague to

Ellsworth Daggett, December 7, 1885; James D. Hague to Ellsworth Daggett, January 26
1886, all M-12, James D. Hague Papers, Huntington Library, San Marino [hereafter
JDH].
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tariff laws of the United States and how they affected the decision to ship sulphides to
New York rather than bullion; the possibility of revolutionary violence among the local
residents of Cusi; the overall debt burden of the company; and the weather; as well as the
health and activities enjoyed by Daggett and his wife, who joined him in Mexico for a
time.2 There were few aspects of the operation of the mines that did not fall under the
purview of either Daggett or Hague, and the men took a keen interest in the fortunes of
the company – Daggett kept Hague apprised of action on the ground, while Hague kept
Daggett apprised of the mood of the investors. Their correspondence regarding the
Cusihuiriachic Mining Company ended shortly after Hague announced to Daggett that
the death of one Mr. Barney, an investor in the mine, “removes a principal supporter” of
the operation, and that he could “foresee trouble if it has got to be supported by money
drawn from here [Boston].”3 Finding that operations at Cusi were not self-sufficient,
both Hague and Daggett moved on to other mining ventures.
The Cusihuiriachic Mining Company was part of a broader trend of American
investment in mining opportunities on and around the U.S.-Mexico border in the
aftermath of the U.S.-Mexico War, particularly in Arizona, Sonora, and Chihuahua. In
addition to being located far from major metropolitan centers – and in many cases, far
from easy transportation hubs or even roads or rails -- these mining operation also
frequently shared investors, technical experts, and even work crews. While some
Americans who sought wealth in these newly publicized mineral districts were
independent prospectors, the majority were involved in mining and speculation
2

James D. Hague to Ellsworth Daggett, Feb 9, 1886 – February 19, 1887, all M-12, JDH.
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James D. Hague to Ellsworth Daggett, February 19, 1887, M-12, JDH.
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companies, both small and large. The officers and founding members of these companies
were often men who had traveled through the region, either with the army or
independently, but the trustees and investors tended to be less experienced either in
mining or with the region. As a result, investors sought the advice of expert consultants
and knowledgeable men such as Hague and Daggett: mining engineers whom they could
employ in the field.
This dissertation traces the social and professional world of mining engineers in
the border region between the southwestern United States and northern Mexico through
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, an era in which both the industry of
mining and the field of mine engineering expanded and bureaucratized rapidly. Focusing
on mining operations in the southwestern U.S. and in northern Mexico, I highlight the
role of mining engineers in the expansion and corporatization of U.S. industrial and
economic influence across the continental United States and into Mexico. Mining
engineers were instrumental in creating and supporting a vision of the American
industrial landscape as a quantifiable exploitable space, readily managed by a cohort of
well-trained technological elites: a technocratic landscape.4
The expertise of mining engineers was the key to success in the mining industry.
In the transnational space of the U.S.-Mexico borderlands in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, mining engineers were the critical technologists responsible for
drawing private investment capital into a region that was distant from the metropolitan
finance capitals of New York and San Francisco, and relatively inaccessible by road or

4

John G. Gunnell, “The Technocratic Image and the Theory of Technocracy,”
Technology and Culture 23:3 (July 1982): 392-416.
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rail, even by the standards of the times.5 Mining engineers were usually the most highly
educated people working in the minerals industry. Prior to making a mining deal,
speculators, financiers, and company bosses relied on mining engineers to make accurate
surveys and estimates of the value of selected ore bodies. After purchase, mining
engineers drew up operating plans; mapped the underground works; selected and
installed machinery; and, if they were talented and/or lucky, did all of this within a
budget that ensured a return on a company’s investment.6 Analyzing the professional
5

The historiography of the extension and integration of the infrastructure of the United

States in the 19th century is long, so I will be brief: critical classic works include Alfred
Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business,
(Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1977) and Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order, 18771920, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967). Howard Lamar, The Far Southwest, 18461912: A Territorial History, Rev. ed., (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press,
2000); William G. Robbins, Colony and Empire: The Capitalist Transformation of the
American West, (Lawrence: Kansas University Press, 1994) offer concise analyses of the
way these changes effected the southwestern United States. More recently, Rachel St.
John, Line in the Sand: A History of the Western U.S.-Mexico Border, (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2011), and Samuel Truett, Fugitive Landscapes: The
Forgotten History of the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands, (New Haven: Yale University Press,
2008) extend the narrative by considering how these changes play out on both sides of
the Mexican border.
6

Clark Spence, Mining Engineers and the American West: The Lace-Boot Brigade,

(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970); Kathleen Ochs, “The Rise of American
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practice and rhetorical strategies of mining engineers in the U.S.-Mexico borderlands
throughout the period of 1860-1920 illuminates how decisions regarding the investment
of private American capital were made during a period notable for the rapid expansion of
the U.S. economy and the westward movement of large numbers of American citizens.
The correspondence between James Hague and Ellsworth Daggett concerning the
Cusihuiriachic Mining Company illustrates two of the most common types of work
undertaken by mining engineers in the late nineteenth century: field management
(Daggett) and consultation (Hague). Their roles speak to their relative prominence within
the profession. Hague was one of the earliest generation of German-educated American
mining engineers to seek a career in the mining fields of the western US and northern
Mexico. He was also a financier and investor in his own right, and went on to

Mining Engineers: A Case Study of the Colorado School of Mines,” Technology and
Culture 33:2 (April 1992): 278-301; Eda Kranakis, “Social Determinants of Engineering
Practice: A Comparative View of France and America in the Nineteenth Century,” Social
Studies of Science 19:1 (February 1989): 5-70; Eric Nystrom, Learning to See: Visual
Tools in American Mining Engineering, 1860-1920, (Baltimore: Ph.D. Dissertation, The
Johns Hopkins University, 2007). Tim LeCain, Mass Destruction: The Men and Giant
Mines that Wired America and Scarred the Planet, (New Brunswick: Rutgers University
Press, 2009); Jeremy Mouat and Logan Hovis, “Miners, Engineers, and the
Transformation of Work in the Western Mining Industry, 1880-1930” Technology and
Culture 37:3 (July 1996): 429-456.
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phenomenal success running a large mine at Grass Valley in northern California.7
Daggett, a few years younger than Hague, was trained at the Sheffield Scientific School
in New Haven, Connecticut, and worked during his career in a variety of mines
throughout Mexico and the southwestern U.S.8 Hague was in a general sense an
overseer, engaging in lengthy conversations and correspondence with the principal
investors in the property as the chief technical advisor, his knowledge gained from his
own initial survey of the property and his extensive correspondence with Daggett.
Daggett, armed with information from Hague as to the financial situation of the company,
the attitude of the investors, and guidance over his budget, had a relatively free hand in
how he handled the day-to-day operation of the mines, determining which mines to focus
on; assessing technological needs; and overseeing the hiring and firing of labor. Between
them, Hague and Daggett made virtually all the significant decisions at the mine, from
choosing the site of initial investment (Hague) to devising a plan of operations (Hague
and Daggett) to overseeing labor, choosing equipment and bringing it in (Daggett), and
determining where and how profits could be made (Hague and Daggett). Mining
engineers were the most influential workers managing the expansion of capital into the
borderlands.

7

Rodman Paul, ed., A Victorian Gentlewoman in the Far West: The Reminiscences of

Mary Halleck Foote, (San Marino: Huntington Library, 1972), 36, 362, 372-384.
8

“Preliminary Roll of the Sheffield Scientific School, 1846-1869,” Sheffield Scientific

School, Yale University, Records (RU 819). Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University
Library.
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Between 1881 and 1901 copper production in the Arizona Territory expanded
from an annual output of 10,000 tons to an annual output of 1.3 million tons.9 The work
of engineers explicitly supported the interests of capital, generally personified by investor
groups and Boards of Directors. They also directly oversaw workers; had a much better
idea of labor conditions at the mine than other workers in the management hierarchy; and
were responsible for the purchase of industrial equipment and the training of workers to
run it. By the twentieth century, mining engineers at the larger mining companies along
the border – the Cananea Consolidated Copper Company, Phelps Dodge, Arizona Copper
– were among the chief proponents, and in some cases the orchestrators, of both the
segregationist and paternalistic policies that became important features towns dominated
by the mining industry, such as Bisbee or Morenci in Arizona, or Nacozari, in Sonora.10
That mining engineers, whose training and expertise equipped them to be technical
9

Historical Statistics of the United States, Table DB73-78, Millenial Edition online.

10

On company towns, and the impact southwestern mining companies on towns that

weren’t formally-planned “company towns, see: Duane Smith, Rocky Mountain Mining
Camps: The Urban Frontier, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1973); John S.
Garner, ed., The Company Town: Architecture and Society in the Early Industrial Age,
(New York: Oxford, 1992); Linda Gordon, The Great Arizona Orphan Abduction,
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 172-185; Monica Perales, Smeltertown:
Making and Remembering a Southwest Border Community, (Chapel Hill: UNC Press,
2010); Katherine Benton-Cohen, Borderline Americans: Racial Division and Labor War
in the Arizona Borderlands, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), 106-108;
Truett, Fugitive Landscapes, 106-108.
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consultants, were ultimately responsible for making decisions in all the varied aspects of
mine management is crucial to understanding the development of the mining industry
through the transnational region of the U.S.-Mexico border.
The breadth of activities in which mining engineers engaged was recognized by
the nascent engineering industry as a whole. When the first engineering societies were
founded in the United States, the American Institute of Mining Engineers was remarkable
for being fairly open in its membership.11 The mining engineers were happy to welcome
capitalists and financiers to their conferences, possibly because it was helpful for mining
engineers if their employers understood their work better. More likely the AIME’s
policies were an acknowledgment that mining engineers had to be closely attuned to the
desires of their financiers. Mine engineering requires money; ergo, mining engineers
believed that money men should be intimately involved in the business of mining
engineers.
The ability to tell wealthy financiers and mine owners that their investments were
no going to pay out was a key aspect of the work of mining engineers, especially in the
early years of the profession. In addition to hotly discussed codes of ethics, mining
engineers relied on an important self-identified characteristic of their professional
identity: their institutionalized and somewhat romantic belief that they were self-reliant,
practical men whose job was to speak plainly and directly at all times. Throughout the
late nineteenth and early twentieth century, many aspects of mine engineering changed,
including the credentialing process for joining the profession, the job trajectory of an
11

Edwin Layton, The Revolt of the Engineers: Social Responsibility and the American

Engineering Profession, (Cleveland: Case Western, 1971) 29.
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individual engineer, the university training necessary for becoming an engineer, and
many, if not most, features of the work itself. The professional identity of mining
engineers, however, remained remarkably constant over more than a half-century of
significant industrial change and the transformation of the borderlands region both
physically and economically.12 At the same time that they were captured into corporate
bureaucracies and implicated in corporate influence, they continued to see themselves as
rugged, independent individualists.
For mining engineers in the southwest and northern Mexico, the role of mediating
between capital and labor was animated by factors specific to the region that their
professional colleagues in the north did not have to contend with to the same extent. An
12

As Ruth Oldenziel clearly demonstrates, linking engineering to traits considered

masculine in the 19th century, such as common-sense and physical coordination, was a
key component of the professionalization of the field as a whole. Ruth Oldenziel, Making
Technology Masculine: Men, Women, and Modern Machines in America, 1870-1945,
(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1999), 10-12. Where mine engineering
departs from the norm of the engineering profession is in this emphasis on the romance
of mining. That working on a mine was an adventure, rather than a job, is a belief that
mining engineers embraced wholeheartedly, and that colored their subject-position within
the nascent corporatization of the mining industry to a remarkable extent. On changes to
the industrial system of the United States see David Hounshell, From the American
System to Mass Production: The Development of Manufacturing Technology in the
United States, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1984), and David Noble, America by Design:
Science, Technology, and the Rise of Corporate Capitalism, (NY: Knopf, 1977).

10

overarching concern was distance. It was more difficult to transport equipment in, and
bullion out, of southern Arizona or Chihuahua in the 1860s and 1870s than it was to
transport silver bullion out of Colorado or Nevada. The distance from rail lines and the
expense of building rails into the desert; the lack of locally sourced water and fuel to
power pumps, mills, and smelters; the challenge of recruiting American workers to such
distant (and frequently climactically inhospitable) locales were tremendous difficulties
that slowed or undermined development of many otherwise promising mining
opportunities. For mining engineers working in Mexico, an added concern was tariff law.
Even if mining could be profitably carried on in Mexico, and bullion could be shipped
out with relatively little expense, would all profits be lost in taxes at the U.S. border? If
so, would the cost of shipping bullion to London or Paris worthwhile? This was an issue
for Daggett and Hague in their work at the Cusihuiriachic Mining Company; although
ultimately they abandoned that project for other reasons, U.S. tariff laws were of major
concern to the two engineers.
An additional, and for some engineers, overarching difficulty faced in mining
through the U.S. – Mexico border region was that of culture. Some mining engineers
viewed the opportunity to work in Mexico or the southwestern territories of the U.S. as a
tremendous adventure. Such men embraced the foreignness of their surroundings, and
were tolerant of, or intrigued by, the linguistic and cultural divisions between themselves
and the average mine worker. The ability to speak Spanish was obviously a crucial
dividing line between mining engineers who loved the borderlands and those who loathed
it, but language skills were rarely a prerequisite for being hired as a mining engineer in
the region, and many mining engineers were happy to learn enough Spanish on the job to

11

be able to communicate effectively with their foremen and local dignitaries. Others
chose to presume that they did not need to learn anything of local society, and permitted
their racial and cultural biases to control their interactions with mine workers.13 Not all
workers at these mines were Mexican or Mexican-American, of course. By the turn of
the century Arizona had large populations of European immigrant miners, and towns
such as Bisbee, AZ, were known as “white-man’s camps,” in which only white AngloEuropean workers were hired for the more lucrative underground positions.14 Mexicans,
Mexican-Americans, and Chinese employees of mining companies stayed above-ground
shoveling ore; doing laundry; and cooking.
The racial and ethnic diversity of the labor force was a defining characteristic of
working life in the mining districts surrounding the U.S.-Mexico border. An additional
characteristic of working life was the migratory nature of the labor force. There was
tremendous turnover among underground workers in mining camps throughout the
region.15 Mining engineers themselves were also extremely transient. Almost by
13

Jonathan C. Brown, “Foreign and Native Born Workers in Porfirian Mexico,”

American Historical Review 98:3 (June 1993): 798 - 801; Joseph F Park, The History of
Mexican Labor in Arizona During the Territorial Period, (MS thesis, Univesity of
Arizona, 1961), 40.
14

Huginnie, “’Strikitos!’: Race, Class, and Work in the Arizona Copper Industry, 1870-

1920,” (New Haven: Ph.D. Dissertation, Yale University, 1991). 44-60; Benton-Cohen,
Borderline Americans, 81-85.
15

Juan Gomez-Quiñones, Mexican American Labor, 1790-1990, (Albuquerque: UNM

Press, 1994), 44; Sarah Deutsch, No Separate Refuge: Culture, Class, and Gender on an

12

definition, their work was peripatetic, taking them from one company to another, and
from one mining site to another on a regular basis. Engineers crossed state, territorial,
and national lines with alacrity, pursuing the most interesting or most lucrative work they
could find.
Another feature of the work of mining engineers that remained relatively constant
through the late-19th and early 20th centuries was that mining engineers consistently
functioned as the on-the-ground voices of the business interests of mining companies.
Field work was the great draw of mining engineering, but it could be uncomfortable, and
occasionally dangerous, for mining engineers. In most cases, mines operated far from
company headquarters, and mining engineers were themselves unprotected from the
results of their edicts – a significant issue as industrialization in mining led to
increasingly antagonistic relations between miners and management. Indeed, some
scholars have accused mining engineers of using their technical expertise as a weapon in
the war of management against labor; while this interpretation goes too far in attributing
malevolent intentions to mining engineers, it is important to acknowledge that mining
engineers were not, on the whole, overly concerned with the plight of laborers. Indeed, it
is striking how infrequently mining engineers refer to labor unrest or to union organizing,
even during the incredibly violent labor upheavals of the early 20th century.16
Anglo-Hispanic Frontier in the American Southwest, 1880-1940, (New York: Oxford,
1987), 18-20, 88-90.
16

A. Yvette Hugginie, “A New Hero Comes to Town: The Anglo Mining Engineer and

‘Mexican Labor’ as Contested Terrain in Southeastern Arizona, 1880-1920,” New Mexico
Historical Review 1994 69(4): 323-344. On southwestern labor history, see James Byrkit,
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Although mining engineering identity remained remarkably static through the
decades following the U.S.-Mexico War, the quotidian details of life as a working mining
engineer changed dramatically. In the mid-nineteenth century, as American interest in
borderlands mining operations began, mining engineers were primarily hired as
surveyors. Working alone, or with one or two assistants, they were dispatched to likely
locations by investors, where they made both surface and subterranean surveys of ore
bodies, sketching for their employers rough maps and mining plans. Depending on the
financial situation of the mine owner or investors, the mining engineer might remain on
sight as a technical expert, but was rarely given the responsibility of full management of
the mine. Over the next several decades, this changed. In part, these changes were due
to the increasing importance of copper mining in the economies of the border states and
territories. Copper mining did not begin in earnest in the borderlands until the mid1870s, but with the advent of electricity, copper quickly became one of the most
important industrial products in the United States. In the Arizona Territory, the impact of
the copper industry was particularly profound. From 1880 onwards, the production of
copper accounted for approximately 20% of the economic production of the territory; by
1900, this comprised 50% of the copper produced in the United States, and the
neighboring Mexican state of Sonora contained several large copper mines in locations
such as Cananea and Nacozari.17 The emphasis on copper shaped mining practices in the
Forging the Copper Collar: Arizona’s Labor-Management War of 1901-1921, (Tucson:
University of Arizona Press, 1982).
17

Historical Statistics of the United States, Table DB73-78, Millenial Edition online;

Charles K. Hyde, Copper for America: The United States Copper Industry from Colonial
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border region in part because of the high demand for copper in the United States, but also
because of the nature of the copper deposits. Unlike the pure native ore found in the
Lake Superior copper district, in Michigan, copper deposits in the Rockies and southwest
contained much lower grades of ore. Keeping up with demand required the adoption of
new mining practices – it was not possible for a miner to simply follow the vein of ore, if
there was no vein of ore to follow. Rather, copper ore and the quartz in which it was
embedded had to be removed from the ground together, and then treated extensively
before it could be shipped to market. The systems devised by mining engineers to
accomplish this task changed the structure of working life in mining camps, in effect
turning mining into an industry based on what historian Tim LeCain has labeled “mass
destruction” – the use of heavy technology and unskilled labor to dismantle a landscape
on a massive scale in the production of metals.18 These new techniques had a profound
effect on the working lives of mining engineers themselves.19
Times to the 1990s, (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1998), 127; Marvin Bernstein,
The Mexican Mining Industry, 1890-1950, (Albany: SUNY Press, 1967), 72-73; David T.
Day, Mineral Resources of the United States [1902], (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1904), 164-166.
18

LeCain, Mass Destruction, 7-11.

19

Many labor histories relating to mining focus on technological change either implicitly

or explicitly as the triggers for the violent industrial actions of the IWW and the WFM of
the 1890s and early 1900s. Scholarship that explicitly considered the role of
technological change in labor relations include Mark Wyman, Hard Rock Epic: Western
Miners and the Industrial Revolution, 1860-1910, (Berkeley: University of California

15

The dissertation is organized in a rough chronology to delineate the tension
between the change in engineering practice and the stability of certain aspects of mining
engineers’ professional identity over the course of more than a half century of dramatic
expansion in the mining industry. Mid-nineteenth century mining engineers were
members of an elite class of European-educated men from prosperous eastern
backgrounds. By the early twentieth century, the establishment of systematic engineering
education democratized the profession a substantial amount, and the growth of corporate
mining eliminated much of the autonomy characteristic of mine engineering in the early
decades. Despite these changes, mining engineers remained wedded to the notion that
their profession rewarded its members with professional lives distinguished by selfPress, 1989), esp. ch. 4; Ronald Brown, Hard Rock Miners: The Intermountain West,
1860-1920, (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1979), ch 5; Larry D.
Lankton and Jack K. Martin, “Technological Advance, Organizational Structure, and
Underground Fatalities in the Upper Michigan Copper Mines, 1860-1929,” Technology
and Culture 28:1 (January 1989): 43-45; Mouat and Hovis, “Mining Engineers”;
Huginnie, “’Strikitos!’” Studies of the mining labor force that emphasize social and
political issues over technological change include Elizabeth Jameson, All that Glitters:
Class, Conflict, and Community in Cripple Creek, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press,
1998); David R. Berman, Radicalism in the Mountain West 1890-1920: Socialists,
Populists, Miners, and Wobblies, (Denver: University Press of Colorado, 2007), BentonCohen, Borderline Americans; Richard Lingenfelter, The Hardrock Miners: A History of
the Mining Labor Movement in the American West, 1863-1893, (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1974).
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reliance, a professional identity increasingly at odds with the quotidien reality of mine
engineering.
In focusing on the professional identity of mining engineers and the scope of their
workplace obligations, this dissertation breaks with earlier studies of mining engineers,
the most significant of which is Clark Spence’s Mining Engineers and the American
West, 1870-1930: The Lace Boot Brigade, Spence provides a deeply researched group
portrait of mining engineers as a privileged social elite who brought their superior
training and intellect to the problem of building a modern America. Spence admires his
subjects for their sweeping technical vision and their tremendous (in general) business
acumen. Yet he does not take the larger context of their work into consideration. Mining
Engineers never questions that his subjects were changing the world for the better, and it
never asks if they were affected by the extraordinary revolution in mining methods that
were pioneered around the turn of the century. A central narrative of this dissertation, by
contrast, is how the profession of mine engineering developed through the nineteenth
century and changed into the twentieth. By locating mining engineers squarely within the
class structure of the nineteenth century United States, I consider how mining engineers
were able to gravitate between the drawing rooms of New York and San Francisco and
the mining camps of Arizona. How did they negotiate their status among their social
peers? How was this different (or not) at a mining camp? Mining engineers passed
between different social worlds frequently, sometimes within the course of a single day
as they moved between the home, office, and mine. How did they create and maintain
authority in these different places?
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In focusing on the professional identity of mining engineers and the scope of their
workplace obligations, this dissertation breaks with earlier studies of mining engineers,
the most significant of which is Clark Spence’s Mining Engineers and the American
West, 1870-1930: The Lace Boot Brigade. In this work, Spence provides a deeply
researched group portrait of mining engineers as a privileged social elite who brought
their superior training and intellect to the problem of building a modern America. Spence
admires his subjects for their sweeping technical vision and their tremendous (in general)
business acumen. Yet he does not take the larger context of their work into
consideration. Mining Engineers never questions that his subjects were changing the
world for the better, and it never asks if they were affected by the extraordinary
revolution in mining methods that were pioneered around the turn of the century. A
central narrative of this dissertation, by contrast, is how the profession of mine
engineering developed through the nineteenth century and changed into the twentieth. By
locating mining engineers squarely within the class structure of the nineteenth century
United States, I consider how mining engineers were able to gravitate between the
drawing rooms of New York and San Francisco and the mining camps of Arizona. How
did they negotiate their status among their social peers? How was this different (or not)
at a mining camp? Mining engineers passed between different social worlds frequently,
sometimes within the course of a single day as they moved between the home, office, and
mine. How did they create and maintain authority in these different places?
More recent studies that analyze the impact of mining engineers on the industry
and landscape of the North American West take a different approach from that of Spence.
Where Spence looked at mining engineers and only at mining engineers, these newer
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accounts tend to subordinate the history of the profession to considerations of the labor or
environmental history of the mining industry. Whether the focus of the study is labor
relations or the mining landscape, these newer studies tend to characterize mining
engineers as heartless industrialists and the chief orchestrators of the devastation of local
ecosystems. Scholars such as A. Yvette Huginnie and Tim LeCain raise concerns about
work of mining engineers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, calling into
question their self-aggrandizing narrative of industrial progress, and asking why the
short-term goal of ever-more-efficient resource extraction was privileged over the welfare
of workers or the future environmental viability of a mining landscape. Mining engineers
were products of a very particularist training, and their reactions to workplace problems,
be they fraudulent mining claims or recalcitrant workers, were informed by their training.
My dissertation seeks to understand what motivated their drive to rationalize and
dissassemble the landscape. Further, I ask how mining engineers themselves deployed
different identities – varied notions of masculinity, or class, for instance -- while
attempting to accomplish their work. By explicitly integrating considerations of gender,
ethnic, and class status into my analysis of mine engineering work, a more nuanced
portrait of life in a mining camp can be constructed.
Geographically, this study of mining engineers focuses on those who
worked in the many and varied mining districts surrounding the U.S.-Mexico border in
Arizona and New Mexico and below. The most compelling reason to study the mining
districts of the borderlands area as a discrete unit is that the mining engineers themselves
treated the area as a unified locale. This is in part because of the geological coherence of
the region. Having worked at one area mine, a mining engineer could reasonably argue
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that he had solid knowledge of the local ores and he could readily obtain a position at a
neighboring mine. In consequence, many engineers who traveled to the region when
young often continued working in the region for much of their careers. In addition, the
comparative isolation of the borderlands as compared to mining territories in Colorado or
California served to designate this transnational space as a distinctive mining region.
Such isolation, particularly in the nineteenth century, discouraged frequent travel, and so
mining engineers were compelled to take advantage of their sometimes brief stays in the
territory by circulating through neighboring mining districts to study local conditions and
mining practices. It was rare for a mining engineer who traveled to Sonora not to visit
mines in Arizona; engineers who traveled to Arizona were likely to make side trips down
into Chihuahua.
By the 1880s political and technological changes served to knit the region more
closely together, despite the international boundary line. As president of Mexico,
Porfirio Diaz opened Mexico to international investment, and American dollars poured in
to Mexico frequently in the form of investment in Mexican mines. Mining engineers
passed easily and frequently across the border. Also in the 1880s, copper began to be
successfully mined along the southernmost edge of Arizona and the northernmost edge of
Sonora. As the market for copper wire boomed with the coming of electricity in the
1890s, the borderlands region took shape in the minds of mining engineers as a coherent
geological landscape. As the engineers moved through the region, they brought with
them the rationale and capital resources for building the roads and rails that quite literally
tied the region together. A geographically bounded study of mining engineers in the
southwestern U.S. and Mexico highlights the international reach of the monied interests

20

for whom mining engineers worked, while underscoring the complex work mining
engineers did negotiating between home and work, and investor and mine.
Chapter one discusses the work of those mining companies that brought the
earliest mining engineers into the region, arguing that American companies wanting to
engage in resource extraction in the region were hampered more by logistical difficulties
than by their lack of mining expertise, and so when they hired mining engineers, they did
so for reasons of class-consciousness and class-solidarity rather than for the specialized
knowledge these men could bring to the region. Chapter two discusses the growth of the
profession of mine engineering alongside the establishment of domestic engineering
academies in the 1860s and 1870s. Chapter three explores new assertions of expertise on
the part of mining engineers facing issues of fraud, mine viability, and mine operations. I
argue that mining engineers’ access to a body of technical knowledge as experts did not
supplant previous modes of technical credibility, such as the apprentice system or
networks of familial and social relations, but rather made for a ‘third way’ to assert
credibility. Moreover, while access to a body of technical knowledge served to bolster
engineers’ authority with respect to claims of mine viability and fraud, it was used also to
undercut engineers’ authority with respect to mine and labor management. Chapter four
analyzes the deployment of masculine and western identities by mining engineers in
borderlands mines. Chapter five considers the development of mass-mining and the
influence of large corporations like Phelps Dodge through the borderlands, which, while
fundamentally restructuring the physical landscape of mining, altered the “landscape” of
the mine engineering profession in the borderlands as more mining engineers were
needed by each company to work in massively sprawling mine sites, and yet each mining
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engineer had significantly less impact on the work undertaken. Chapter six discusses the
role of mining engineers in the so-called “development companies” – in particular the
Guggenheim Exploration Company – that operated in the southwest and northern Mexico
in the early decades of the twentieth century. These companies, by formalizing what had
previously been ad hoc, were instrumental in binding together the mineral-rich landscape
of the borderlands into a technocratic machine feeding private American commerce.
Throughout this period, the expansion of American capital into the U.S.-Mexico
borderlands was inextricably bound up with the emergence and changing role of a new
class of technical professional: the mining engineer.
In analyzing the role of mining engineers in this region and at this time I draw
upon several discrete strands of scholarship. Regional studies and the new transnational
“borderlands” studies have guided me in locating the peregrinations of mining engineers
in space. The vast literature on the labor, ethnic and social history of the southwestern
borderlands has been another critical resource. The history of mining, mining labor, and
mining technology can be usefully juxtaposed to scholarship in the history of technology
and the new ‘envirotech’ literatures. Crucially, in order to place mining engineers within
their social and cultural context, I have also drawn on important recent diplomatic
histories that link the politics of gender to that of the expanding U.S. sphere of influence
in the late 19th and early twentieth centuries. What emerges is a complex group portrait
of a critical professional class working amid and enabling the rapid industrial dynamism
and social and economic expansion of the United States into the borderlands region.
Mining engineers made decisions about the allocation of capital and human resources,
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reshaping not only a critical industry but also the economic, social, and physical
landscape of an entire region into the 20th century.
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Chapter One
Early Mining in the Borderlands:
The Limits of “Intelligence and Capital,” 1850-1865

“The simple truth is, that the soil of nearly all North America is more or less
impregnated with gold… In Arizona and Sonora it is known to abound. In Mexico, it
would have been a principal article of export but for the greater plenty of silver.”20 This
statement from Harpers Weekly in 1858 was not out of step with what was commonly
printed about the mineral wealth of western North America in the years following the
California Gold Rush. Reports of the fabulous wealth unearthed in California were
commonplace to readers of papers in New York or Chicago. Thus when reports of other
sites of mining wealth began to circulate – whether of the Comstock Lode in 1859, or
Pike’s Peak a couple years later – the American public was primed to accept these
reports, and speculators and entrepreneurs prepared to take action to reap the benefits of
the alleged natural wealth of the continent. American fortune-seekers who traveled to
Nevada or Colorado did so in company with thousands of their fellow-men.
But through the 1850s and 1860s, some Americans took a less well-traveled path
down to the newly mapped U.S.-Mexico border region. The Arizona Territory, and the
states of Sonora and Chihuahua in Mexico, were all known to have several mining
districts. As independent prospectors, speculators, and members of joint-stock
companies, Americans hastened south to try to capitalize on the promise of the territory.
They were not particularly successful, but the experiences of these early American
20
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prospectors were of tremendous importance to those who came later. Early prospectors
popularized the region as a destination for adventurers, and provided information about
what might be needed to establish successful local mining operations.
The Americans who traveled to the borderlands in the 1850s and 1860s were a
disparate group. Some came west from the more populous states of the U.S. Others,
particularly in the early 1850s, traveled southeast from the gold mining districts of
northern California. For many of these erstwhile forty-niners, the Gold Rush had been a
time of thwarted dreams. The expense and difficulty of reaching California meant that by
the time would-be miners arrived in San Francisco, they had very little money, and even
less interest in the tedium of panning for gold. Lacking immediate success, many
migrants who had the means to leave did so – Americans, Mexicans, and other foreign
nationals, who left in particularly large numbers following the passage of the Foreign
Miner’s Tax in 1850. This charge of $20 per month for non-Anglo miners to run a placer
mining operation led many Sonoran gold seekers, in particular, to head home from the
California mines. Some were sidetracked by silver mines in the New Mexico Territory,
but many more headed back into Sonora or Chihuahua, embracing the opportunity to
return home while trying their luck prospecting in established mining districts near
Hermosillo or Alamos. Sonoran natives were joined in their return home by American
fortune hunters, drawn by stories of the mineral wealth of Mexico and by the promise of
easy travel and the economic integration of Sonora and Arizona.21 Not all miners in the
21
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gold and silver districts of Sonora, Arizona, and Chihuahua came via California.
Contemporary reports counted upwards of 1000 men who left Alamos and Hermosillo, in
Sonora, for the territory of the Gadsden Purchase.22 This strip of land across southern
Arizona was acquired by the United States from Mexico in 1854 in hopes that it would
prove to be good land for a transcontinental railroad. That there was gold and silver in the
mountains near Tubac and Tucson was an added bonus American legislators did not
anticipate.
Upon reaching the mining districts in the new borderlands, prospectors found a
series of overlapping ethnic, national, and political groups operating throughout the
territory. Although the most recent major political disruptions in the area were the
annexation of the New Mexico Territory and the Gadsden Purchase by the United States,
the relative absence of the U.S. military in the aftermath of the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo meant that relations between the newly American territories and the northern
Mexican states were fairly amicable; indeed the border between the U.S. and Mexico was
almost fully permeable at this time. It was scarcely marked through the Sonoran and
“Sonora: The Making of a Border Society, 1880-1910,” Journal of the Southwest: 435436. The political integration of Sonora and Arizona was occasionally a topic of
discussion in American politics. See for instance Amy Greenberg, Manifest Manhood
and the Antebellum American Empire, (New York: Cambridge, 1995), ch. 1; Ernest May,
The Southern Dream of a Caribbean Empire, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana University Press,
1973), esp. ch. 6; John Douglas Pitts Fuller, The Movement for the Acquisition of All
Mexico, 1846-48, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1936).
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Chihuahuan deserts, and law-abiding citizens of both countries crossed with ease, while
bandits and less-than-principled characters exploited the agreements that prevented
American soldiers from chasing them into Mexico, and Mexican authorities from
pursuing them into the U.S. The ease of border crossing meant that American prospectors
seeking mining opportunities were as likely to head south of border as to stay to the
north. Whether in the U.S. or northern Mexico, they found that federal authorities had
little to do with local affairs—a condition greatly exacerbated in U.S. territory by the
advent of the Civil War in 1860—and prospectors discovered that they were at the mercy
of more local concerns.
The two nation-states were not the only political entities with which gold- and
silver- seekers had to contend. The new borderlands were also home to several native
tribes, including some who maintained generally peaceable relations with Sonoran and
American authorities, such as the Akimel O’odham (known to contemporary Americans
as the Pima), who occupied the Gila River basin north of Tucson; the Tohono O’odham
(known to contemporary Americans as the Papago), who traveled through a broad swathe
of land on either side of the Santa Cruz River, encompassing the old presidios of Tucson,
Tubac, and Tumacacori and crossing the new international boundary line; and, farther
south, the Yaqui. The presence of these and other native tribes did not prevent
Americans from sometimes referring to the area along the border between present-day
Arizona and Sonora as Apachería or Apache-land, in reference to the people with the
strongest military presence in the region. Most Mexican and American citizens were
ignorant of the existence of multiple Apache tribes, and, indeed, many white travelers to
the borderlands made a habit of calling any native person who made them slightly
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nervous “Apache.”23 Travelers’ reports from Arizona and Sonora, in particular, focus on
the military threat of the Apache, and to the extent that the United States maintained a
military presence in and around Tucson in the 1850s it was to combat Apache claims on
new American territory and property.
Local political conditions in mining camps in the borderlands region were further
complicated by endemic civil unrest throughout the state of Sonora in the 1850s and
1860s. Occasional Apache raids were only the start of the problem for Sonoran miners.
The actions of American filibusters, private U.S. citizens who marched armies of
mercenaries into the state in a bid to claim it for the United States via conquest, made
native Sonorans cautious of the yanqui newcomers, although most prospectors who
settled into mining communities near the new international boundary line had little
interest in the actions of the filibusters except as they disrupted work on mining
projects.24 In addition to invasions by American soldiers of fortune, during the 1850s and
1860s Sonora also endured a more successful foreign occupation, this one by French
forces. As the French had some interest in the supposed wealth of the silver mines of
Sonora, the state experienced an extended occupation. The governor of Sonora,
meanwhile, fled north of the border into Arizona while French forces, allied with the
23
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Yaqui and Mayo tribes, assaulted the population. This uneasy state of affairs did not
settle down until the late 1860s, when a weakened French army was finally pushed out of
Sonora.25
In the midst of all this political and military turmoil, prospectors and miners still
flocked into a region renowned for the wealth of its mines. Following the tradition of
California mining, many of these miners were independent prospectors. During the
California Gold Rush, placer mining, in which a miner caught flakes of gold or silver in a
wash pan as they flowed downstream from a higher location (the elusive “mother lode”)
was the norm. Placer mining requires almost no capital outlay besides a pan and a sieve;
one man working alone is as likely to find a nugget of value as are a group of men
working with a marginally more complex trough or sluicing system. In the arid
Southwest, however, there were few active placer mines in the 1850s.26
Many of the larger ore deposits in the borderlands were silver rather than gold,
and much of this silver ore was found embedded in quartz rather than washed down into
streams, and so the riverine mining experience of many California gold seekers did not
help them much once they reached the mining districts of Chihuahua, Sonora or present25
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day Arizona. Those newcomers who mastered different mining techniques, however,
were vocal in their endorsement of the local mineral wealth. One mining engineer,
pleased by the encouraging assays his silver samples from Batopilas received in San
Francisco, remarked that “the more I have become acquainted with the California mining,
the better I am satisfied with the value of the Mexican.”27 Rich gold and silver manifested
in the region in narrow veins of almost pure ore, making it relatively simple to extract
with a pickaxe and a shovel. Although Americans used words such as “inexpert,”
“minor,” and “desultory” to describe ongoing mining projects that they saw, local
practices included a great deal of active mining, following the practices the Spanish had
brought with them to North America in the sixteenth century. Mining was not the largest
industry in the borderlands, but it occupied an important place in the local economy, with
many people working occasional claims, or hiring out as skilled labor at the larger mines.
Such mines rarely used the wood timbering practices that were common at underground
mines in the United States and Europe; rather, ore was left in situ as pillars to prevent the
roof of the mine collapsing. Smelting and processing techniques first used by the Spanish
and still widely practiced were labor- but not capital-intensive, and enabled small-time
producers to work even refractory ores (those that manifested in concert with other
minerals rather than as pure veins) with some small success. If a prospector hit a good
strike, local knowledge of how to build an arrastra or implement the patio method was
readily available and inexpensive to acquire, if a person were so inclined.28 There were
27
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ample experienced Mexican and “friendly” natives, members of the Papago, Ópata, and
Yaqui tribes, who could be hired to work in a promising mine.29 Some Americans,
however, were uninterested in gaining from local experience. As newcomer John Denton
Hall fumed, “it was impossible… to give satisfaction” to such men. “Many a poor devil
of a Mexican miner, on giving a correct assay... and report of a mine, has been belied and
abused as an ignoramus... from the simple fact that he has not satisfied by lying, the hope
of his much more ignorant employer.”30
Sonora

was a slightly acidic surface of stones onto which roasted ores were dropped. A team of
mules then dragged a heavy weight around the circle as a slow trickle of water dripped
onto the crushing surface, mashing the ores into a slurry. The slurry dropped through the
stone sieve and was retrieved from the clay base for further processing. Otis Young,
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The career of John Denton Hall exemplifies in many ways the experiences of the
new settlers in the border territories. An Englishman who met with “indifferent success”
in the gold fields of California, Hall accepted the invitation of a Mexican friend he met in
California to try his luck mining silver in Sonora.31 For the next fifteen years, Hall
engaged in a series of unsuccessful mining operations, both in Sonora and in southern
Arizona. Hall’s memoir, Travels and Adventures in Sonora, offers a notably detailed
depiction of the experience of mining silver in the borderlands in the mid-nineteenth
century for a certain kind of white foreigner. Like many Americans who traveled from
California to Sonora, Hall had no connections to New York investment money, and was
constantly struggling to raise capital. Unlike many other white men who traveled to the
region, Hall became remarkably attached to the region during his residency, experiencing
the borderlands as an interesting, if not always comfortable, place to live his life, rather
than simply as an exotic background for an adventurous youth. In short, he seemed to like
it there.32
Hall was loquacious on the subject of Sonora’s mineral wealth. Indeed, he
announced in the preface to his memoir his intention to make it clear that the mines of
Sonora and Arizona were “safe investments for legitimate mining,” a truth Hall feared
was lost on the American public due to the machinations of “unprincipled speculators.”
Unfortunately for Hall’s stated purpose, the narrative that follows is notable for the
indifferent success it chronicles. Hall detailed not only his own failures, but those of other
31
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investors as well. In the spring of 1852, for instance, Hall began working at a gold mine
at El Cajon de Brisca; by “June 5th, 1852” he related, “we were to all intents and
purposes dead broke.” Later that summer, Hall and his enigmatically named American
friend, Mr. C., did some small-time “gold digging” nearby. Reading between the lines, it
is evident that what the two men did was camp out and live hand to mouth off what game
they could shoot. Tiring of this life, Hall and Mr. C. began working with a Mexicanowned silver mining company at the Santa Teresa de Jesus mines, just north of the
mineral district of Cucurpe, and about fifty miles from the U.S.-Mexico border south of
Tucson. “We were dubious as to the success of the speculation” Hall explained, “but
there was something so enticing about silver mining, that we accepted the offers made
[to] us.”33 Indeed, Hall returned to gold mining only two more times in the next fifteen
years, for ventures in which, needless to say, he did not turn a profit.
Following the failure of the Santa Teresa mining effort, Hall and Mr. C. decide to
strike out on their own again, independently working a mine close to Cucurpe. When this
enterprise also failed, Hall apprenticed himself to the new amalgamator at the Santa
Teresa mines, continuing to work in the district until 1855, when the company stopped
working and depopulated the mines. Hall next contracted to work the recently abandoned
mines with some workers supplied by the company; this mining attempt was also cut
short by a wave of violence, this time the civil war in Sonora. Hall’s workers were
drafted to fight for the government, and consequently left the mine. Frustrated by the
disruption of his speculations, Hall shifted his attention northward to Arizona, where he
entered into an unwritten contract with a man who claimed ties to investment money in
33
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New York. This project too failed miserably, and Hall returned to mining in Sonora.
Once again, Hall was disappointed; as he put it, “hopes apparently so well-founded have
all vanished like smoke before the wind.”34
In Travels and Adventures in Sonora, Hall described seventeen different mining
operations in Sonora and Arizona, active between 1850 and 1866, which were owned
whole or in part by foreign investors, the vast majority of whom were American. During
this period, many Americans were enticed south of the border by the loose legal strictures
on mining, and the willingness of eastern investors to be persuaded that Mexican mines
were far superior to the proven wealth of the mines of California. One contemporary of
Hall’s estimated that in the year 1860-61, as many as twelve fully financed American
companies began mining operations in Sonora alone.35 Of those operations in Sonora or
Arizona with which Hall himself was familiar, only three resulted in other than abject
failure: the Babicanora mines, operated as of 1864 by a French corporation; Sylvester
Mowry’s Patagonia mine in Arizona, at which operations were suspended at the start of
the U.S. Civil War; and Hall’s own small success with a mine located near the Santa
Teresa, circa 1863.36
John Denton Hall was a small-time operator, and his travails were probably
unknown to people outside his immediate circle. But the arc of his career in Sonora and
Arizona, from independent prospector, to prospecting with other people’s money, to
34
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working for larger mining companies is emblematic of the general trend in the
borderlands hard rock mining industry in the years before the U.S. Civil War. The
directors and investors in regional mining companies were acutely aware of the
difficulties posed by working in a region so distant from the economic center of
American society, but they and other observers sought to blame their failures on those
aspects of their industry more mutable than location. Sylvester Mowry, for instance,
blamed the workers, stating baldly, “the Mexican [miner] is poor, without energy, and too
lazy to trust to help himself.”37 Hall, who fancied himself a mining expert, saw a different
problem. He believed that “the great difficulty in working mines in Sonora and Arizona
to advantage, is the scarcity of scientific, practical miners; for this reason, parties are
diffident of investing in mines, fearful of losing both mine and money.”38 Although
Hall’s own story was one of failure, he clearly hoped that his experiences would inspire
investors with knowledge of mining and more financial resources to come into the region
to work in the mines. He was not the only person to think that the problems investors had
mining in the borderlands were due to a lack of “scientific, practical miners.” The NewYork Daily Times agreed, declaring in 1852 that “there are very rich silver mines in this
country [Mexico and New Mexico], but neither capital, enterprise, nor knowledge, to
work them.” 39
The Arizona Territory
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Assembling both knowledge and capital at a mine site in the borderlands proved
quite difficult in the 1850s and 1860s. Hall, for instance, was largely an auto-didact, and
once he learned how to work the ores in the region, he was never able to find real success
with the small amount of capital to which he had access. A handful of other operators,
however, were able to raise fairly substantial sums of cash, and to bring into the area
bona-fide mining professionals – engineers – to consult on and manage various mining
operations. Many of these larger businesses were founded as joint-stock companies,
overseen, sometimes loosely and sometimes tightly, by boards of trustees or investors
located east of the Mississippi. Beginning in the 1830s, industries requiring massive upfront capital investment, such as railroads, and later, mines, were almost exclusively
financed in the United States by sales of stock; that John Hall did not have the
connections, and therefore the access, to these sources of finance was a chief reason he
was unable to capitalize on the opportunities he had in Sonora. The advantage of the
joint-stock system for company managers was the relative ease with which large sums of
money could be raised. Using stocks to finance southwestern mines also brought the
mineral wealth of the territory to the attention of financiers, whose interest in the
borderlands through the late nineteenth century would become necessary as mining
entrepreneurs became railroad boosters seeking the large cash influx necessary to build
the regional infrastructure.40 Although stock was often sold in a manner similar to today,
with a public offering when a company was sold or incorporated, it was sometimes sold
piecemeal, as when the owners of the Gila Copper Mine decided in 1857 to sell a few
40
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shares in their company to raise quick cash so they could ship already-extracted ore out
of Arizona.41 Such ease in raising capital, however, came with the price of nominal
accountability to those shareholders for the success or failure of a company’s operation.42
With stockholders’ money, mining companies hoped to purchase the most advanced
mining and smelting technology available, as well as the experienced workers who could
successfully operate such equipment. Advertising the skill and credentials of staff
mining engineers became a crucial tool for managers and owners seeking to raise money.
The Heintzelman Mine
The Sonora Exploring & Mining Company, overseen by a board of trustees in
Cincinnati, was one of the most well-capitalized mining companies in the borderlands
region in the 1850s. Initially capitalized at over $2,000,000, a remarkably large sum at
the time, it seemingly had all the advantages that observers thought a successful
borderlands mining company needed: money, a property with substantial silver ore
holdings, and some of the top mining engineers working in North America.43 Yet the
inability of even this well-advised and well-financed company to pay dividends indicates
the hollowness of the standard analysis of mining, as expressed by Hall and others, that
success required simply money and knowledge. As one mining journal succinctly
summed up the belief: “[Mining] requires of those who pursue it a special education and
41
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experience, or the labor devoted to it may be fruitless… it is the offspring of intelligence
and capital.”44 As the history of the Sonora Exploring and Mining Company
demonstrates, this formulation, while logical, is not complete.
The Sonora Engineering and Mining Company. was founded by Charles Poston, a
regional booster responsible for lobbying Congress to separate the Arizona Territory
from New Mexico, along with a business partner, Major Samuel Peter Heintzelman.
Heintzelman, a veteran of the U.S.-Mexico War, had stayed in the region after the Treaty
of Guadalupe Hidalgo, establishing an Army post at the junction of the Gila and
Colorado Rivers in 1850.45 Like many military men stationed on the frontier,
Heintzelman spent some of his spare time surveying the landscape for speculative mining
prospects. In 1856, in partnership with Poston, he purchased a silver mining claim near
Tubac in the Gadsden Purchase territory, the eponymously named Heintzelman Mine,
and the two established the company to exploit the claim. Despite its name, the Sonora
did little exploration and mined only in the Santa Rita Mountains north of the Mexican
border. When raising capital for their venture, Heintzelman and Poston placed great
emphasis on the security of the Sonora Exploring and Mining Company’s property,
assuring investors that the “mere presence” of four companies of dragoons in the nearby
town of Tucson, and, of course, of Heintzelman himself, would prevent Apache raids at
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the mine.46 Indeed, the first annual report, likely penned by Poston himself, told
stockholders that the company had sent “an armed party [to the Gadsden Purchase] of
sufficient strength to protect itself against the Indian tribes.”47 This statement is in
keeping with a trope of eastern American writing about mining in Mexico or the new
southwestern territories, in which the armaments carried by the exploring party were
described in as much detail as the supposed value of the mines.48 The Sonora
Engineering and Mining Companyaggressively asserted the security of its property, no
doubt hoping that this would direct stockholder's attention to the subject matter of most
interest to all concerned: mining.
Poston and Heintzelman's strategy in this regard proved moderately successful.
From the start, however, they were plagued by other difficulties. The company had
trouble getting the necessary credit from freighting companies in Sonora to transport
heavy machinery from the nearest ports in western Sonora, and this meant that they had
to try to bring expensive and heavy mining machinery to Tubac overland from San
Francisco or points in the eastern U.S. Although his Cincinnati investors appreciated the
apparent security of investing in a company managed by a major in the U.S. Army,
46
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Heintzelman proved to be a terrible executive. He was far more interested in his military
career than in the day-to-day life at the mine, disliked the climate in southern Arizona,
and appointed his monumentally ineffective brother-in-law, Solon H. Lathrop, as
manager of the mine.49
Despite shortcomings in the managerial department, one area in which the Sonora
Exploring and Mining Company distinguished itself was in the hiring of mining
engineers, the majority of whom had trained at Freiberg, in Saxony. Unusually for the
region, the Heintzelman Mine often had on staff more than one mining engineer, and as a
contemporary observer noted, the company made an effort to hire a “real class of
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people.”50 This is a testament to the relative solvency of the operation, which gave the
Sonora Engineering and Mining Companythe ability to hire expensive experts whose
skills could be bragged about in annual reports and trade publications. As stated in one
of the company's earliest public announcements of its plans, the annual production of the
mine was projected to be almost half a million dollars, a “view... borne out by the agent
of the Company and scientific gentlemen on the expedition [my emphasis].”51
In the 1850s and 1860s, mining engineers working in the Arizona or New Mexico
Territories, or in Mexican states, were only rarely hired to manage mining properties. The
Sonora Engineering and Mining Companyfollowed this pattern. Over a seven-year
period, 1856-1863, the company employed mining engineers Guido Küstel, Charles
Schuchard, Frederick Brunckow, and Herman Ehrenberg as metallurgists, prospectors,
on-site engineers, and technical advisors; none served as a supervisor or manager,
although all were central to the company’s ability to advertise its operations. Küstel, for
instance, who wrote books on ore dressing and the processing of gold and silver ores and
eventually became one of the best-known engineers in the western United States, came to
Arizona from a position at a smelting firm in San Francisco, lured by the richness of the
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ore in the Santa Ritas.52 His reports on the value of the Heintzelman mine were cited by
mining professionals and regional boosters alike.53 Hiring Küstel sent a clear message to
investors that the company was able to attract educated mining men to its ores, and
served to proclaim the seriousness of the endeavor to anyone who might question it.
Mining engineer Herman Ehrenberg was also touted by company directors to the
stockholders as a particularly valuable asset. In addition to articles and citations in
mining journals, Ehrenberg was a frequent contributor on mining matters in the local
paper, the Weekly Arizonian, and the paper returned the favor by praising his talents to
the sky. Although far from an objective reporter of matters of local interest — the
Weekly Arizonian was owned and operated by the Santa Rita Mining and Milling
Company, a subsidiary of the Sonora Exploring and Mining Company — the high
opinion of Ehrenberg expressed in the editorial pages was seconded by interested
easterners, one of whom described Ehrenberg as “a gentleman of education and
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intelligence and thoroughly informed upon all points connected with these distant
countries [Arizona and Sonora].”54
Yet despite the wealth of intellectual capital at the Heintzelman Mine, the mine
struggled to turn a profit. Guido Küstel reported in 1857 that he was able to extract $148
of silver per ton of ore. While not an insignificant payout, this was not nearly enough to
cover the costs of operation. When it opened, the Heintzelman mine used an adobe oven
to heat ore prior to treatment, and treated the ore using the patio process, a traditional
Mexican system for separating silver ore from quartz. The oven was a simple blast oven,
operated by a single man powering a bellows.55 Although a supremely effective
technology for a small-scale local mining operation, the patio process could not produce
enough silver to pay the cost of shipping that silver to markets in New York or San
Francisco. To be profitable, the Heintzelman needed to operate on a more ambitious
scale, producing relatively large quantities of high-quality silver. The investment the
company made in mining engineers was naturally intended to enable this to happen.
Although mining engineers were comparatively expensive employees, the amount of
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money that could be made by selling high-grade silver was expected to be far more than
the cost of one or two engineers.
Guido Küstel initially took responsibility for upgrading the treatment processes
used by the Sonora Exploring and Mining Company. Shortly after beginning operations,
he instituted the barrel process of amalgamation for on-site reduction of ore. Processing
silver ore – separating the silver from the mined ore and shaping it into a form that could
be readily transported – is complicated. As Küstel explained, “the concentration of silver
ores is generally a delicate process, being subject to heavy loss, which cannot be
avoided.”56 Barrel amalgamation, also known as the “Freiberg method,” after the German
institute where it was developed, was a process for treating silver ores by mixing them
with salt, and using silver’s affinity for the chlorine in salt to separate it from what
nineteeth century mining manuals called “baser materials.” In barrel amalgamation, half
a ton of roasted, pulverized ore was placed in a barrel, along with a large quantity of
water and iron. The barrel was then rotated at a high speed on a perpendicular axis. This
continued until the “paste” in the barrel reached a consistency similar to heavy cream. At
that point, quicksilver (mercury) was added to the barrel, and the rotating continued for
another twelve hours, after which time the barrel was topped off with water and the
rotation slowed down, so that the amalgam falls to the bottom of the barrel. As a final
step, the amalgam was reheated to remove the quicksilver, and the remaining silver
concentrate shaped into blocks for transport.57
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Initially, Küstel used a team of mules to power the rotation of the barrels. This
was not very successful. The trade publication Mining Magazine reported that the mules
provided insufficient “regularity of motion” for successful amalgamation; in addition,
there was “much injury and loss occasioned by stopping to rest or change the animals.”58
The engineers at the Heintzelman wanted to bring in steam-powered equipment to solve
the production issues with the mules, but the nearest port, Guaymas, was fifteen hundred
miles away, and the directors feared the route was not secure. The other option was to
ship the amalgamators overland. At 50,000 lbs. apiece, the cost to bring two
amalgamators overland would be $15,000.59 Despite the impracticability of this cost for
a mine producing approximately $500 of ore per week, the decision was made to buy the
equipment, on the calculation that the long-term viability of the mine required such
capital investment.
Yet despite all the calculated risks the various mining engineers suggested to
Heintzelman, Lathrop, and their successor, industrialist Samuel Colt, the Heintzelman
Mine failed to live up to its promise. Indeed, the engineers, rather than increasing the
output of the mine, seem to have served instead as convenient scapegoats for more
general managerial problems. Heintzelman, for instance, publicly reprimanded one of his
mining engineers for lacking knowledge of metallurgy. He further accused the engineer
of wasting money through lenient dealings with Mexican laborers and of not
58

“Silver and Copper in Arizona,” Mining Magazine, Second Series 1, no. 1 (November

1859).
59

H[erman] Ehrenberg to William P. Blake, ed., Mining Magazine, Second Series

(January 1860).

45

understanding barrel amalgamation, a process about which Heintzelman himself
assuredly knew almost nothing.60 Given Heintzelman's general ignorance of mining
processes, it is difficult to give much credence to the major’s attacks on the mining
engineers on his payroll, especially as Heintzelman's final ill-conceived action as
president of the company was to send a shipment of silver overland to San Francisco for
smelting, where from “some imperfection in the furnaces, or some other cause, [the yield]
was 47 per cent. less than the assay. This scarcely paid the expense of sending the ore so
far, and was the source of much embarrassment to the Company[.]”61 Such poor decision
making was not unusual at the Sonora E&M Co., where valuable shipments of equipment
were perpetually getting lost or stalled in a tangle of bad business practices and personal
vendettas.
Notably, however, the mining engineers who worked for the company were
prolific publicists of their work, publishing a multitude of articles devoted to their
metallurgical practices and the geology of Arizona in trade publications such as New
York's Mining Magazine, as well as in local, company-owned newspapers such as the
Weekly Arizonian. Positive reports on the wealth of the mine continued to be issued
through the end of the 1850s, although such reports were almost always accompanied by
an explanation of the logistical difficulties to be overcome in the service of bringing
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modern mining and metallurgical practice to the Heintzelman Mine.62 The Sonora
Engineering and Mining Companylacked neither investment capital nor intellectual
capital in the form of mining experts, but suffered rather from poor management and the
perhaps-foreseeable difficulty of trying to mine a quartz district that was several hundred
miles from the nearest water or rail route. In addition, bad luck and bad timing plagued
the enterprise, as the federal government withdrew troops from Arizona at the start of the
Civil War in 1861 and investors concurrently pulled out of mining enterprises for the
duration of the conflict.
The Santa Rita Mining and Milling Company
Neighboring the Heintzelman Mine was a subsidiary of the Sonora Exploring and
Mining Company, financed by the same group of Cincinnati-based capitalists: the Santa
Rita Mining and Milling Company. Like the Sonora Engineering and Mining Company,
the Santa Rita Company made an effort to hire university-trained mining engineers,
although without the same capital resources to draw upon, it only succeeded in hiring
one, in 1860: a young man named Raphael Pumpelly. Like Guido Küstel, Pumpelly was
a graduate of the Freiberg Academy, in Saxony.63 And like the Sonora Exploring and
Mining Company, the Santa Rita Mining and Milling Company possessed both
“intelligence” – in the form of Pumpelly – and “capital,” albeit not as much as the parent
company. For a company operating in the multi-cultural environment of the borderlands,
Pumpelly was a good hire. Although he did not speak Spanish, he was fluent in French,
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and his employers may have hoped that he would be able to muddle through the language
barrier to communicate with Mexican laborers, as proved to be the case. As a recent
Freiberg graduate who was also proficient in German, the language in which much of the
cutting-edge research in mining methodology was published, Pumpelly was acquainted
with the most up-to-date scholarship on mining. He was also connected to a wide
network of professional mining engineers who could provide the young engineer with the
benefit of their experience if he so required.64
Yet although the directors made the calculation to hire a Freiberg-trained expert,
Pumpelly did not have more success than Ehrenberg, Küstel et al at the Sonora Exploring
and Mining Company. Pumpelly’s task in Arizona was to help the Santa Rita Mining and
Milling Company open some new mines, and to establish a modern smelter in the Santa
Rita Valley. In a region which, in Pumpelly’s own words, was “credited by Mexican
tradition” to possess silver deposits of unthinkable wealth, his job was to make such
rumors into reality.65 As noted by William Wrightson, the general manager of the Santa
Rita Mining and Milling Company, “it is one thing to have ore – however good it may be,
and quite another thing to extract the silver out of it.”66
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Almost from the start, Pumpelly's attempts to institute modern mining methods in
Arizona were plagued with difficulties. When he first headed to Arizona in 1860, the
Santa Rita was already deeply in debt, acquired in part from the company’s sponsorship
of the Weekly Arizonian.67 He was not impressed by the landscape or climate – this
native of Owego, New York considered the locality of Tubac to be “a veritable hell.”68
Most problematic for Pumpelly, he realized shortly after his arrival that “the capital of
our company was not proportionate to the results expected to be achieved.”69 In spite of
his misgivings, Pumpelly spent considerable time mapping the Santa Rita’s holdings,
which he considered to be impressive and intrinsically rich. Indeed, Pumpelly traded on
his time in Arizona later in his life, giving public lectures on the ores of Arizona and
publishing a well-received memoir of his time at the Santa Rita, as well as a couple of
short travelogues for publications such as Putnam’s in the 1860s.70 During the first
weeks of Pumpelly’s time in Arizona, he surveyed the company’s property, visited
neighboring mining sites, and experimented with various means of heating the company
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furnace, which did not correspond to any furnace Pumpelly had previously encountered
and for which he was the sole responsible party.71
Despite being one of the most credentialed young mining engineers in the United
States at the time, Pumpelly was unable to raise the fortunes of the Santa Rita Mining and
Milling Company. Unlike at the Heintzelman Mine, where the technical experts were
simultaneously publicly lauded for their skill and privately blamed for the company's
failure to turn a profit, the directors of the Santa Rita Mining and Milling Company
expressed more primal fears about the problems facing their business, going so far as to
tell their investors that the area surrounding Tubac was a “country which is worse than a
frontier, which is, in reality, the heart of a wilderness, with laborers who speak a different
language from our own.”72 During his tenure in the borderlands, Pumpelly was by his
own account preoccupied with his personal safety when he was not frustrated by the lack
of resources at his disposal. He believed, possibly correctly, that the Santa Rita mine was
the site of more Apache raids than any other place in the country, and considered the
attempt to operate a modern mining company under those conditions to be almost
criminally insane. Pumpelly’s existential concern became particularly acute about six
months after his arrival when Mr. Grosvenor, Pumpelly’s friend and the superintendent at
the Santa Rita mine, was killed less than a quarter mile from their shared quarters.
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Neither Pumpelly nor the bookkeeper, also an American, knew if Grosvenor had been
killed by Apaches in retaliation for an American raid on a local encampment the previous
week, or by their Mexican employees, in retribution for the Santa Rita Mining and
Milling Company’s failure to make payroll. Following Grosvenor’s death, Pumpelly
abandoned any pretense of working as a mining engineer, and busied himself working as
debt collector and accountant, attempting to extract the Santa Rita Mining and Milling
Company from Arizona with as little financial loss as possible. He and his American
colleagues moved to Tubac from the mine on June 15th 1861, and Pumpelly left Arizona
a few months afterwards, in company with Charles Poston and a man Pumpelly described
only as as a “known murderer” named Williams.73
Pumpelly’s experience at the Santa Rita was slightly different from that of
Ehrenberg or Küstel at the Heintzelman, yet it offers a similar lesson about the relative
value of mining engineers in the borderlands during the 1850s and 1860s. John Denton
Hall and others may have pointed to the need for capital and expertise in building a
successful mine, but the stockholder companies near Tubac were also in desperate need
of a more stable political climate and a cheap and safe means to transport their product to
market. Pumpelly, for instance, was unable either to establish systematic extraction
methods, or to process successfully any quantity of ore. Yet he nonetheless proved very
useful to his employers, albeit in ways they could not have anticipated. For instance,
after the death of Grosvenor, when it was clear that the company would not be able to
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continue operations, Pumpelly oversaw six weeks of smelting at the Santa Rita, during
which period he and his largely Mexican workforce were surrounded, and occasionally
shot at by a force of Apache warriors. After the smelting was complete, Pumpelly took it
upon himself to personally separate the silver from the lead planchas, a process which
took him approximately sixty hours of nonstop labor. Given that the workers at the Santa
Rita had stayed with Pumpelly at risk of their own lives for several weeks, he could
probably have trusted them to perform this final task. Given the strength of the ethnic
hostility felt by white Americans towards Mexican men, however, Pumpelly’s employers
were undoubtedly thankful for what they would have considered his exemplary caution.74
Raphael Pumpelly’s experience demonstrates that despite the need for technical
men in the border region in the 1860s, noted by John Denton Hall among others, in the
absence of military security or significant capital resources, mining engineers were at this
time less valuable as experts.75 Company directors clearly hoped that mining engineers
would bring specialized knowledge into the region, elevating a mining prospect to the
status of a worthy investment. The Santa Rita Mining and Milling Company, for instance,
noted in its first annual report that, “the unexpected difficulties which have... surrounded
the Sonora Exploring and Mining Company... have created some distrust in the success of
mining in Arizona.” They then noted that they sought the opinion of Frederick Brunckow
of the Sonora Exploring and Mining Company, “a gentleman well known as an eminent
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mining engineer” as to where they ought to sink their own mining shaft. 76 The
implication is clear that whatever the troubles of the Sonora E&M Co., they were not
caused by the inadequacies of its technical professionals. It is equally clear that being
able to cite a “well-known” mining engineer was an important tool in raising investment
capital.
In a certain sense, mining engineers during this time were most valuable to their
employers as tools of the stock market, trotted out for the sake of investors, and cast
aside, or blamed, when windfall profits failed to materialize. Raphael Pumpelly was
hired in part to combat the distrust that eastern investors felt towards western mining
ventures; although the company could afford to pay for his services as a surveyor and
metallurgist, the Santa Rita company could not afford to implement Pumpelly’s
engineering plans, nor could they afford, on a more basic level, the necessary security to
protect their property or employees from death and dismemberment. The engineers of the
Sonora Exploring and Mining Company published many articles about the process of
mining silver in the Santa Rita Mountains, and confidence in their abilities led one of the
most important industrialists of the mid-nineteenth century, firearms manufacturer
Samuel Colt, ultimately to purchase the mine. But the mine nonetheless failed to turn a
profit, limited by a dearth of local infrastructure, and similar capital poverty as at the
neighboring Santa Rita mine. Although company directors hoped that mining engineers
would be able to solve the kinds of problems that plagued small-time operators such as
Hall, profitably mining the U.S.-Mexico borderlands proved to be extremely difficult in
the years prior to the U.S. Civil War, and impossible once hostilities broke out in the east.
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That said, the experiences of these early mining engineers were not without value.
Metallurgists such as Küstel gained experience working southwestern ores, and published
widely read papers on their properties and attributes. Potential investors in San Francisco
and New York heard stories about the great wealth of the ores mined at Alamos, Tubac,
or Santa Teresa, and these stories primed the investment market in later decades. Patterns
of behavior were established during these years to which generations of future mining
engineers remained committed. Lured by the challenge of working difficult ores in faraway places, mining engineers such as Küstel, Ehrenberg, or Pumpelly headed into the
borderlands, each hoping he would bring the necessary intelligence to work the ore, and
trusting that his employers would be willing to invest the necessary capital to extract it.
To this ambitiously noble pursuit of excellence in knowledge, mining engineers coupled
the frisson of travel to an unknown (to them) and scantily mapped territory claimed and
inhabited by people quite foreign to the lives of university-educated men from New York
or Washington, D.C. As the profession of mine engineering grew and changed, the
experiences of these early American mining engineers came to occupy a larger-than-life
place within their profession as the ensuing generations of mining engineers took up the
adventurous mantle of their forebears for themselves.
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Chapter Two
Instituting Expertise in the Borderlands:
Mining Education in the United States

Herman Ehrenberg, mining engineer for the Sonora Exploring and Mining
Company, observed in 1859 that “the grand interest of the country being mining, this
should be fostered by all means... [and] scientific and practical men, well acquainted with
the manipulation and metallurgical treatment of ores, are indispensable.”77 This
statement was not so much a compelling insight as it was a sober assessment of the
realities of borderlands mining. Ehrenberg, along with the handful of other mining
engineers who worked through the borderlands region in the 1850s and 1860s, was a
German-trained engineer. As such, he was a member of a distinct minority. The
majority of the miners, prospectors, and assorted speculators who traveled to the region
from the eastern United States at the time were, at best, self-taught mining men.
University-trained experts such as Ehrenberg were few and far between in the United
States in general, and were particularly uncommon in the borderlands. Although the
southwestern United States experienced a couple of booms, such as that of Tombstone,
notable for their pure, easily extracted ore, much of the mineral ore in the borderlands
was of a lower grade, and required significant processing before it could be conveyed to
market. Because of this, mines that operated without good technical advice had little
chance of success. Mine owners, investors, and operators were very aware of the need
for technical workers, but in the 1850s and 1860s, the shortage of such people was noted
77
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even by members of Congress. Senator William Stewart of Nevada, for instance, noted
that “the number of truly scientific and practical men who have been engaged in the
examination and working of our mines is extremely limited.”78
Between the 1860s and the 1890s, however, the number of university-educated
mining engineers increased significantly in the United States. In concert with other whitecollar workers, most notably doctors, lawyers, and civil and mechanical engineers,
mining engineers shared in the late-nineteenth century drive for the standardization of
professional expertise.79 While fraternal and trade organizations played a role in the
professionalization of mining engineering, they did not assume the “gatekeeper” role of
groups such as the American Medical Association or the American Society of Civil
Engineers. Rather, the development of a domestic system of dedicated mine-engineering
education was of paramount importance in changing the professional role of mining
engineers between the 1860s and 1900. In turn, the professionalization and growth of the
field of mining engineering had a dramatic impact on the mining industry in the
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borderlands region, providing regional mining engineers with not only a growing network
of professional colleagues to call upon for assistance, but also with tools for asserting
their authority that were either not available to, or not useful for, engineers in
Ehrenberg’s generation.
Michel Foucault posited that knowledge and power work together to establish
institutions which by their nature are oppressive, and therefore knowledge claims –
technical, scientific, or otherwise – presupposed a attempt to assert authority over a social
system.80 To claim technical expertise, as mining engineers do, is therefore to claim the
authority to override social, political, or economic considerations in the service of a
higher cause – that of a supposedly objective technical truth. Yet in the establishment of
professional mine engineering, the relationship between the claim of technical expertise
and the assertion of authority was not always so straightforward. Some of the earliest
mining engineers to work in the southwest and in northern Mexico found their academic
credentials actively working against their ability to assert their authority. Later on, some
discovered that a mining engineer’s need for academic and technical credentials, although
seemingly paramount, was actually secondary to his need to demonstrate hands-on, local
knowledge as he established his plans as a technical advisor and manager on-site at the
mine. This tension between professional credentialing and the necessity of demonstrating
a strong practical knowledge of mining techniques and local circumstances became a
driving force in structuring a U.S.- based system of mining engineering education
between the 1860s and the early 1900s.
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The Freiberg Network
Most mining engineers who worked in North America in the 1860s and 1870s
were trained in Germany, for the most part at the Königliche Sächsische Bergakademie
(Royal Saxon Academy of Mines) in Freiberg, Germany, the foremost mining institution
in Europe. Raphael Pumpelly, who worked for the Santa Rita Mining and Milling
Company in Tubac; James D. Hague, a major investor in southwestern and Mexican
hard-rock mines; Guido Küstel, metallurgist and mining engineer for the Sonora
Exploring and Mining Company, also in Tubac; all three Janin brothers – Louis, who
spent a few months in Tubac as Küstel’s assistant, Henry, and their brother Alexis – and
Rossiter Raymond, long-time editor of the Engineering and Mining Journal, were only
the most important of the first generation of German-trained American engineers who
spent a significant portion of their careers in the western United States and Mexico.81
More often than not, graduates of Freiberg maintained life-long connections to each
other, corresponding about both personal and professional matters. Such friendships
ensured that mining engineers in the new territories of the western United States
remained part of a small network of educated and unusually cosmopolitan men. This
network helped men in obvious ways, by enabling an easy flow of information about
work opportunities and new mining methods, while taxing the Freiberg graduates with a
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certain social responsibility toward one another. In the early 1880s, for example, a
Freiberg graduate named Price took a job out west and was “broken down through
softening of the brain or some other form of intellectual ruin.” Two of Price’s former
classmates who cared for him through his breakdown took up a subscription among
Freiberg alumni to send the unfortunate man back to his family in England. Louis Janin
and James Hague, two successful Freiberg alumni from a previous generation, neither of
whom was a particular friend of Price’s, together contributed more than a third of the
expense of Price’s trip home.82
At Freiberg, students split their time between classroom and “practical” studies in
the field, a unique approach in mining education before 1864. Graduates of the Academy
began their careers knowing the latest metallurgical techniques and theories of ore
genesis. As with any credentialing process, the network of working professionals to
which Freiberg provided access was as important as the education obtained by students at
the Freiberg Academy. A Freiberg education certainly bestowed several advantages
besides the purely academic on a mining engineer wanting a career in North America.
Ambitious officials at marginally profitable companies hired trained mining engineers,
hoping that their academic backgrounds would enable them to turn a profit under
exceedingly difficult conditions. As we have seen already, this strategy was not
successful at borderlands mines in the 1850s and 1860s. Yet German-trained mining
82
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engineers coninued to command high salaries in western mines. Their presence lent a
veneer of respectability and authority to speculative ventures, which in turn indicated the
socio-technical authority of their status as educated technical workers.83 Not only was
the supposedly esoteric expertise of a Freiberg-trained mining engineer valued by
investors, but among educated Americans, German universities were considered to be the
best in the world.84 A young mining engineer who held a certificate or a degree from
Freiberg was considered in certain circles to be the superior of an engineer trained at
other European institutions, such as the Royal School of Mines in London, or the École
des Mines in Paris. A Freiberg graduate wanting a career in North America was in the
happy position of possessing a level of education that could soothe the anxious investor
who wanted to be sure he was hiring the “best” mining engineer available, while also
having the kind of practical education that would be useful in wrangling with mine
workers out in the field.
Mining Engineers at the Frontier
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Although “practically” trained mining engineers with German degrees such as
Pumpelly and Küstel were hired on the basis of this coincidence between their training
and credentials, they were not always greeted with open arms when they arrived at a
mining site. Speculators, mine operators who fancied themselves (and sometimes were)
very knowledgeable about mining processes and local conditions, and the apprenticetrained skilled workers who staffed midcentury mines were often very suspicious of the
university-educated men brought in from outside to fix, upgrade, or re-organize a mine.
Much of this suspicion stemmed from the inequities of class distinction: a Freiberg
education was not easy or inexpensive to obtain, and possessing German training
signaled a life of privilege available to few Americans at the time. In the mid-nineteenth
century, only the children of the elite could afford to spend three or four years living in
Europe to attend a mining school. Still fewer possessed the requisite language skills to
study in Germany. Indeed, stories abound of Americans who cheated or got lucky on
their language exams and then discovered they could not follow a technical lecture in
German.85 Despite the challenges inherent to attending university in Germany, prior to
the 1890s, it was not uncommon for budding mine engineers to spend two or three years
at an American university, such as Harvard or Yale, and then to “finish up” with a
certificate from Freiberg. These early American mining engineers were almost
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exclusively the products of extremely privileged backgrounds.86 Yet these mining
engineers were in a sense independent operators without the full support of a professional
class. They lacked institutional support within the mining industry, or automatic
recognition of their education from their colleagues. Each engineer had to negotiate his
status onsite, by demonstrating either his worth or an appropriate humility before the
local knowledge of others at the mine.
The social privilege of mining engineers was thus a double-edged sword in the
southwestern borderlands, where technical knowledge was measured not by degrees or by
scientific authority but by the ability of an engineer to build profits for his employer.
Although many people doubtless agreed with Senator William Stewart of Nevada that
“an education at Freiberg is a guarantee not only to position and influence, but to the
regard and confidence of the humblest miner,” investors and managers also frequently
complained through the 1860s of the lack of technical skills possessed by their
university-trained mining engineers.87 Capt. J.W. Ruggles, for instance, mine manager at
the Guazapares Mine in Chihuahua, fired his engineer due to that engineer’s “dead, flat
failure” to make the mine profitable. The engineer in question acknowledged that he
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“might have been roasting his ores too long; or that he might have been using too little
salt.” Neighboring mine operators and American agents in Chihuahua, meanwhile, agreed
that the engineer “was not sufficiently acquainted with [the variety of ore at the mine]...
by which means he ruined the whole concern,” but they cast no aspersions on the
engineer’s general technical competence. 88 Ruggles, however, insisted he would have
none of “this or that, or the other trifling excuse in extenuation of what appears to me [the
engineer’s] ignorance of the business.”89 Rather, it was in Ruggles’ interest to place the
blame for the failures at Guazapares on the shoulders of the mining engineer, rather than
on external forces, or on himself for hiring a man who was not acquainted with the local
ores. In this instance, all observers, including the engineer himself, agreed that the
engineer lacked practical knowledge that would help at the mine, but the vehemence of
Ruggles’ attack on his engineer underscores a problem that vexed mining engineers,
particularly in the early days when there were very few in the region. Even if this
engineer had roasted and treated the Guazapares ores properly, that alone was no
guarantee that the company would turn a profit. Absent a profitable balance sheet, how
could a mining engineer prove his value?
In practice, possessing a German mining degree did not immediately endear a
mining engineer to his local contacts in Arizona or Sonora, a circumstance which
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compounded the difficulties faced by engineers attempting to prove themselves in the
field. As a young engineer, for instance, John Hays Hammond, a mining graduate of
both Sheffield Scientific School and Freiberg, was told outright by an acquaintance that
he could not have a letter of recommendation since “engineers educated in the theory of
mining had not been successful” in southwestern mining projects. Hammond, who later
became one of the wealthiest and most influential mining engineers in the United States,
learned from his mistake. He obtained his first mining position, as an assayer for George
Hearst, by, he claimed, foreswearing the value of his engineering education altogether.90
Hammond may have played down his education on Hearst’s account, but although Hearst
may have publicly proclaimed his mistrust of mining engineers, he owed the long-term
success of his mines on the Comstock and in Deadwood to the innovations of mining
engineers, including those of Freiberg-educated Guido Küstel and both Louis and Henry
Janin.91
The value of a university degree in the eyes of working miners was also
undermined by the strength of the apprenticeship system which thrived under the large
population of Cornish immigrants who dominated the workforce in mid-century western
and Mexican mines. These miners traditionally worked in teams that bid on contracts for
labor, rather than by negotiating a daily or monthly wage. Men advanced in pay grade
and responsibility with seniority; under the Cornish system, a manager was always a
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miner who had worked up through the ranks, rather than a college-trained engineer.92
The social value of a college degree was not worth as much as local knowledge acquired
in the field at a mining camp.
The growth of an American educational system
Given the shortage of substantive technical and managerial competence in the
borderlands, the difficulty of acquiring an education at Freiberg, and the suspicion with
which that education was greeted, a movement grew after the U.S. Civil War to establish
a national mining institution in the United States. Editorials in such disparate papers as
the Arizona Miner and the San Francisco Bulletin argued forcefully that it was in the
national interest of the United States to establish an American school of mines on the
model of Freiberg or the Royal School of Mines in London.93 In 1868 Senator Stewart of
Nevada went so far as to introduce a bill in Congress to establish a National School of
Mines, to be located close to the major hard-rock mining regions of Colorado, Arizona,
and Nevada. The arguments in favor of an American school of mines included the
nationalistic assertion that “we send our young men to the schools... in Europe, to learn
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that which they could much better learn at home, if we had institutions equally thorough
and comprehensive.” The observation that “the production of ore has decreased, as the
amount of waste generated by mining has increased,” and that the industry ought to focus
on producing profits from low-grade ore were also cited as evidence for the critical need
for a national school of mines.94 Two common objections raised to Stewart’s proposal
included a fear that establishing a Board of Mining to oversee technical standards would
suffocate individual entrepreneurial investment, and the belief that taxpayers should not
support the mining industry, since individuals, not the community, benefitted from the
industry.95 The bill was withdrawn before the Senate could vote on it, but not before
Stewart could give an impassioned defense of the mining industry and mineral wealth of
North America, insisting that American-trained-Americans could do better mining work
than could men trained at “the great school at Freiberg.”96
Lawrence and Sheffield
In the absence of an American School of Mines, the domestic options for training
engineers were really limited in the 1850s and 1860s, which is one reason Stewart’s
proposal generated so much attention in mining districts despite its lack of traction in the
94

“Considerations in Reference to the Establishment of a National School of Mines as a

Means of Increasing the Product of Gold and Silver Bullion,” (Washington: Intelligencer
Printing House, 1867), 5; “Opinions of the Press...”, 4; and [Stewart], “Speech,” passim.
95

Prescott (AZ) Arizona Miner, “The Proposed Mining College,” 24 March 1866;

[Stewart], “Speech,” passim.; and “Opinions of the Press...”, passim.
96

Wm. Stewart, Congressional Globe, 556-561; January 16, 1868, 40th Congress.

66

Senate. Prior to the Civil War, there were only a few institutions in the United States that
trained engineers or provided a technical or scientific education. Rensselaer Polytechnic
Institute, founded in 1823, and the Polytechnic Institute of Pennsylvania, founded in
1857, both trained civil engineers, but neither produced a significant number of graduates
who worked in the mining industry.97 Other schools that eventually had significant
mining programs, such as the California School of Mines at Berkeley and the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, had very few mining graduates before the
twentieth century. The domestic schools that provided the greatest number of mining
graduates during these early decades were the privately-operated Lawrence Scientific
School in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and the Sheffield Scientific School in New Haven,
Connecticut. Of these schools, Sheffield eventually became the more prominent training
ground for mining men, while Lawrence eliminated its mining program in 1879—but
during the 1850s and 1860s they were more similar than they were different.98 Not only
were the programs of study similar, but mining students at each had similar experiences,
as students and faculty alike wrestled with being affiliated with the least prestigious of
the scientific fields: mining.
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From the outset, both Sheffield, established in the early 1850s, and Lawrence,
established half a decade earlier, granted degrees in civil and mechanical engineering.
Dedicated mining programs were established a few years later, although it is noteworthy
that in the mid-19th century the mining program did not differ significantly from the other
courses in engineering. To modern eyes, all of these courses were astonishingly broadbased, with students taking more classes in fields such as botany, languages, rhetoric, and
history than in mathematics or topography and mapping. Despite the similarity in the
programs, most Sheff or Lawrence graduates who worked in the mining industry in the
1850s and 1860s studied geology or chemistry as undergraduates. Whether this was
because the field of mine engineering was not particularly well established, or because
the mining curriculum was looked down upon by other students is unclear.
While the mining students at these scientific academies were thought to be
pursuing the least scholastic of the fields of study, all students at both Lawrence and
Sheffield were considered the academic inferiors of their neighbors at Harvard and Yale.
In later years, many students who enrolled in Lawrence after a couple of years at Harvard
College had weak academic records, and mining students were among the weakest of
them all, suggesting that in the early years of dedicated mining education the brightest
students interested in the industry chose not to study mining because it was seen by their
scientific peers to be an inferior academic pursuit.99 In some ways, such evident disdain
for the mining curriculum probably served graduates of Lawrence quite well in the field;
if U.S.-educated educated mining engineers were greeted with suspicion by mine
99
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managers and workers, it could be that it helped an engineer establish his technical
authority to be able to claim the credential as a geologist rather than as a mining engineer.
Regardless, the principle difference between the curriculum at Lawrence and the
curriculum at Freiberg remained the absence of a “practical” mining component in the
U.S. schools.
In New Haven, faculty and students alike devoted more time to asserting the
importance of dedicated training for engineers than did their peers at Lawrence.
Eventually such effort resulted in Sheffield becoming a top engineering institution while
the prestige of Lawrence flagged among those in the mining business. But initially
demanding respect was an uphill battle, for faculty and students alike. Entrance
examinations were instituted as early as 1861, with mixed results. As one historian of
Yale University explained, the entrance exams were useful as they
dissipated the danger that this school [Sheffield] would become a refuge for a
certain class of students whose presence, while it added to the number of those
receiving instruction, diminished the effective working of the instruction given.
The trouble was that attempting to keep weak students out of Sheffield meant that the
school lost revenue, and so the faculty also made provisions for admitting numerous
“special” students who failed to pass the entrance exams. The result was that many
students “who cared for only a nominal connection with the college in order to save
themselves from being held responsible for their vigorous way of doing nothing at all”
were admitted to the school in spite of the relatively hard entrance exams. Sheffield
courses thus had a very high attrition rate, and when students from Yale College across
the street mocked “Sheff” students for being lackadaisical intellects who drank too much
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and were generally so dissolute they were “past praying for,” students at Sheff knew
there was some truth to the characterization.100 The combination of academic and social
stigma experienced by Sheffield undergrads during the nineteenth century may have
caused many of them to be reflexively defensive about their choice of (or need for) a
career in mining. It almost certainly prepared them to foreswear their academic
credentials in the manner of Sheffield alumnus John Hays Hammond.
The Morrill Land Grant
Proponents of an American-based system of engineering education hoped that by
broadening the educational options for prospective mining engineers beyond the rarified
bastions of Cambridge and New Haven, the passage of the Morrill Land-Grant Act in
1862 would revolutionize the domestic mining industry. The Morrill Act granted states a
certain acreage of land to sell; the size of the land-grant was determined from the 1860
census. Proceeds from the sale of this land were designated to endow public “land-grant”
universities devoted to teaching the principles of agriculture and the “mechanic arts.”
The phrase “mechanic arts” was not clearly defined in the legislation, however, and most
of the funds thus raised established institutions with relatively large agricultural programs
and comparatively small faculties for engineering and the applied sciences. In a small
number of cases, however, the Morrill Act did indeed advance the cause of engineering
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education.101 Schools established by funds from the Morrill Act included the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the Missouri School of Mines at Rolla, both of
which eventually trained large numbers of mining engineers. The Morrill Act had some
odd and unintended consequences, however. For instance, rather than establishing an
agricultural college, legislators in Connecticut diverted the semi-annual interest payments
of the Morrill Act into the operating fund of the otherwise privately-funded Sheffield
Scientific School, and the mining curriculum was a significant piece of their argument
that this was an appropriate use of funds.102
In the early years, the land-grant system was somewhat ad hoc. Many institutions
only employed one or two engineering instructors, and the courses offered were
contingent upon the knowledge of those instructors. Yet over time, the land-grant
colleges developed what one historian of engineering education has called a “land-grant
style.” This “style” resonated with the particular job requirements for mining engineers
very well, with an emphasis on the relationship between practical and theoretical
knowledge, and with a significant proportion of class time devoted to field or laboratory
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work.103 Although the Morrill Act did not do for engineering education what proponents
of a national mining academy hoped – it did not create a network of mining colleges – it
did provide funding for a style of education that was closer to the education of Freibergtrained engineers than to the theoretical miners who came out of other European
institutions or from Lawrence or Sheffield in the 1850s and 1860s. The land-grant
colleges, by providing a public source of funding for training engineers, contributed to
the overwhelming emphasis on practice that came to dominate American engineering
education by the end of the nineteenth century.
Of more immediate importance to the mining industry, however, the Morrill Act
dramatically and immediately increased the number of institutions providing engineering
education in the U.S. In 1860, there were seven engineering colleges in the United
States. By 1872, there were seventy.104 Fewer than three hundred men received
engineering degrees in the U.S. during the two decades preceding the Civil War. Over
the next ten years, that number quadrupled. Ten percent of those new engineering
graduates – approximately 120 men over the course of a decade – were mining engineers
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with specialized degrees.105 Despite the relatively small number of men who possessed
mining degrees in the 1870s and early 1880s, as engineering education became
progressively more available, investors and financiers began to expect that anyone who
called himself a mining engineer would have a college degree. In the long run, these
American engineering colleges changed the demographics of the profession of mine
engineering. By the turn of the century, more than ten thousand students were enrolled in
engineering colleges, and while the private institutions remained the most prestigious
schools for mining, the preponderance of “land-grant” colleges made it possible for many
more men to take at least some college courses, and, indeed, the vast majority of mining
graduates in 1900 came from the land-grant system. 106
The Columbia School of Mines
Over the long-term the establishment of the Morrill Act revolutionized the
engineering profession within the United States, but in the short-term, the most
significant challenge to the dominance of Freiberg alumni in the nineteenth century
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mining industry was the opening of another private mining institute in 1864, the
Columbia School of Mines in New York City. While all courses on mine engineering
offered extensive classes in geology, chemistry, and surveying, in addition to the usual
engineering requirements of algebra, trigonometry, calculus, physics, and German, the
feature that made Columbia stand out with respect to other technical schools in the
United States was the Summer School of Practical Mining.107 This program differed
from the practically-oriented “land-grant system” of education in that the practicum was
the central curricular feature, around which all other aspects of the mining curriculum at
Columbia were based. Consciously modeled on the practical curriculum at Freiberg, the
School of Mines required all third-year mining students to spend the summer as
apprentices in a working mine, mostly in the copper mines at Lake Superior, Michigan.108
Neither Lawrence nor Sheffield offered a comparable “hands-on” experience. Some of
Columbia’s early success undoubtedly stemmed from the belief, common in the North
American mining community, that “our schools are not practical enough, [and] that
practical miners do not find the graduates capable of doing what they profess.”109
Columbia had strict entrance requirements, and also provided relatively good
opportunities for scholarship students, making it a top choice for upwardly mobile
prospective engineers. The relative success of Columbia in usurping the dominant
position of the European academies, principally Freiberg, as the premier institution for
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budding mining engineers also owes a debt more generally to the direction of American
scientific study in the late nineteenth century. Historians of science have puzzled over
the predominance in U.S. science of experimental and observational scientists over
theoretical and mathematic thinkers prior to 1900, a situation that seems to point to the
relative backwardness of American science.110 Mining, a field of study that privileges
fieldwork and the application of theoretical knowledge for immediate and concrete
financial gain, was perfectly positioned to take advantage of this perceived weakness in
the American model.
The Columbia summer school was designed explicitly to bring the social and the
technical aspects of mine engineering together, to give the university students the
practical experience that would legitimize them in the eyes of grizzled old miners. In
practice, it served to underscore the class distinction between mining engineers and
working miners, but also to give the engineering students the tools they would need to
negotiate their status on-site at a mining camp. Growing up in Toledo, Ohio, William
Field Staunton was so impressed by his neighbor’s son, a mining engineer named John A.
Church who worked at the time in Tombstone, Arizona, that he decided to follow in
Church’s footsteps to the Columbia School of Mines.111 Staunton, who eventually
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became the president of the Congress Mine, one of the largest gold mines in Arizona,
recalled to the end of his life the social stigma he felt as a student in New York.
Although the son of a successful railroad engineer, as a student he judged himself a cashstrapped and unsophisticated midwesterner compared to his classmates. Staunton’s term
of enrollment in the Summer School of Practical Mining, however, demonstrates the
impact that a Columbia education had on the relationship between even a middle-class
Midwestern boy and the “practical” miners whom he would direct throughout his career.
In the summer of 1881, Staunton’s Columbia class worked at a copper and iron mine in
the Keweenaw Peninsula in Michigan. When he first arrived, Staunton made an error
typical of first-time miners, and forgot to extinguish the candle in his hat before it
guttered. As the candle flickered out, it melted the resin that attached it to the front of his
cap, and the wax, resin, and end of the wick all stuck to Staunton’s forehead. His friends
had to shave his hair off to remove the mess, leaving a readily recognizable symbol of
Staunton’s inexperience for all to see.112 A rube in New York, Staunton also found
himself to be a tenderfoot underground, although he was able to parlay that early naïvete
into a story that showed him to be capable of modesty and able to play by the rules of the
underground workers.
Staunton’s troubles at the summer school did not end with a shaved head. Later
in the summer, more comfortable with life underground, he heard that some of the miners
preferred to leave the mine by climbing directly up an 800-foot ladder, rather than by
walking out through the tunnel. Staunton reasoned that this shorter climb would be a
faster, and therefore better, way to exit the tunnel, and followed a group of miners up the
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ladder towards the surface. Unaccustomed to such physical labor, Staunton soon
exhausted himself, and, losing sight of the miners he followed, clambered hand over hand
in the pitch dark after his candle burned out. He recalled:
At last... I saw a faint glimmer, like a fire-fly, seemingly miles below me
in the shaft. The light grew, and then I could hear the steps of men on the
ladders coming up. On few occasions in my life have I felt a more joyful
sense of relief. They found me, perched like a squirrel, at the top of a
ladder which had projected farther past one of the landings than the others,
and which I had passed in the dark. The miners seemed to find the
situation hugely amusing, a feeling I did not share at the moment.113
The absurdity of Staunton’s situation is apparent. The underground workers clearly
understood that the young “college boys” would one day be the supervisors and managers
of works just like their own. What a pleasure to find a young engineer-in-training
perched “like a squirrel” on a ladder, unable either to keep his candle lit or to find the
mine exit without recourse to the miner’s local knowledge.
Staunton also gained significantly from telling this story. His rookie mistakes
were a shorthand for explaining that he had already made mistakes in underground
mining, and was unlikely to make those mistakes again. He could therefore approach the
field as an experienced hand rather than as a green college boy. The Engineering and
Mining Journal once explained that “‘the principal advantage gained by this manual work
[in the Columbia Summer School] was the braking [sic] of the ice between the student
and the miner, placing them in pleasant relations and on common ground, the student for
113
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the time becoming, to all intents and purposes, the miner’s ‘butty,’ and to be treated and
instructed as such.”114
Although it seems unlikely that the class divide between the principally foreignborn, apprentice-trained miners and the predominantly east coast, university-educated
mining engineers could really be bridged, Staunton’s stories indicate that he really was
treated as a miner’s “butty,” and that he called on this experience to legitimize his
authority for the rest of his career. Columbia graduates thus began their careers with a
real advantage over their other colleagues: while a graduate of Sheffield, for instance,
would have to find a way to work underground for a couple of summers to gain
Staunton’s experience – a project few, if any, Sheff men undertook on their own – a
graduate of Columbia was understood by his peers and potential employers to have a
worker’s insight into underground work. Columbia graduates themselves began their
professional careers with a visceral notion of how tenuous their claims to authority would
be underground. Although even a young engineer might have plenty of theoretical
knowledge of how to mine and what to mine, he would still have to negotiate with the
miners to make the work happen.
Even Columbia’s famous practicum was not actually the same as an
apprenticeship experience. Many people in the industry — engineers and owners alike
— felt that there was simply no substitute for extensive underground experience, and this
inexperience was shorthand in the industry for criticizing engineering work as sloppy or
poorly conceived. An anonymous engineer’s report on the Santa Elena mining property
114
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in Sonora, for instance, lamented the work done by Eben Olcott, who was employed to
manage the property in 1881 shortly after he graduated from Columbia. “Olcott carried
out [his work] in a most elaborate and costly manner” the report stated. “Properly
speaking, [Olcott produced] no cut, it was simply an enormous out-crop of quartz that
was carried out.” In other words, Olcott failed to engineer the mine; rather, he grabbed a
chunk of surface rock and called it mining. Even more egregious, by the account of the
report’s author, Olcott chose the wrong process for milling ore extracted by a previous
manager and allegedly lost 60% of the ore’s value.115 This failure, the report's author
implied, was a direct result of Olcott's lack of practical knowledge of mining, and his
reliance on book-learning over common-sense. If Olcott did indeed commit these errors
(and there is no way to verify the claim either way), they were costly mistakes, both in
terms of revenue lost to the mine owners, and, presumably, in labor expended to remedy
the mistakes. Olcott went on to have a remarkably successful career, as a partner in a
highly successful mining consulting firm based out of New York and a well-known
expert on southwestern, Mexican, and Latin American mining projects, serving at one
point as the president of the American Institute of Mining Engineers. This professional
success stemmed in no small measure from the combination of Olcott’s well-respected
Columbia degree, and to the many mining projects in Mexico he managed as a young
man, including the Santa Elena.116 Yet as a young engineer, the Columbia degree could
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not fully overcome the suspicion on the part of other engineers that every questionable
decision Olcott made was the result of an over-reliance on theoretical “knowledge” of
mining over practical experience. Olcott’s situation points to a curious aspect of the
Columbia model of field education. Although it was instituted to further the mining
knowledge of students, the summer school was actually most effective in alerting young
mining engineers to the fact that they would have to negotiate their status at the mine —
that it would not be self-evident to the workers that a mining degree makes a man an
engineer.
Overall, however, the success of the Columbia system was apparent to people in
the industry, and by 1880 other institutions followed suit. The Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, for instance, installed a “mining lab” on its campus in Cambridge, and the
California School of Mines instituted a requirement that mining students use their
summer vacations to visit area mines and metallurgical works. Until the late 1890s,
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however, more engineering graduates of Columbia worked in the mining industry and in
the related field of metallurgy than did graduates of any other American university.117
Impact of Educational Changes on the Profession
One of the most noteworthy features of the history of engineering education in the
U.S. in general, and of mine engineering education in particular, is its evolution from a
broad-based classical education with a heavy emphasis on languages and mathematics
into a specialized course of study in physics and chemistry. In the early 1870s, every
student at Sheffield, for instance, took a three-year course in either mechanical or civil
engineering; those students who wished for a degree in mining took a fourth year of
metallurgy. Regardless of major, each student was required to study two full years of
both German and French, as well as three years of drawing, geometry, physics,
differential and integral calculus, and some courses in botany, English composition, and
geography, as well as specialized courses in mechanics and stone cutting (for civil
engineers), and steam engines (for mechanical engineers). All students were also
required to study several semesters of elocution, although some faculty believed this
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should be an optional requirement.118 Sheffield actually eliminated many of the language
requirements in the 1880s, a move that in retrospect made the curriculum at “Sheff” more
modern than that at other private scientific institutions. By the 1890s the faculty was
again concerned that the entrance requirements for Sheffield were too low and began to
demand that students read either French or German upon entrance, as well as Latin well
enough to read Caesar in the original.119 By 1901, the stricter entrance requirements
remained in place, but almost all of the “frills” in earlier Sheffield course requirements
had been eliminated for mining engineers, including botany and elocution, and replaced
by the more professionally relevant study of thermodynamics, mineralogy,
crystallography, hydraulics, chemistry, and machine design. While calculus remained in
the curriculum, geometry, algebra, and trigonometry were relegated to the entrance
requirements and advanced study of these fields was no longer mandated. These changes
were intended “to enable the men to have a course leading to more practical results in
their professional work.” By 1906, Sheffield had instituted an optional course in Spanish,
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a far more useful language than French or German for the many Sheffield graduates who
worked at mine sites in the southwestern United States and throughout Latin America. 120
To some degree, this shift in educational focus is reflective of changing mining
methods. Nonselective mining methods of the twentieth century were heavily dependent
on engineers’ understanding the chemical attributes of an ore; the physical manifestation
of an ore-body was of secondary importance, as the quantity of rock removed from the
ground was so great. The great changes in the coursework of prospective mining
engineers, however, also serve to underscore the ways in which the working role of
mining engineers changed through the first decades of the profession. In the 1850s and
1860s, mining engineers were classically trained advisors, whose knowledge of geology
and chemistry was far superior to that of most practically-trained miners. A half century
later, mine engineering education had changed such that they could more readily serve as
critical technical experts, advisors and managers.
By 1900, mine engineering professionals were wholly invested in the American
university system, while remaining committed, in principle if not in practice, to the idea
that a “practical,” or apprenticeship-centered, education was in some sense superior to a
“theoretical,” or university-centered, education. As engineer George Packard expressed
in a letter to the editor of the Mining and Scientific Press in 1907, “there has never been
such a demand for the college graduate as there is today.” Indeed, Packard continued, it

120

Governing Board Minutes, March 11, 1901, May 22, 1905, and February 5, 1906, all

folder 56, box 6, RU 819.

83

“unfortunately is not necessary for the present graduate ‘to start at the bottom.’ It would
be much better for him if it were.”121
In 1907 Packard was nearing the end of his career, but the ambivalence he
expressed concerning the replacement of practical mine work with college credit was not
simply generational. Rather, mining engineers as a group persistently expressed
discomfort with the perception that they were among the elite, and noted with concern
that the best place to learn mine engineering was not in the classroom, but
underground.122 As late as the 1930s, the alumni bulletin for the Colorado School of
Mines ran an article discussing the concern of School of Mines graduates that they would
be accused of “looking for a ‘white-collar job’” because they were “afraid to soil [their]
hands in manual labor.”123 The publication naturally concluded that “no one can accuse
the young alumni of the Colorado School of Mines of such an attitude,” yet the fact that
this fear could be stated so baldly is an indication of how troubling the profession
continued to find the idea that a university-trained engineer was less “practical” than a
working stiff down in the mine.
The introduction of a widespread technical education for mining engineers did
more than create a more uniform class of mining professionals; it also effected a mining
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engineer’s advancement throughout his career. As it became easier to get a technical
education, career prospects dwindled for men who lacked university certification.
Halfway through 1913, the Bulletin of the American Institute of Mining Engineers began
to publish the work histories of men nominated for membership. While these listings
include only a small sample of mining professionals, the individuals listed were among
the most professionally active, and can be taken to be indicative of the demographics of
the profession as a whole. The vast majority of the nominees attended engineering
institutes, and held graduate (E.M.) and/or undergraduate degrees in mining. Only a
handful of the nominees had not attended university; of these, most were between the
ages of 35 and 55, with two or three decades of experience as superintendents or
overseers before being nominated for membership in AIME.124 Through the 1870s or
1880s, a man who was known to have good “practical” skills could readily find
employment as an expert, and the ages of the men nominated in 1913 indicates that they
probably began working in mining in the late 1880s or early 1890s. The nominees with
college degrees were significantly younger, most under thirty with no more than eight
years work experience; more often, these young men were working at only their second
or third professional position, and had been out of college for fewer than four years.
By the twentieth century, possession of a mining degree was presumed to be the
decisive factor in hiring decisions, even when hiring managers declared education (or the
lack thereof) to be irrelevant. In 1902, for instance, Courtenay DeKalb, a Columbiatrained mining engineer in charge of operations at the Fernando Mining Company, was
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pressured by the owner of the company, Colonel Livermore, to hire his son, Tom. When
DeKalb expressed his reluctance to take Tom on as assistant engineer, the Colonel
assumed that DeKalb’s reluctance stemmed from the fact that young Livermore “ha[d]
not received a technical training in the schools.” DeKalb objected to this
characterization, and protested that he did not care whether Tom had a college degree or
not. The Colonel continued to demand that DeKalb nonetheless hire his son; DeKalb
continued to refuse, asserting that Tom was unreliable and knew nothing about geology.
Had Tom Livermore completed coursework in mining, he would have studied geology,
thus mitigating at least one of DeKalb’s reservations. Had Tom completed a college
degree, he might also have demonstrated some reliability, or at the very least the ability
to complete a task once he began it. Despite DeKalb’s protestations that he did really not
care whether Tom Livermore had a college degree or not, Col. Livermore was clearly
correct to think that his son’s lack of a degree materially damaged his professional
chances.125
In less than a generation, in concert with the opening up of the educational
landscape for mining engineers, and the increasing specialization of mine engineering
coursework, the employment field for mining engineers changed dramatically. By the
1890s, engineers who themselves graduated from college in the late 1870s or the early
1880s, barely a decade after the Columbia School of Mines was established, were already
125
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making excuses to their superiors on behalf of informally-trained co-workers whom they
wanted to promote. When William Field Staunton resigned from his position as
superintendent of a group of mines in Tombstone, Arizona, he recommended a man
without a university background, Bert Macia, whom he described as “a very good
practical man,” as his successor.126 Sounding both defensive and paternalistic, Staunton
explained to his superiors that “[Macia] has the advantage of being a practical miner and
the promotion would undoubtedly stimulate him to do his best.” Furthermore, Staunton
asserted, “I believe in promotion from the ranks where the man has good stuff in him
even though some of the embellishments may be absent.”127
What Staunton coyly referred to as “embellishments,” were nothing of the sort.
Rather, he was indicating to his superiors that he understood that a person who did the
work of a mining engineer – which, in 1908 when Staunton resigned from Tombstone,
included supervisory positions such as the one he was leaving – ought to possess a degree
from an engineering institution. By the twentieth century, institutional affiliation could
stand in for practical, “ground-up” knowledge, even in borderlands mines, some of the
least institutionalized and most anti-establishment mining districts in North America a
mere four decades earlier.
In the 1850s and 1860s, hard-rock mining in the North American West and
throughout northern Mexico was carried out primarily by independent prospectors,
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apprentice-trained miners, and auto-didactic speculators. University-trained engineers
came up through a system dominated by the German mining academy at Freiberg,
although they were, for the most part, Anglo-Americans from the northeastern United
States. After the U.S. Civil War, the Columbia School of Mines led the way in
establishing a new mining curriculum in the United States that was a hybrid of theoretical
and practical training, modeled on the system at Freiberg. The success of the Columbia
model, in combination with the establishment of several new dedicated engineering
institutions in the 1860s and 1870s, caused the faculty at engineering colleges more
generally to take mining seriously as a field of study independent from civil or
mechanical engineering. Narrowing curricular focus in mining programs through the late
nineteenth century coincided with a tremendous increase in the number of students
educated at the newly established engineering and technical colleges. At the same time,
the mining industry came to need workers who could extract ever-lower grades of ore,
and who therefore had advanced training in metallurgy and chemistry. By the turn of the
twentieth century, university-educated mining engineers were critical workers in the
mining industry; no longer outside consultants, mining engineers were, rather, integral to
the operation of a mining venture.
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Chapter Three
Expertise Enacted

As increasing numbers of mining engineers earned the E.M. degree from the
mining institutes created in the United States in the latter half of the nineteenth century,
the importance of mining engineers within the mineral industry grew. By the late 1870s,
a mining engineer was attached at one time or another to almost every mining project in
the western United States. This had the effect of engaging mining engineers in both
rhetorical and substantive battles concerning the use and meaning of their professed
scientific and technical expertise. The ability of mining engineers to reassure investors
that a given mining prospect was not fraudulent, to assess speculative risk, and to
participate in managerial decisions regarding mine operations became increasingly
important for their own professional success as well as for the success of the mining
operations to which they were attached. Meanwhile, the terms of such assurances also
changed. While in 1863 booster Sylvester Mowry could claim that the “character of the
men.... [was] a certain assurance of large returns” on a mining investment in Arizona, ten
years later such an assertion was no longer the only valence of credibility.128 Rather,
investors judged engineers by the quality of their plans for a mine, their managerial
abilities, and their use of technical knowledge to expose fraudulent mines, to investigate
the financial irregularities that flourished in the mining industry, and to provide definitive
responses to myriad arguments about the value and prospects of particular pieces of
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mining property. Mining engineers’ assertions of the integrity of their technical
knowledge, along with more established connections to the apprentice system and to
family and social networks, became critical in the late nineteenth century, as engineers
positioned themselves both within the mining community, and within the changing
professional mores of their field. New references to a mining engineer’s “body of
technical knowledge” did not usurp previously established modes of determining a
mining engineer’s worth. Rather, connection with a group of technical experts offered a
third way for a mining engineer to protect his reputation and argue for the validity of his
claims, particularly in cases where fraud or illegal activity was suspected on the ground.
In trying to impose their managerial plans at a mine, however, mining engineers could
find that asserting their technical expertise sometimes worked against them. This chapter
will look at episodes in the professional histories of mining engineers to demonstrate the
changing ways in which expertise was rhetorically defined during an era of
professionalization and modernization. Placing these episodes within the broader context
of both the regional circumstances in the U.S.-Mexico borderlands and the on-the-ground
work of mining engineers highlights the utility and complex nature of these new
assertions of technical expertise.
The social network within which mining engineers defined their technical
knowledge was composed of a web of familial ties. Many of the first mining engineers to
attend university in the United States were the sons of apprentice-trained mining
engineers, or of men otherwise engaged in leadership roles in underground work in
mining —foremen, superintendents, and crew chiefs. Thus, as in many trades, mine
engineering tended to be a family affair. Charles Hoffmann, who was trained at Freiberg
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and moved to California in the 1850s, had four sons, all of whom followed in his
footsteps as mining engineers; Joseph Collins, a mining man from Cornwall sometimes
referred to as “the grandfather of technology,” likewise had four sons who were
successful mining engineers.
The family of T.A. Rickard, the influential editor of the Engineering and Mining
Journal (1902-1905), and manager and editor of Mining and Scientific Press and the
Mining Magazine (1905 through the 1920s), offers one of the best examples of this
patrimony. Rickard was the great-grandson of a Cornish mine captain, the son and
grandson of accredited mining engineers, and had four uncles and brothers who also
worked in mine engineering, primarily in North America.129 Being a part of such an
established mining dynasty carried significant benefits. After Rickard, whose mining
degree was from Britain’s Royal School of Mines, over-valued a mine and lost thousands
of dollars of his employer’s money, he found a place for himself in the profession as a
writer and editor on ethical and legal matters concerning mining engineers. 130 Rickard’s
deep knowledge of, and comfort within, the mining world doubtless gave him the
confidence to give voice to some unpopular positions, and to argue with some of the most
well-established of his peers. In the early twentieth century, Rickard used his platform as
editor of the Engineering and Mining Journal to lobby for standardized professional
ethics and to bring to mine engineering education into the Progressive framework
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embraced by mechanical and chemical engineers.131 If the standards Rickard publicly
embraced were established, he himself would have likely come up short — he owed his
ongoing professional career to his guild-based fraternal connections, rather than to his
successful deployment of technical knowledge. Yet Rickard positioned himself as a new
kind of mining engineer against an “old guard” of which he was, through family
connections and generational affiliation, a member.132 Mining engineers could benefit
from their family connections in more standard ways, as well. The sons of Charles
Hoffman, all of whom graduated from university in the 1890s and early 1900s started
their careers as assistants to big-name mining engineers through their father’s
connections within the industry. Most notably, one of Ross Hoffman’s first professional
positions was as a junior engineer for the Guggenheim Exploration Company, headed up
at the time by John Hays Hammond, a family friend. Despite the liberalizing force of the
new engineering institutions, and their role in bringing more men, of more varied
backgrounds, into the profession, the ties of family, friendship, and school loyalty proved
an enduring force within the community of university-educated mining engineers,
complicating professional loyalties while providing their members with important
avenues of professional support.
One of the most established of the family dynasties in western mining was that of
the Janin brothers. Unlike many of their mining engineering peers, who tended to be
either of German, English descent, or (as T.A. Rickard expressed it) of “old New England
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stock,” the Janins were a French family that settled in New Orleans in the early 1800s.133
Three of the six Janin brothers were mining engineers, educated in Europe at the École
des Mines and the Freiberg Academy in the 1850s. A Janin was present at virtually every
major mineral strike in the west following the Gold Rush.134 Louis Janin, the eldest,
served as an assistant, and possibly the only university-trained engineer, in the
Butterworth exploring party in Arizona in the 1850s; in 1864, he was the metallurgist at
one of the largest mines on the Comstock Lode, where he instituted the so-called
“Freiberg Process” of barrel amalgamation to extract silver ore.135 Alexis Janin worked
with his brother Louis at the roasters on the Comstock, and after Louis tired of
amalgamation and returned to mine inspections, Alexis continued to refine the smelting
procedure, gaining a reputation as “a metallurgist of exceptional genius.”136 At the start
of his career in the 1860s, Henry Janin principally worked in gold mining in California.
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He had the reputation of being the very best American mining consultant. In addition to
conducting significant explorations at the behest of other investors, Henry Janin himself
was an early owner of the Homestake Mine in the Black Hills of South Dakota. He sold
most of his shares to George Hearst, but retained a stake in the largest and most profitable
gold mine in North America. In the next generation, Louis Janin’s two sons, Louis, Jr.,
and Charles Henry Janin, also worked as mining engineers.137 The trajectory of their
careers was shaped by the way their father’s generations asserted and enacted the
different modes of mine engineering expertise, both among their professional peers and
on the ground at the mine.

Surveys and Inspections
Through the late nineteenth century, a primary aspect of mining in which the
growing cohort of technically-trained university-educated mining engineers participated
was the crucial work of surveying and inspection of mining sites. During a typical mine
inspection, a mining engineer scrutinized the full extent of a property, to determine the
value of the ore deposits, or, in the case of an operational mine, the value of the property,
including extant technology, as a whole. Before the advent of the automobile, a mining
engineer walked or rode on horse or mule-back over the entire property. As described by
one student of mine engineering, a mine inspection needed to
include all the operations necessary to determine the relative positions of
any two points underground; to establish the position of points
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underground with respect to given points on the surface... and also those
[actions] necessary to its future prosecution.138
In other words, mining engineers had to find and record each outcropping,
waterway, or elevation change, and to accurately depict the latitude and longitude of
neighboring claims in order to map the direction, depth, and breadth of the ore body. If
the mine was on a new site that had never been worked, the engineer would also drill
holes to take samples of the earth at regular intervals in order to discover the direction
and extent of the ore body, as well as the composition of the ore itself.139 These samples
were usually sent to an assay office. Many engineers got their professional start in assay
offices, and many men who remained in assay offices for their entire careers were college
classmates of mining engineers who had majored in metallurgy and chemistry rather than
in engineering per se, reinforcing the significance of social connections and university
affiliations amongst mining engineers.140 When an engineer was called on to inspect a
mine operation that had already been worked, he was expected to go over the entire
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underground works, to map both the tunnels and the ore body, and take samples from
each ore face most recently worked.141
Fraud was a recurring problem during this period. There are many points in any
examination of a mine at which a sample could be contaminated or, in industry terms,
“salted.” It was virtually impossible for an engineer or his assistant to remain with all of
the samples all the time to ensure that an outside party did not tamper with them.
Oftentimes the samples were stored in the mine office or with the engineer’s personal
belongings until it was time to send them to the assayer. Engineers who inspected mines
owned by a person or consortium other than his own employer were sometimes
accompanied throughout the inspection by the agent or representative of the owners. An
engineer usually interpreted such close attention as an attempt on the part of owners to
keep him from seeing something that would either dramatically raise or lower the
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valuation of the mine, but it was just as likely that the owners simply wanted to establish
for themselves the integrity of an engineer’s work.
Such close monitoring of an engineer’s inspection, however, rarely lasted long.
The process of inspecting a mine was arduous and uncomfortable, and typically involved
walking or riding for fourteen or more hours each day for two to three weeks. Indeed, the
ability to withstand tremendous bodily strain during these inspections was a significant
aspect of a mining engineer’s working life, and a man who could not maintain the
marathon task of a mine inspection, or who “broke down” on the job, had little hope of
recovering his career.142 In remote areas such as the borderlands region, inspecting a
mine meant spending weeks outside in punishing hot weather, without adequate access to
water or familiar foods. Mining engineers in the nineteenth century often had to climb in
and out of mines themselves. Only the largest and most well-established hard-rock mines
had rail cars or joists to bring miners below ground. In the United States, this meant
walking down miles of tunnels or climbing up and down long ladders; in Mexico, it could
mean climbing up and down so-called “chicken poles” — notched logs that Mexican
miners who worked in soft-soled shoes or bare feet could navigate with ease, but that
evaded the grip of Americans’ hard-soled boots.143 Even the most enthusiastic owner’s
agent wearied of following in an engineer’s footsteps, and mining engineers typically
completed their inspections alone or accompanied only by their own assistant. Working
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as an assistant was an important part of an engineer’s career trajectory during the late
nineteenth century as the system of engineering education developed and became
established. These assistants were generally young engineers or students from technical
colleges, and had considerable responsibility. On large mine inspections in particular, the
mining engineer and his assistant might split up to hasten the sampling process, leaving
both men liable for ensuring the purity of their samples. For a solitary man engaged in
mapping and sampling a mine site, tampering with the assay samples was simple; and
although mining engineers themselves had a lot to lose from salting samples, they could
not trust anyone, including in some cases their own assistants, to refrain from doctoring
the assays.144 Although being a mining engineer meant doing many different kinds of
work, surveys and inspections were among the most visible, as inspection reports were
used to raise initial investment funding, and then used as baseline analyses in any work
moving forward. Under the best circumstances, mining engineers were aware of the
value of their reports, and scrupulous about checking their data.

A Western Diamond Field?
The nature of the profession, however, was that mining engineers did not always
have the luxury of doing their work “by the book.” Henry Janin had a reputation for
being “as cool as a cucumber, with a temper that could not be ruffled by… any breeze.”
His conservative reports on mine prospects placed him among the most trusted men
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working in western mining in the nineteenth century United States.145 As a result of this
high professional esteem, Henry was approached in 1872 by two grizzled prospectors,
Philip Arnold and John Slack, who wanted to prove to potential investors that they had
found a field of diamonds in the mountains of North America. Chief among the
financiers were two Civil War generals, as well as the mining speculators William C.
Ralston, the head of the Bank of California, and Asbury Harpending, all of whom were
apparently in agreement that if the conservative Henry Janin believed the mining claim to
be real, it must be real.
Arnold and Slack kept the location of their find secret, although metropolitan
newspapers in Chicago, San Francisco, and New York reported that it was in the Arizona
Territory, the only North American region deemed “exotic” and unknown enough to be
hiding such riches. The news that Henry Janin was heading into the wilderness to see the
alleged field of diamonds sparked a miniature diamond rush in northern Arizona, as
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speculators stormed the desert hoping to find gemstones for themselves.146 The location
of the mine was kept a secret even from Janin himself, and Arnold and Slack did nothing
to disabuse the notion that the mine was in Arizona. Along with Harpending and
Ralston, who insisted on joining the expedition, Henry was blindfolded for the duration
of a long train ride out of San Francisco, and then for a subsequent journey on horseback.
When their blindfolds were finally removed, the men found themselves on a vast, high
mesa. Due to the arduousness of the journey and the need for absolute secrecy, Henry
traveled without an assistant. He was therefore the sole mining expert in the field when
Arnold and Slack showed him their initial “discovery” of a raw diamond and a half dozen
rubies. The three men walked around the site a few times, digging shallow holes at
locations where the ground looked “different.” At many of these sites, they uncovered
still more gemstones —usually a diamond with a few rubies; sometimes only the rubies;
sometimes sapphires. By Henry’s own account, he performed nothing resembling a
standard survey of a mining site, and he allowed himself to be led through the site by
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interested parties rather than making the kind of methodical assessment he was trained to
make and on which his reputation rested.
Henry Janin later described his “stay at the diamond fields […as] so short, and
there was so much to be done in the way of locating, surveying and securing the property,
water rights and title lands that it left me much less time than I desired in which to
prospect and sample this tract of ground.”147 Upon returning to San Francisco —another
multi-day, blindfolded expedition —Henry supposedly sent the gemstones to jewelry
dealer Charles Tiffany in New York for valuation and wrote a preliminary report
extolling the virtues of the site.148 In addition to the report, he contacted some friends
and family to inform them of his belief that diamonds had been discovered in North
America.149
Many geologists, including the young Clarence King, recently appointed director
of the United States Geological Survey of the Fortieth Parallel, did not believe it possible
that there could be diamonds in the Rocky Mountains of North America. The science of
ore formation, and of the geological processes that created gems, were poorly understood
in the 1870s, but King was suspicious of the claim that diamonds could be found in the
western U.S. The 40th Parallel Survey had just mapped the Great Basin and the land
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encompassing the proposed transcontinental railway route. Although the survey had not
dipped down into the presumptive location of the gemstones, in northern Arizona, King’s
work indicated that the geologic conditions for a diamond field simply did not exist in or
around the Rockies. Should King be proven wrong, his own scientific expertise, which
was backed at great expense by the U.S. government, would be called into question.150
He had reason to investigate the diamond claim for himself.
Coincidentally, two of Clarence King’s assistants saw Henry Janin on the train in
company with grimy and weathered men whom they suspected were diamond
prospectors. Armed with information as to the general area Henry Janin and the
prospectors had been investigating, King and a couple of his associates from the survey
took a highly secret trip to Ft. Bridger, Wyoming, where they hypothesized the diamond
hunters had boarded the train. From there, King and his assistants rode south for about
150 miles until, somewhat fortuitously, they came upon the campsite recently vacated by
Henry Janin and company: a high mesa with plenty of recently disrupted soil. In short
order, King found several diamonds, sapphires, and rubies; closer inspection, however,
showed clear evidence of tampering. Most damning, he found gemstones only in those
places on the claim where the ground was disturbed. Sampling dry, hard land that was
clearly untouched by human hand did not yield any gemstones. Satisfied that the gems
he exposed were fraudulently planted, King returned to San Francisco, where he
immediately informed Henry Janin of his findings, and also of the location of the mesa,
in northern Colorado rather than in Arizona. The two men returned for a joint
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exploration of the site, and together published a formal report stating that there was no
multi-million-dollar diamond field in North America.151 The investors attempted to
recover the money they had already paid to Arnold and Slack, but Slack had disappeared,
and Arnold returned home to Kentucky. The governor of Kentucky was opposed on
principal to extraditing Kentuckians into the hands of Yankees, or of prosecuting his
citizens for crimes committed beyond state lines. Arnold was killed in a brawl a few
years later; he died the wealthiest man in his county.
In the aftermath of the diamond hoax, many professional mining engineers
pointed out that Henry Janin, who was trained at Yale University and the Freiberg
Academy in the 1850s, and whose mining experience was principally in ore extraction in
the western United States and Latin America, had never actually seen a diamond field.
Yet Arnold and Slack’s ability to pull off the hoax rested on how well Henry understood,
in theory, what he ought to find when looking for diamonds, and on their success in
structuring Henry’s visit to the site in such a way that he was unable to actually put his
theoretical knowledge to work on the ground. Another critical aspect of Janin’s role in
the “diamond muddle” was his supreme confidence. His preliminary report stated that he
“considered this a wonderfully rich discovery, and one that will prove extremely
profitable,” and it was reported that when King first approached him to express his
doubts as to the legitimacy of the field, Henry Janin brushed off his concerns, attempting
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instead to persuade King to buy shares in the company.152 He wrote those words despite
the fact that by his own account he had not performed his duties as a mining engineer and
he did not perform a proper survey. He had not surveyed the ground properly to
determine the geological structure; he had not planned or taken samples from the ground
at defined intervals; he only spent a single day on-site — this was not a thorough or
coherent inspection.
The role of Henry Janin’s expectations must be taken into consideration along
with his confident (or arrogant) belief that he could recognize a diamond mine. As an
experienced, educated mining engineer, he certainly should be able to identify the
geology of a diamond field. Yet all of Henry Janin’s experience — all of his on-theground expertise — was with heavy-metals mining. He had only read about how
diamonds present in nature, and never seen them for himself. Prior to his brief journey to
the alleged diamond field, Henry had seen and heard reports on the value of the diamonds
Arnold and Slack had brought to San Francisco when they announced their find. The
most prominent jewelers in town inspected these diamonds and reportedly gave them
exceedingly high valuations. For centuries, most of the diamonds in the world were
mined in India, but during the 1870s, the worldwide mining community was in thrall to
152

Covington Janin, “Requiem for Henry Janin, 1838-1911: Years of Gold and

Diamonds[,] Silver and Music[,] Days of Heartbreak,” [San Francisco: ca. 1973],
#433068, HL, frontispiece; Spence, Mining Engineers, 114; Pacific Coast Annual Mining
Review..., 50; Henry Janin to S.L.M. Barlow, 26 June 1872, Folder 3, Box 81, SLMB,
HL; Aaron Sachs, The Humboldt Current: Nineteenth-Century Exploration and the Roots
of American Environmentalism, (New York: Viking, 2006), 256.

104

the extraordinary diamonds the British were mining in Africa. If a new diamond field
could be found in Africa, many Americans reasoned, why not in the continental United
States as well? The atmosphere of great expectations that surrounded Arnold and Slack’s
claim, coupled with Henry Janin’s theoretical understanding of how diamonds present in
nature prepared the engineer to believe that what he saw was a field of diamonds. Henry
Janin unwittingly demonstrated that a little knowledge is a dangerous thing.
Despite the fact that his inaccurate report resulted in the embarrassment of
prominent figures in American finance, and almost created an economically devastating
“diamond bubble,” Henry Janin himself was never suspected by his peers in the mine
engineering community of being a criminal.153 Other engineers understood that Janin
was not given the opportunity to practice his trade properly on the alleged diamond mesa;
he was thus considered a patsy, rather than a man who had intentionally defrauded those
who trusted him. Janin only survived as an engineer because of his decades-long
reputation as a cautious mining engineer; a less-seasoned man could have been
professionally destroyed by an error of this magnitude. Henry Janin merely removed
himself from the region, relocating his professional office to London and avoiding
performing mine inspections in western North America for much of his remaining career.
The diamond episode thus underscores two features of the state of mining in the
1870s —the importance of reputation to a mining engineer’s professional career, and
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how reliant the mining industry, even as early as the 1870s, was on the judgment of
engineers to value mines. In the 1860s, companies with investments in locales that were
difficult to reach found it useful to hire experts to reassure their investors that everything
was above board. By the 1870s, dishonest mine profiteers sought out a trusted expert in
order to run a scam, and Henry Janin was hardly the only engineer to attach his reputation
and expertise to such illegitimate projects. Millions of dollars could depend upon an
engineer’s estimate of the extent of an ore body and the cost of extraction. In
consequence, when a company suspected deception at a mine site, mining engineers were
usually near the top of the list of suspects. Henry Janin, however, was never accused of
being criminally dishonest, largely because of his decision to publicly retract his
statements by publishing a report on the fraudulent diamond site with Clarence King.
Ultimately, King’s endorsement of Janin was as important as Janin’s personal reputation
as a “conservative” engineer or his status as a member of the well-connected Janin clan.
Henry Janin’s experience with the diamond mine illustrates the risk inherent to a
mining engineer’s claim to be a technical expert. Although investing in a mine was selfevidently a risky proposition, as professional men, mining engineers did not want to be
thought of as risk-takers, positioning themselves rather as strategic advisors. 154 As Louis
Janin explained, “[mining engineers] must be cautious in conclusions but bold in
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executing; an expert is cold nosed.”155 Mining was a speculative industry, and one reason
mining engineers were hired was to increase the odds that an investment would succeed.
The highest praise a mining engineer could receive, as Janin implied, was that he was
cautious and conservative. Mining engineers’ status as educated professional men rested
upon their deployment of technical expertise, the most obvious manifestation of which, in
the late nineteenth century, was the geological and mechanical knowledge mining
engineers learned at university. Obvious risk-taking suggested that such hard to come by
expertise was worthless.156 Yet the nature of the mining industry meant the possibility
always existed that despite his best efforts a consulting engineer would make a mistake.
After all, engineers understood that it was
“on the strength of the recognized integrity, ability, and successful
experience of the engineer that capital is invested in mining enterprises.
The success or failure of such enterprise determines the career and future
value of the engineer. He risks his reputation when he submits a report to
his client.”157
Therefore, mining engineers themselves had a rhetorical challenge when constructing
their reports. Sounding authoritative while also acknowledging that expertise had limits
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was a difficult prospect. Mining engineers made frequent use of terms such as
“cautious;” “conservative;” and “careful” in writing their reports, even when the
conclusions thus qualified were clearly absurd, as when an engineer concluded that the
ore reserves at the Mulatos Mine in Sonora were “by careful calculation, simply
inexhaustible.”158 More often, caution was asserted so as to highlight weaknesses in the
engineer’s own work. In a report on a mining property in Yuma County, Arizona, for
instance, mining engineer John Church reiterated his point so that it would be perfectly
clear: “No careful survey of these claims has ever been made... A careful survey is a
necessity before any purchase can be made.” Church had inspected the mine in question,
but did not perform a full survey. In the cover letter accompanying his highly qualified
report, Church noted that there was a reported $450,000 net profit to be made from the
ore in sight, and that he thought that it might be worth paying as much as $800,000 “b/c
what’s not in sight may be equally valuable.” 159
The dual nature of mining engineers — that they were always possible conduits
for mining scams as well as the best investigators of possible dishonesty — posed a
problem for the profession. In the wake of the diamond scandal, for instance, an editorial
in the Engineering and Mining Journal asserted that in the early days of the scheme
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“Henry Janin’s name was all that secured for this enterprise the public confidence.”160
The insertion of mining engineers into the center of the diamond case was self-serving of
the editors of the Journal, who took every opportunity to extol the quality of the mineengineering community as a whole, but drawing attention to their central significance
came with a price, as it suggested to the public that mining engineers might be
responsible for the failure, as well as the success, of mining operations.

Establishing the Credibility of the Profession
A simple but effective way for engineers to reassure investors of their
trustworthiness was to use a third party to vouch for the quality and probity of a mining
engineer. Such vouchers came in different forms, such as a letter of introduction from a
well-known engineer or financier or a statement signed by the upstanding residents of a
given locale. John Anderson, for instance, a “pioneer” and mining engineer who worked
in Arizona beginning in 1881, carried a document signed by the citizens of Rohnisville,
Humboldt County, California, his previous residence, which certified “that Anderson is a
machinist and engineer.”161 Prior to 1900 it was particularly common for letters in
support of an engineer to be appended to a mine report, suggesting that a mining
engineer’s claims to technical expertise had to be vouched for by non-technical people.
A report put out by the Loma de Plata mining company included a signed and notarized
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affidavit in support of the company’s engineers from a local Sonoran miner, who was
known locally to have milled and smelted an extremely valuable ore body estimated at
$640 per ton; a pair of mining men who were acquainted with the purchasers of the mine
that adjoined the Loma de Plata, and a presumably-knowledgeable third party, D. L.
Guernsey, whose “personal inspection of the Loma de Platta [sic] left him favorably
impressed” by both the value of the property and its technical management. None of
these affidavits were from mining experts who were known outside the region, but each
was presented in the report as a prominent mining man in the Altar district of Sonora. A
potential investor could, in principle, seek out these attesters to verify their statements.162
Likewise, the Aztec Syndicate published a report on the mines of the Santa Rita
Mountains, citing two articles from local newspapers as well as the work of engineer
Raphael Pumpelly to support its own engineer’s assertion that the mines contained
valuable ore.163 As the experiences of Henry Janin demonstrate, however, when mining
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engineers were brought in to survey a mining property, the words of other technical
experts, such as Clarence King or John Hays Hammond, who were presumably
completely impartial, were of much greater importance in supporting or undermining the
technical assertions of the initial mining engineers than were the affidavits of inexpert
locals.
Unlike laboring miners, who lost income, food, and lodging overnight when a
mine closed without warning, consulting mining engineers had some control over the
level of risk they took on at any particular mining claim.164 As they needed to promote
themselves as highly educated, skilled advisors in a context of economic uncertainty, they
utilized distinct rhetorical strategies when addressing capitalists and financiers about
mining issues. For consultants, the financial instability of the mining industry was most
frequently manifested in their need to find the correct level of endorsement for a marginal
mining property. Although the mistakes made by mining engineers opened the
profession up to the ridicule of the general public and the mistrust of both working
miners and mine owners, many successful mining engineers were skilled in the rhetoric
of qualification, a talent that is particularly apparent in mining reports written in the years
after mining was well-established as a regional industry.165 For instance, after receiving
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assays that were lower than anticipated on samples he took during a survey of the Copper
Chief mine in Arizona, engineer Harry Titcomb wrote to his employer that “as the
property stands at present it would not be at all attractive under the terms you
outlined.”166 Titcomb thus offered a bleak assessment of the value of the property,
without thoroughly discouraging the purchase of the mine. Should an investor choose to
purchase the mine, Titcomb could cover his tracks by noting that he thought the Copper
Chief was a poor investment. Should the Copper Chief make money, Titcomb could note
with satisfaction that he recognized the mine’s potential. In a similar vein, a mining
engineer cautioned in his report on a property near Alamos, in Sonora, that the ownership
of the property was uncertain, and that labor seemed quite expensive for the quality of the
copper ore available. Furthermore, with regard to a second mine on the property, the
engineer noted that the current manager was unable to speak Spanish or to communicate
directly with the miners, and therefore “the importance of the enterprise centers on
conditions of management, future technical policy and participation.”167
Carefully qualified reports could be seen to be the work of mining engineers
intent on protecting themselves from professional embarrassment or worse, but such
reports were valuable to investors, as they could serve as the basis for renegotiating the
purchase price of a mining property. Disagreements between mine owners and potential
purchasers over the value of a given property were at the heart of many mining
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negotiations; mining engineers were responsible for providing advice to potential
investors on how much to offer for a particular mine. Even in negotiating properties that
were tremendously rich, a potential purchaser could make an offer on a property well
below the asking price for the land, and if the owner could not produce enough evidence
to demonstrate the inaccuracy of the report, but was still determined to sell, that owner
might have to accept a much lower bid than anticipated.
A disagreement of this kind played a role in one of the most important mining
purchases of the nineteenth century, the 1881 purchase of the Copper Queen mine near
Bisbee, Arizona, by Phelps, Dodge, and Company. Despite the belief of the on-site
managers of the mine that there was a large body of ore deep underground, the fact that
shallower assays pulled up inferior grades of ore led a Boston-based company to offer a
low bid on the mine. The existence of this bid, made as Phelps, Dodge was getting
paperwork together to make an offer, caused company leader William Dodge
considerable concern, and he called on the mining engineers James Douglas and Eben
Olcott to find evidence in the field to help him to counteract the Boston company’s claim
so that Phelps, Dodge could responsibly make a higher bid and secure the rights to the
mine.168 Despite the work of Douglas and Olcott, Phelps, Dodge did not purchase the
mine in 1881, instead buying up land adjoining the Copper Queen. The work done by
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these mining engineers was not in vain, however. Phelps, Dodge successfully bought the
Copper Queen in 1885, largely on the strength of earlier surveys by Douglas and
Olcott.169
Another way that consulting engineers managed the expectations of their
principles was by using their initial reports to suggest that all a mine needed to be
successful was better on-site management. Engineer James D. Hague reported to the
owners of the Cusihuiriachic Mining Company in 1885 that “the whole thing needs
clever management, and the mine especially wants to be taken in hand by an experienced
man.”170 Although endorsing the mine, Hague simultaneously distanced himself from
any production that might result. If the mine failed, he could explain that it needed an
extremely efficient manager and if the company chose to hire an incompetent man, he,
Hague, could not be held responsible. Advocating for good management gave a mining
engineer considerable latitude for expressing his enthusiasm about a mine. Engineers
less circumspect than Hague also used this tactic, such as the man who gushed, “with the
proper management, this mine will pay larger dividends and continue to do so for a
longer period of years than any gold mine now in history.”171 Without the qualification
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that the mine needed good management, such unequivocal support for a mine could cause
an engineer’s professional colleagues to mistrust him, and in the worst-case scenario,
destroy a mining engineer’s consulting career (as happened to T.A. Rickard, editor of the
Engineering and Mining Journal).
Engineers with established consulting practices did much of their work visiting
and reporting on already operational properties. Although engineers who were managers
and supervisors relished the opportunity to talk to their professional peers, they were also
concerned that visiting experts would steal information about the technology or
techniques they were using, or would publish information that was detrimental to the
financial well-being of a company, causing investors to scale back or pull out entirely.
Because of this, managers tended to be cagey around consultants and suspicious of their
visits. William Field Staunton recalled of his time as manager of the Silverbell copper
mine in southern Arizona, “we had been reasonably free from experts for some time,
but.... for some reason or another they began to come again.”172 The cautious
relationship between engineers-as-managers, and engineers-as-consultants, is evident in
Staunton’s words. Staunton himself was educated at the Columbia School of Mines, and
as a leader in the local mining industry, he frequently made independent mine visits as a
consultant himself, yet he clearly experienced the visits of other experts as a burden to be
endured. As consultants, engineers were aware of the awkwardness of their position. Of a
mine visit in 1881, James Douglas noted, “The Longfellow Co. [in Globe, AZ] is jealous
of admitting visitors…. They relaxed their rule in my favor, but of course I had to follow
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wherever led, and my observations were necessarily superficial.”173 The awkwardness of
the manager/consultant relationship points to its effectiveness in ensuring critical
standards and practices throughout a regional mining industry.
Besides personal affidavits and rhetorical gymnastics, other more standardized
attempts were made by mining engineers to assure the public of the probity of the
profession. Some engineers thought that the existence of a professional code of ethics
would be the best means to gain the public trust. These engineers hoped that the
American Institute of Mining Engineers (AIME), founded in 1873, could serve as a
“gatekeeping” organization for mining engineers, much as the American Medical
Association did for doctors or the American Society of Civil Engineers did for civil
engineers. AIME welcomed members “practically engaged in mining, metallurgy, or
metallurgical engineering,” and initially had rigorous educational guidelines for
membership, ensuring that each member engineer was well known to his colleagues.174
The small membership of the AIME in the early years served as the most effective
guarantor on the honesty of mining engineers. By joining the AIME, mining engineers
agreed to be governed by collegial codes of conduct, spelled out in the AIME charter and
informally enforced by the community.175 The self-policing nature of the early years of
AIME, like that of many nineteenth-century professional organizations, was decidedly
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premodern, harkening back to the standards and practices of medieval guildhalls, which
were organized specifically to protect the interests of a small group of apprentice-trained
craftsmen. Unlike the new professional organizations such as the American Medical
Association, however, the AIME had no power to rescind an engineer’s membership or to
sanction a colleague who strayed from the straight-and-narrow. Although members in
AIME were closely vetted by other members, by the end of the nineteenth century many
of the educational guidelines for membership were dropped, and anyone affiliated with
the mining industry, including investors and businessmen with no formal engineering
training, could apply for membership. In addition, AIME could do nothing to prevent
nonmembers from working as practical mining engineers. Thus the organization, while
serving as an important clearinghouse for the mining industry, fell short as a standardbearing organization.
These weaknesses in the AIME organization meant that professional ethics were
an important and consistent topic of discussion in AIME’s own Transactions, as well as
in the two most prominent mining journals, New York’s Engineering and Mining
Journal, and San Francisco’s Mining and Scientific Press, well into the twentieth
century. Observers, particularly other types of engineers, felt that mining engineers, as
represented by AIME, were too responsive to the demands of finance capital.176 In part
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to counter such accusations, other societies for mining engineers were founded in the
early twentieth century, including the Mining and Metallurgical Society of America
(MMSA) and the American Mining Congress (AMC). While AIME members focused
their energies on “educational and technical” matters, and the AMC worked for
“economic and legislative” ends, the MMSA was established in 1908 specifically to
strengthen the ethical standards of mine engineering. The charter members of the MMSA
actually voted on whether the new organization should take “a positive stand in
controlling and improving the ethics of the profession,” or work for the “maintenance of
a high professional standard among its members and a constant endeavor to check and
eliminate dishonesty and fraud in the mining industry.”177 However, as with AIME, the
MMSA did not have the power to prevent someone from working as a mining engineer,
and therefore its ability to police the ethics of the profession fell short.
The absence of a strict gatekeeping organization for mining engineering was
particularly relevant for mining engineers working at mine sites that were somewhat
inaccessible, such as those in the new southwestern borderlands and much of Mexico.
The difficulty of reaching the mining regions of these territories from New York, Boston,
or San Francisco meant these regions were particularly plagued by accusations of mining
fraud — what one engineer described as the “kind of fakes [that] do Arizona more harm
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than good.”178 Perhaps this is why mining engineers who did spend significant time in
these locations were so frequently hired as consultants to check one another’s work. By
the turn of the twentieth century, the higher volume of American investment in the
borderlands, enabled by the new rail lines that eased travel into the region, resulted in an
increasing number of investigations of mines of dubious quality. Visiting salted, or
possibly salted, mines became more and more a part of consulting engineer’s work. In
the early twentieth century, both Harold Titcomb and Charles Hoffmann were brought to
mines in Mexico as outside experts to determine whether the mines had been salted. The
conclusions each engineer drew about the mine he surveyed is very clear; but each was
careful to couch his critique with reference to older forms of social interaction, rather
than solely within the realm of technical expertise.
Titcomb was hired in May 1910 to check up on a survey submitted by an engineer
named Kennedy on a mine near Naica, in Mexico. In the course of a lengthy
investigation of Kennedy’s work, during which Titcomb and his assistant checked and reassayed every fourth sample taken by Kennedy, and then conducted their own full survey
of the mine, Titcomb decided that “Kennedy was salted badly.” Titcomb explained the
fraud in detail: the assay results were, in general, too high; each sample left “unguarded”
by Kennedy during his investigation returned higher assays than the norm; Kennedy
grossly understated the cost of labor at Naica, and overstated the value of erecting a
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smelter at the mine; Kennedy’s estimates of ore “in reserve,” or as-yet unseen, were twice
as high as Titcomb’s.179
By Titcomb’s estimation, Kennedy was clearly at the very least incompetent, and
quite possibly was the person responsible for the salting. By returning higher assays than
existed at the mine, he gave the owners the ability to sell more stock in order to purchase
new equipment, and thus to make more money themselves, and, eventually, to sell the
mine for a higher asking price. With millions of dollars at stake, it was quite possible
that the owners consciously hired a mining engineer they could buy off. However, it is
notable that Titcomb never explicitly accused Kennedy of dishonesty. Rather, he phrased
the problems with Kennedy’s investigation in the passive voice: he “was salted badly”
and his valuation “was mistaken and too high.” Titcomb worked for the Guggenheim
Exploration Company; he was a well-respected, highly paid mining engineer of broad
experience. That even someone with such stellar credentials hesitated before
condemning a fellow mining engineer’s work is indicative of the strength of the code of
etiquette that governed the profession. The technical expertise of mining engineers was
something that they had to be vigilant in guarding, so unless there was something clearly
to be gained by proving a colleague wrong, mining engineers were loathe to criticize one
another’s work. Titcomb’s reticence also speaks to the difficulty of proving the
culpability of people who engaged in mineral swindles, even in the face of overwhelming
evidence that someone had tampered with the assays. The particular exigencies of
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working in the borderlands, and of maintaining good relations amongst the relatively
small population could also account for Titcomb’s evident discomfort in accusing
Kennedy. In the remote locales where Titcomb worked, professional standards were less
important than cordial relations with one’s neighbors. It is easy to imagine Titcomb
deciding that he would rather have a colleague of dubious honesty than a colleague who
disliked him.
The experience of Titcomb’s colleague, Charles Hoffmann, offers another
example of a mining engineer’s circumspection in the face of evidently tampered assays.
Hoffmann reported to his principles that a Mexican mine he visited on their behalf was
salted. The investors, led by mining engineer and financier John Hays Hammond, were
contemplating building a water flume at the site, but not in purchasing the mine. A
couple of months after submitting his report, Hoffmann received a letter from William
Fitzhugh, the owner of the mine. In addition to declaring his astonishment that Hoffmann
found the mine to be salted (“you never once intimated to me in the slightest way your
suspicion of anything wrong”), what is most noteworthy about Fitzhugh’s letter is his
tone of anger and betrayal. Fitzhugh was angry because an outside party might assume
that he, the local man, was responsible for perpetrating a scam. More critically, he felt
betrayed because he felt that, as a gentleman, Hoffmann ought not to have shaken his
hand if he believed the mine to be salted.180 In expressing his outrage, Fitzhugh was not
suggesting that Hoffmann betrayed any professional standard, but rather that the mining
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engineer had bypassed the social mores of a gentleman in the interest of furthering his
professional goals.
In replying to Fitzhugh, Hoffmann dismissed the idea that he was somehow
disloyal to the man, and referenced a distinction between his personal and his
professional obligations: “I was not making the examination for you, and although
personally friendly to you, it would have been unprofessional in me to inform you of my
results.” Furthermore, Hoffmann gave two reasons for his own astonishment that
Fitzhugh could be so upset with him: “the mines were salted and it was my duty to so
report, but I never accused you or anybody else of the salting.” Furthermore, Hoffmann
pointed out that anyone who knew, as he did, that Fitzhugh did not stand to make any
money from his contract with Hammond et. al., understood that there was no reason for
Fitzhugh to salt the assays.181 Hoffmann was a professional, and he wanted his
relationships to acknowledge that fact first and foremost, along with all it entailed —
technical mastery, social status, and membership in a privileged fraternal society.
Fitzhugh wanted his relations with mining engineers to follow a different pattern, in
which personal connections among social peers were more important than abstract
matters such as technical knowledge or professional standards. Hoffman’s observation
about the distinction between his personal feelings and his professional obligations
served as a rebuke to Fitzhugh for taking Hoffman’s actions personally, while suggesting
that Hoffmann abided by a set of social rules governing relationships that were different
from —and more modern than —the rules that Fitzhugh himself referenced. Yet
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Hoffmann made this point gently, trying not to offend a man who was clearly afraid that
he was being accused of salting a mine. A mining engineer’s professional knowledge
and expertise, which provided employment and an entrée into a privileged society of
professional peers, and the social grace needed to maintain a pace in that professional
fraternity, were often at cross-purposes. Mining engineers walked a fine line in critiquing
one another’s work. The question of who was right was not always as clear as Hoffman
and Titcomb found it to be.

The Oro Grande —Lies and Lawsuits?
Alexis Janin, for instance, found himself at the center of a mining lawsuit of
ambiguous validity. In 1888, the Oro Grande Company, a mining syndicate based out of
San Francisco, bought the Mulatos Mine, a gold mine located in the state of Sonora in
northern Mexico. Shortly after commencing mining operations, the company decided
that the recoverable ore was not of a quality or quantity sufficient to recoup the initial
investment. Faced with financial ruin, company directors decided to sue the mine’s
previous owners, Mexican nationals, for the return of the $800,000 purchase price. In the
lawsuit, the Oro Grande Company alleged that it had hired American mining engineer
Alexis Janin to survey the Mulatos, and that the company purchased the mine on the
strength of Janin’s recommendation. The lawsuit further implied that the ore sampled by
Alexis Janin during his inspection had been “salted,” or doctored, by the Mexican landowners. While the lawsuit did not claim that Janin orchestrated the allegedly inaccurate
assays, the implication was clear that the engineer had either misread the signs of salting
out of incompetence, or had quietly ignored evidence of outright fraud. This was the
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kind of allegation that could destroy Alexis Janin’s career, by making him out to be a
patsy, or worse.182
Naming Alexis Janin in the lawsuit was a red herring, as was much of the content
in the suit. Complicating matters, some months after Janin conducted his survey, and
shortly before the Oro Grande Company filed its lawsuit, there was a cave-in at the mine,
which reportedly “had done such damage as to seriously impair the value of the
property... [and] caused the stoppage of all work in the mine.” The superintendent’s
claim that he shipped tens of thousands of dollars of gold out of the Mulatos each month
was an outright lie, Janin argued, as the ore was not that valuable to begin with, and the
cave-in dislodged and rendered inaccessible much of the richest ore on-site. In Janin’s
estimation the disaster, rather than salting, was the reason for the company’s low yields.
Furthermore, his own report, based on an examination that took him seven weeks to
complete with three assistants, and which covered the newest and supposedly richest
portion of the underground works [much of which was subsequently destroyed by the
cave-in], concluded that the likely yield from the gold on the property would be only
$2.50 per ton, after deducting costs for labor and transportation. Janin himself spent
several weeks corresponding with his acquaintances and with the editors at various
engineering journals, explaining that his report “contain[ed] no expression of my firm
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opinion of the cash value of the property, and when I consider the list of assays given
complete in my report I am at a loss to understand why any one should have expected
them to give a high average yield.” Furthermore, he asserted, “I [would not] wish my
report altered in any way, it being a perfectly clear statement of facts obtained by the best
means put at our disposal.”183
The putative existence of a “high average yield” was the critical feature of the
case as brought by the Oro Grande Company. Alexis Janin firmly believed the Oro
Grande Company officers intended to artificially inflate the stock value of their mine by
only mining and milling the highest grade of ore at Mulatos and then promoting the mine
as a high producer. The cave-in at the mine, Alexis theorized, derailed this scheme,
causing the company to cry “salting” to explain why the mine failed to actually turn a
profit. By linking Alexis Janin’s name with the Oro Grande Company in the lawsuit,
company officers hoped to capitalize on his reputation and extensive connections within
the professional community of mining engineers, who took a strong interest in such a
high-profile lawsuit. Company officers were fortunate, moreover, in that the publicity
brought their case to the attention of Mexican president Porfirio Diaz, who offered to
refund the company’s investment if fraud could be proven. Once Diaz made this
proclamation, nothing could be done but to send yet another mining engineer to the
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Mulatos to determine if the assays checked by Janin were salted. The engineer chosen
for this delicate task, purportedly by Diaz himself, was John Hays Hammond.184
Hammond, like the Janins, was educated at Yale and at Freiberg, and enjoyed a
high reputation among his professional peers. Unfortunately, the only real record that
remains of his trip to the Mulatos is his Autobiography, an exciting, if not particularly
reliable, narrative of his swashbuckling adventures. It is also unclear who paid
Hammond’s salary, and as with Henry Janin in the diamond fields, Hammond’s employer
might have subtly influenced the engineer’s interpretation of what he found on-site. In
the Autobiography, Hammond states that there was no doubt as to the competence of
Alexis Janin’s survey, but that he, Hammond, quickly determined that the assay samples
Janin took were salted, and that the poverty of the mine was evident as soon as the ore
was run through the mill. The implication is that Alexis Janin should not have trusted
assay samples in determining the value; Janin himself agreed with this methodological
assessment, and insisted all along that he had desired to inspect the mine by other
means.185 Hampered by time and money, he chose to take samples and then analyze
them to the best of his abilities.
The involvement of Hammond in the Mulatos case, like the involvement of
Clarence King in the diamond fraud, brought a third-party engineer into the conflict;
unlike the diamond case, however, Hammond’s presence served mostly to create a “he
said, he said” discrepancy between two technical experts — Alexis Janin, and John Hays
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Hammond — who agreed that the mine had little value, but disagreed over whether
Janin’s assays had been salted or not. Alexis Janin never admitted that he had been
salted, although he did argue that if his assays were tampered with “that of course
relieves the experts from any responsibility; for having employed as many assistants as
the means at their disposal would permit, and only trustworthy men, nothing more could
be demanded of them.”186 The Mulatos scandal was in most respects a typical “salting”
issue. The lawsuit suggests that a mining engineer’s claim of technical expertise was
limited — all the Oro Grande syndicate had to do to deflect suspicion from themselves
was to claim that they had been duped, and despite Alexis Janin’s concerted arguments,
the Oro Grande officers were not pilloried as criminals or stock promoters. Who, after
all, could expect ordinary American citizens to stand up against the intrigues of
unscrupulous Mexican mining speculators? As with other aspects of this case, even the
conclusion is unclear. In his autobiography, Hammond claimed that since salting was
proven (by his own inspection), Diaz returned the money to the Oro Grande Company.
An undated mining engineer’s report from the 1910s states that the Supreme Court of
California returned the mine to its Mexican owners, but makes no mention of financial
settlement.187
The Oro Grande Company lawsuit also indicates the rhetorical utility of a mining
engineer’s assertions of expertise. Alexis Janin’s principle weapon against allegations he
considered libelous was to point to his technical work, citing at length and in multiple
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outlets his sampling technique and providing detailed assessments of his assay results.
He could readily assert that his accusers lacked the necessary knowledge to judge his
assessment, by claiming, for instance, “I am at a loss to understand why any one should
have expected [my samples] to give a high average yield.” In addition, he could assert
his authority by “call[ing the] attention [of other engineering experts] to the unreliability
of this method [sampling] of determining the value of so large a body of ore.”188

Technical Credibility and Labor Management: Louis Janin and Concepción
Mining engineers had to assert their status as technical professionals in other
aspects of their work, not only when called upon to adjudicate or investigate fraud or
salting scandals. The case of Louis Janin at the Concepción Mining and Milling
Company brings to the fore complicating issues in mining engineers’ work with labor and
in mine management.
In 1886, Louis Janin was appointed the superintendent for the Concepción Mining
and Milling Co., a gold and silver mine operating in a small U.S. enclave in Michoacan,
Mexico. The Concepción was owned by a group of investors from St. Louis, Missouri.
Initially hired as a consultant to write a report on the mine’s potential for the Board of
Directors, Louis was prevailed upon to direct the operation of the mine himself, once the
company determined it wanted to buy the property. He was able to negotiate several
perks into his contract with the Concepción: in addition to taking partial payment in stock
options and serving on the Board himself, Janin also arranged to superintend operations
from the relative comfort of his business address at the Union Club in San Francisco;
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providing, of course, that the company hire his choice of on-site manager. Janin,
however, would retain authority for all mining decisions. Thus he occupied a position
between a consultant and a manager, responsible at some level for aspects of both jobs.
Louis Janin’s skillful report was only partially responsible for enabling him to
negotiate such a generous compensation package. His reputation and connections were
as valuable to the new company as his technical knowledge. Janin had been working in
western North America since the 1860s, having first traveled to the Arizona Territory
shortly after the U.S.-Mexico War. In addition to his work on the Comstock Lode, which
established his reputation as a clever engineer, by the 1880s Janin had been successfully
managing mines in California for years, and from his base in San Francisco had access to
much of the eastern capital that was rapidly flowing to the west coast. Through his
brother Henry, who was by this time established as a consulting engineer based in
London, Janin also had connections to the most important capitalists of the era, including
the Rothschilds.
As superintendent, Louis Janin worked from an 11-point “to do” list he evidently
compiled during an on-site visit to Concepción in July 1887. This document contains the
kind of technical and mechanical suggestions a mining engineer was expected to produce,
such as a calculation of the cost of digging the shaft, and plans to “unwater [the] mine”
through a complex series of hoists. Janin also indulged in some peevish observations
about the construction of tunnels built before he took charge, which he described as
having been built “Mexican fashion ... zig-zag, and not level.”189
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Despite the detailed and orderly plans, engineering work at Concepción was
easily derailed, and not by technical concerns. In early September 1887, he decided to
fire the bookkeeper, a man named Smith, who was having some differences with Janin’s
hand-picked, on-site mine manager. For six weeks, Janin wrote or received one or two
letters or telegrams a day concerning Smith, to the virtual exclusion of all other
correspondence with the mine. The trouble with Smith, according to Janin, was that he
was incompetent; a poor accountant who behaved disrespectfully towards both the
manager and himself. The further trouble with Smith was that after receiving a telegram
from Louis Janin terminating his employment, he refused to leave his position, claiming
that the engineer and the mine manager had “acted meanly from the start and... not
worked in the interest of the co[mpany].”190 Smith’s refusal to step down infuriated
Janin, who in turn insisted that he “alone represented the Board, and... [he] must have
obedience from every subordinate, without any division of authority.”191
In thus asserting himself, Louis Janin received no support from the Board of
Directors, who were of the opinion that the mining engineer was in charge of the mine
works only, and so lacked the authority to remove an office employee. Furthermore, the
president of the company explained to Louis, “I have the utmost confidence in Mr. Smith
[the bookkeeper], and... am utterly at a loss to understand how he could have acted in a
manner to lose the confidence of [both the manager] and yourself.”192
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Up to this point, the difficulties Janin had with bookkeeper Smith could be
described as typical of a mid-level manager powerless to control his subordinates (due to
his physical distance from the mine) and undercut by his superiors. But Louis Janin was
not working for a large and faceless corporation: he was himself a member of the Board
of Directors of Concepción, and he was on very friendly terms with many of the other
Board members. He was also the sole technical informant for the Board, which
mistrusted the on-site manager. Despite his close relationship to the members of the
Board, they were unwilling to hear anything Janin had to say that did not involve
engineering, which was one reason he failed to persuade the Board that Smith’s work as a
bookkeeper was detrimental to the health of the mine. Janin’s vision of the scope of an
engineer’s work was more expansive that that of the Board. He construed his realm of
expertise broadly; they construed it narrowly. The Board failed to understand that the
mine was embedded within a Mexican community; when the bookkeeper at Concepción
skimmed profits off of the top, and took sides in local political affairs, as Louis believed
Smith had, such actions affected the workers at the mine, and the work—both technical
and otherwise—accomplished.
Without the support of the Board of Directors, there was little Louis Janin could
do, either to proceed with his engineering plans or to quiet the increasing discontent of
the people he referred to as “Peon’s” —the miners and support workers at Concepción.
By attempting to fire the bookkeeper, Louis Janin unwittingly placed himself in the
center of a complicated local power dispute that escalated on a daily basis. There were
reports that a local strongman, allied with Smith, was rallying to the streets crowds of
workers shouting “‘Death to the Americans.’” Terrified American employees refused to
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show up for work, and the Mexican miners, for all intents and purposes, went on strike.193
Louis Janin’s correspondence with his on-site manager mine at this point was entirely
given over to this labor dispute, and he despaired over what he considered to be the
foolishness of Mexican miners who were willing to disobey the directives of a man
(himself) who was to a large degree responsible for their employment.
Given the Board’s insistence that Janin was a “practical” miner, it is curious that
the bulk of the correspondence between the mining engineer and the President of the
company concerned labor problems at the mine —those same problems which the Board
insisted that, as an expert technician, Louis Janin had no right to oversee. Janin himself
considered the labor problems to be technical problems, and therefore under his
jurisdiction. The President wrote to Louis Janin of his dissatisfaction with the on-site
manager: how the manager had not sent proper reports to the Board the previous month;
how it was impossible to get information about the progress of draining the mine; how
the expenses at the mine seemed to be excessive, especially given “the cheap Mexican
labor, and the relatively low price of supplies.”194 The Board, furthermore, mistrusted the
Mexican system of contract mining.195 In a contract system, individuals and groups of
miners signed contracts to produce certain lengths of tunnel, with payment based on their
estimate of how long such work might take. Unlike an hourly or daily wage, this system
193

Amelia Kline to Louis Janin, 14 September 1887, folder 1, box 1, LJ, HL.

194

James Blythe to Louis Janin, 11 October 1887, folder 1, box 1, LJ, HL.

195

The Mexican system of contract mining is very similar to that of Cornish miners. See

Larry Lankton, Cradle to Grave: Life, Work, and Death in the Lake Superior Copper
Mines, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 62-63.

132

removed the miners from the direct supervision of the local manager or mine foreman. If
the contract were held by a miner who placed value on the well-being of his workers —a
wise move for a contractor, as then he had stronger workers who could accomplish more
—it could give miners significant leverage to enact work slowdowns or to renegotiate
their wages. If the contract were held by a person with more despotic tendencies, there
was no way for an employer to assure that the miners were being treated fairly or
receiving their share of the pay. This could lead to significant conflict on-site. In short,
contracts were usually an expensive system to manage, and the Board was desperate to
introduce a tiered system of wages. However, given the violence of the worker
dissatisfaction provoked by the Smith debacle, neither Louis Janin nor the on-site
manager was willing to implement a system that might, once again, stop work at the
mine.196
More than anything, Janin wanted labor relations to be left in the hands of the onsite manager, who reported to Louis Janin directly. Rather than agreeing to this
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suggestion, the President continued to pepper Janin with questions about new equipment
and about neighboring properties. 197 He expressed concern about the low grade of the ore
that was being excavated, and demanded that neither the manager nor Janin sign any
contracts for labor or equipment without first sending those contracts to St. Louis for
approval by the Board. This last demand, which Louis Janin did his best to ignore,
effectively removed the engineer from oversight of those technical matters he was hired
to superintend. Although the Board of the Concepción was responding to a particular
problem in a particular mine, this kind of conflict between Board and engineer was not
unusual, particularly for men of Louis Janin’s generation. Trained at Freiberg by mining
engineers who worked in the German context at small-scale mines operated by
apprentice-trained miners and superintendents, men such as Louis Janin had to learn how
to navigate the different labor conditions of North America on their own, and they
learned that labor management was a critical aspect of technical work. Without a
competent and well-trained workforce, mining simply could not occur, and by the late
nineteenth century, apprentice-trained, experienced miners were in short supply, given
the massive increase in the number of mining projects underway in both Mexico and the
United States. It may be that previous experience with a Mexican labor force led Louis
Janin to decide to employ workers who operated on the contract system rather than as
wage laborers, as he may have previously found contractors to be easier to manage.
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The labor unrest at the Concepción Mining and Milling Company highlights the
incongruous job requirements of late-nineteenth-century mining engineers. Louis Janin
was expected to be knowledgeable about mining practice and equipment and to ensure
that work proceeded apace. But there was also an implicit understanding that he would
be able to interpret local labor politics and practices well enough to prevent discord
within the ranks. He obviously failed in this regard. This can be attributed, in part, to his
actual physical distance from the mine. San Francisco is several thousand miles from
Concepción —a difficult journey of multiple days. Louis Janin’s failure can also be
blamed on the inherent complexity of the role of mine superintendent. As superintendent
and technical expert, a mining engineer was supposed to be a voice of reason — this is
why the Board of Directors paid him a rather high salary. Janin clearly considered
himself the final arbiter of work on the ground. He conceived of himself as the
authoritative voice at the mine; that he was considered by the Board, to be only a
“technical expert” was galling, emasculating, and ultimately undermined his authority.
As Louis Janin wrote to the president of the Board: “I do not claim that I was opposed in
Engineering details. —that would have been too much —But every policy suggested has
been rejected or so hampered as to become useless.”198 When he was fired, in late
October 1887, Janin contemptuously declined the company’s request that he remain
available for consultation on an as-needed basis, on the grounds that “from the very start
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there has been uncalled for opposition and distrust” in the management on the mine
[emphasis in the original].199
Louis Janin’s expertise—his education at Yale University and the Freiberg
Academy; his connections among elite businessmen in both New York and California;
his record of success in mining projects; the very credentials that made him a successful
mining engineer—enabled the Board of Directors to cast aside his suggestions with
respect to managing the particular challenges of mining in Mexico, on the grounds that
his work ought to be theoretical and technical in nature.200 Following the lead of Smith,
who complained that Louis had no authority over the mine, the Board of Directors
explained to the engineer that although “it is true we are not miners or experts, but we
propose to run this property on strictly business principles” —as if Louis Janin himself
were not aware of the need for the Concepción to turn a profit.201 Here again, the
specificity of the conflict between Janin and the Board highlights a more general problem
facing mining engineers who asserted the validity of their technical knowledge in
combatting complex problems on-site at a mine. By virtue of their training and broad
experience at many different mining sites, mining engineers considered themselves to be
experts on not simply the technological apparatus needed to extract ore, but on all the
mining operations, including the labor force, that supported that apparatus. Company
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owners, by and large, saw separate spheres of expertise: engineering, and personnel
management. Mining engineers understood this distinction (as Louis Janin noted, “I do
not claim that I was opposed in Engineering details”), but found it flawed. If more than
engineering was required to run a mine, and mining engineers were responsible for
running the mine, then mining engineers considered that “more” to be within their
purview. As at the Concepción, however, engineers often had a hard time making the
case that they were knowledgeable about nonengineering matters, or that personnel issues
were within their realm of expertise.
Indeed, how was a mining engineer to demonstrate that he had “expertise” in
management or personnel matters? Prospective mining engineers did not study
management in college — there was no academic field of business training in which they
could be schooled until well into the twentieth century. The only way that a mining
engineer could demonstrate expertise as a manager was through working in managerial
positions. On the basis of his resume, Louis Janin should have had no trouble declaring
himself an expert at mining in Mexico. In the 1860s, Louis Janin had been among the
earliest mining engineers to travel into the Arizona Territory; he followed up on his
tremendous success milling silver in the Comstock Lode with stints as a managing
engineer at several mines in Mexico in the 1870s before striking out on his own as a
consulting engineer.202 While Louis Janin understood the impact of labor discord on
202
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operations at Concepción more clearly than did the company’s Board of Trustees, he just
as clearly could not control the relationship between the mining economy and the local
political situation. It was widely believed among mining engineers and investors in the
nineteenth century that very few Americans had the “skill in handling Mexicans” thought
to be required to be a successful labor manager in Mexico.203 By virtue of his extensive
time in Mexico, Louis Janin was perceived to have such skills; yet since the workforce at
Concepción was not tranquil, his managerial expertise was readily dismissed by the
Board. An expert manager would not have let the situation get so out of control,
regardless of the external situation at the mine.
An important aspect of the industry’s recognition of the expert, or specialized,
technical knowledge of mining engineers is that the acknowledged value of expertise
varied depending on the context in which it was asserted. In situations where investors
felt nervous about their investments, or where they may have thought themselves to be in
Nevada,” AIME Transactions 19 (1890): 195; [Obituary], Engineering and Mining
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over their heads, such as the diamond mines incident, or in establishing a profitable
American export economy in Michoacan, far from the U.S. border, technical expertise —
and only technical expertise — was highly valued by financial investors. A
circumstance more familiar to American investors —for instance, a conflict with a
Mexican landowner in Sonora, such as that at the Mulatos in which Alexis Janin was
involved — meant investors were more likely to question the technical literacy of an
expert, such as Alexis Janin, but also forced investors to entrust yet another technical
expert with determining the rights of the situation. That such contradictory attitudes
towards engineering expertise were all in play highlights the balancing act in which
mining engineers had to engage when asserting their professional status, as they decided
whether to emphasize their social status, familial connections, or technical proficiency in
a given professional situation. For mining engineers such as the Janin brothers, the fact
of their superior knowledge and technical abilities was paramount, but they operated
within a small fraternal world of school connections and social status, and had to choose
carefully which networks to tap into at different times in their careers. When they were
hired for a job, mining engineers considered that their years of training and fieldwork
entitled them to high salaries and the respect of both their employers and employees. In
the surveillance of fraud, mining engineers found that although university-gained
technical expertise was not infallible, it gave them a critical tool for arguing for the
validity of their claims and opinions, and had real weight in the eyes of investors,
financiers, and other mine workers. In labor management and mining operations,
however, mining engineers’ claims of technical proficiency could be used against them,
and served to undermine their claims to authority in these other realms of mining work.
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Technical expertise, the aspect of mine engineering that most set engineers apart from
other mine workers, was a double-edged sword in mining engineers’ attempts to establish
the credibility and authority of the new profession in the business world of mining.
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Chapter Four
Westering Easterners:
Mining Engineering Identity

In the 1870s and 1880s, Mary Hallock Foote, the wife of Columbia-educated
mining engineer Arthur De Wint Foote, traveled with her itinerant husband to several
major mining sites, including Leadville, Colorado, Grass Valley, California, and a mine
in Michoacan, Mexico. Although socially well connected, Arthur Foote did not enjoy a
particularly successful career as a mining engineer, and for much of the late nineteenth
century, his wife supported the family with a career as an author and illustrator for
literary magazines such as Putnam’s, the Atlantic Monthly, and the Century Illustrated
Monthly Magazine. The success Mary Hallock Foote found in the literary world was due
to her ability to interpret, for a predominantly northeastern educated audience, the exotic
nature of the places her husband worked. In a memoir published after her death, she
described her husband’s circle of friends as “professional exiles” and “remarkable men,
cultivated, traveled, [and] original.”204 While this depiction of her husband as an “exile”
probably says more about Hallock Foote’s own mixed feelings about living apart from
her literary friends in New York than about her husband’s attitude towards mining camps
and miners, the gulf to which she alludes between the class background of university204
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educated mining engineers and that of almost everyone else in a mining camp was real.205
Class affiliation underpinned the professional identity of mining engineers through the
late nineteenth century, not only on-the-ground in mining camps but also in the popular
perception of mining engineers and in mining engineer’s self-presentation in the drawing
rooms and board rooms of New York and San Francisco.
Through the early years of the twentieth century, as mining engineers were
increasingly drawn from the ranks of college educated men, their class status was clear –
they were, after all, the sons, brothers, and classmates of mining investors and capitalists.
Historians have long noted that there is a fundamental conflict between engineering
professionalism and the business interests that engineers serve. In The Revolt of the
Engineers, Edwin Layton writes that mining engineers could never truly separate their
expertise from their collusion with the company line. In essence, Layton argues, mining
engineers were businessmen first, and principled expert advisors second, and this
205
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conflation of roles made mining engineers the most ethically compromised and least
professional of the engineering fields.206 Mining engineers would probably have disputed
this claim, and indeed the distinction between businessman and advisor within mine
engineering was fuzzy at best. Sometimes the only evidence that a mining engineer did a
good job was that a mine turned a profit. In this regard Layton is correct – mining
engineers were deeply interested in the fortunes of the companies they worked for, even
if they served only as employees and were not actually stockholders or in uppermanagement. As success for a company meant success for an engineer, however, it is not
clear that “good business” for a mining engineer and “principled technical professional”
were two separate things. Rather, technical knowledge was at the heart of the
professional identity of mining engineers, and they worked hard, as individuals and as a
group, to present themselves as competent technical professionals rather than as
spokesmen for any given company or for the industry as a whole.207 For mining
engineers working in the borderlands, the distinction between company man and
technical man was particularly complicated, as the “company,” as such, was not readily
present to protect them and enforce their authority in these liminal spaces. The central
offices and investors were, in general, located far off-site, usually in centers of capital
such as New York or San Francisco. When on-site at a mine even a very junior mining
206
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engineer was usually among the highest ranking company officials present.
Consciousness of their status pervaded the quotidian workplace interactions of mining
engineers and, in concert with their status as technical workers, underpinned the
professional identity of “the mining engineer.” Mining engineers negotiated their
bureaucratic status most notably by embracing their self-image as westering
frontiersman. This quintessentially American identity both reified their racial status as
white men and had a fundamental classlessness that could paper over the obvious status
distinction between mining engineers and the mass of mine workers.
By the late 1800s, due to changes within the mining industry and the profession of
mine engineering discussed in chapter two, the technical skill of mining engineers was
valued by mine promoters throughout the borderlands. With increased U.S. military
presence through the southwest after the Civil War, mining operations in Arizona, for
instance, were becoming viable in ways they had not been in the 1850s and 1860s. As
the odds that a given mining project would be successful improved, the drive on the part
of the industry to obtain more capital also increased. Mining engineers remained an
important piece of the fund-raising puzzle. Their expertise was still pointed to as
providing a reason to invest in a given mine, and mining engineers themselves, whether
working as consultants, project engineers, or managers, often reported directly to a
mine’s investors either in paper or in person.208 To be professionally successful, mining
208
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engineers depended upon their ability to merge their roles as technical experts with other
professional duties and obligations -- namely, to reconcile their work as consultants and
managers with different class, gender, and self-consciously “western” identities, as they
asserted themselves within an industry that required a steady flow of capital. As
consultants, mining engineers had to communicate with mine owners, board members,
and their agents – those people in the mining industry most associated with finance. As
managers, mining engineers were responsible to the capitalists, but principally interacted
with mine superintendents, foremen, and miners in the field. 209 In addressing each
audience, mining engineers used distinct rhetorical strategies to present themselves as
expert technologists who were qualified to assess mining claims and create plans for
exploitation. Within their professional community, mining engineers adopted a discourse
of identity that drew upon aspects of a distinctly American pioneer narrative to
underscore their competence to assess and administer such risk.
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From the 1860s onwards, the drama of working in western territories was a
critical aspect of the professional image of mining engineers.210 Raphael Pumpelly’s
memoirs exemplify the portrayal of mining engineers as men in the heart of “westering”
conflict, although his tendency to portray himself as scared and overwhelmed is unusual
for published work. Within a couple of decades, tales of the “Old West” had become one
of the defining features of professionals working in this region. One engineer, who grew
up in Missouri in a town whose bank was robbed in 1873 by Jesse James, was inspired to
study mining by his desire to see the “real” West. Of his first trip to New Mexico and
Arizona, in 1888, he noted “from what I read and had been told I expected the boys to
wear their guns and spurs while dancing, but instead I found them a jovial lot.”211 An
210
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obituary for Louis Janin by his old friend and colleague Rossiter Raymond made a great
deal of Janin’s early experiences with the Butterworth Expedition in Arizona, explaining
that Janin’s choice of career was directly related to the allure of the West he felt as a
young man. Janin cared little for the domestic political and military dramas of the 1860s,
according to Raymond. “[His] thoughts had long been turned to the new, wide, free
region further West..., [he was] already enlisted for that war which .... was waged by an
army of prospectors and miners, for the physical conquest of a new Empire.” Even
James Douglas, mining engineer and head of the Phelps Dodge Company which held
mining operations throughout the borderlands, told a story about feeling like a tenderfoot
when he first visited a bar in Arizona in 1881, and his fear at the time that someone
would notice how foreign he found saloon culture.212
Mining engineers whose lived experiences of southwestern travel were
legitimately “wild” did not necessarily enjoy those times in their careers when their lives
were in danger.213 In later years, however, that did not prevent them from indulging in
nostalgia for the “old west,” nor did it prevent them from perpetuating those stories when
they had the chance. The romance of the wild west remained an important narrative
strand in mining engineers’ reported memories of their early years in the field. “I heard of
Harry’s adventures in Arizona [in 1865],” wrote Raphael Pumpelly to his friend Louis
and W.E. Dodge to James Douglas, 12 October 1881, folder 30, box 3, James Douglas
Papers [hereafter JD], AHS.
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Janin, “and recognized the ‘philosopher’ in the coolness of his demand for spectacles,
while under fire.”214 In this account Pumpelly, who was familiar with how genuinely
discomfiting western adventures could be, grants Henry Janin one of the most prized
attributes of a man of learning, grace under fire. The “adventures” to which Pumpelly
alludes occurred in Arizona, suggesting that Janin’s party was besieged, possibly by the
same forces that so traumatized Pumpelly. That what Pumpelly finds to admire in the
story is Henry Janin’s grace under pressure – his call for something that clearly defined
him as an educated man, his glasses, no less -- is indicative of the significance of these
events as personal touchstones within the profession. Pumpelly suggests here that even
extreme circumstances, a mining engineer thinks carefully, and logically, and demands
the proper tools for pursuing his agenda.
The image of the engineer as westering adventurer inspired young mining
engineers starting their careers. As one mining engineer cogently recollected, he and his
colleagues were “entranced and thrilled with... the glamour and adventure that appeared
closely associated with such an occupation.”215 In letters home, and in columns in local
and national magazines, mining engineers portrayed themselves as quintessential
American adventurers. Their chosen profession, they argued, “has a life, a speculation, a
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profit, [and] a vitality... well suited to the American character.”216 At the Colorado
School of Mines, wearing a Stetson, the iconic hat of the western frontier, was a privilege
reserved for “manly” seniors and the younger students eagerly awaited their chance to
break-in their hats.217 Many mining engineers explicitly related themselves and their
working lives to the narrative of American westward movement.218 This attitude towards
mine engineering was summarized in a short essay entitled “The Engineer was Here”
appended to a note thanking James Douglas for providing the author, Frank Aley, with
transportation to Douglas, Arizona. While clearly a paean to Douglas personally, the
qualities Aley attributed to Douglas were general rather than particularist personal quirks.
Aley describes Douglas as being both like a “prosperous, intelligent farmer,” necessarily
attuned to detail and cautious by nature, and also like a railroad engineer, responsible for
“pull[ing] the throttle that turns the main shaft” of the Phelps-Dodge train. Of the
“wonderful system of commercial progress in Arizona and Sonora… he is the Engineer.”
In Aley’s narrative of development, early mining engineers, including James Douglas,
traveled to Arizona and Sonora when the country was wild and “pioneered” the
establishment of mining camps and companies. When the companies prospered, mining
engineers remained as the civilizing and productive forces in the economy working, in
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Aley’s words, “persistently, hopefully, and with profound discretion, playing the
wonderful game of progression with Dame fortune.” However overblown Aley’s prose,
he clearly links Douglas, and through Douglas, the mine engineering profession, to what
historian Frederick Jackson Turner the characteristic “American intellect”: “acuteness
and inquisitiveness; that practical, inventive turn of mind, quick to find expedients; that
masterful grasp of material things… that restless, nervous energy.”219 Aley’s many and
conflicting analogies of a mining engineer’s importance – the engineer as farmer, as
driver, as economic mastermind – all relate to a concrete mechanical ability, the mining
engineer’s “masterful grasp of material things.” To Turner, the presumed individualism
and intellectual attributes of the frontiersman were significant because they nurtured the
growth of democratic institutions. For mining engineers, ingenious creativity in solving
practical, technological problems was a key responsibility. This valorization of
supposedly practical skills was internalized by mining engineers as an aspect of their own
work out west. Indeed, a critical facet of mining engineers’ identification with the
pioneer spirit was that it served to protect them, in their own eyes at least, from
accusations that their university training, designed to give a technical understanding of
mining, actually rendered them soft and unable to understand the physical nature of the
work.
As part of mining engineers’ identification with a pioneering masculinity, they
were careful to explain, both to one another and to their friends and families back east,
that their work required physical stamina and a certain comfort with discomfort.
219
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Nobody, one engineer asserted, should join the profession who lacked “the physique
necessary to stand a great deal of hardship in all kinds of climate.”220 To reach the most
remote mining camps in the Southwest and Mexico, mining engineers had to ride on
horse or mule back for days, sometimes weeks. The work of mapping and surveying a
mine could take several months and involved walking miles a day, both above and below
ground. As managers, good mining engineers spent several hours a day in the loud, hot,
and stuffy world underground, actively supervising the work of miners: ensuring that cuts
were made in the proper direction; or setting up and maintaining water pumps to clear the
mine shaft. Engineers spoke amongst themselves disparagingly of “‘the ladies walks’ of
the mine” which they had all at one time taken or led. The phrase described those mine
tours that avoided all of the dirty or unpleasant places, suitable, therefore, for “ladies,” or
for those men who needed to be “shielded” from the workings of the mine, such as
eastern investors, or (probably more often) technical experts employed by rival mine
owners.221 As women were to be sheltered from making arduous or overly technical visits
into the mine; so men who could not handle the rugged world of the mines were to
remain in a sphere wholly separated from the real work of mining. The implication is
apparent that mining engineers themselves did physically and mentally challenging,
thoroughly masculine work.
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The audience for such demonstrations of masculinity was clearly other mining
engineers, who needed to be reassured that they belonged in the field, and in their chosen
profession, and that they were not “tenderfeet” with no practical knowledge of hardship.
As Gail Bederman has noted, the ideology of manhood is comprised of many strands of
cultural meaning, and is internally contradictory. Whether born to privilege or merely
aspiring to it — early mining engineers were mostly born to privilege, while men who got
their start after the late nineteenth century were more likely to pursue the profession out
of social ambition — mining engineers shared an interest with other privileged white men
in projecting themselves as genteel, respectable, and of strong moral character, traits
associated with a Victorian notion of manliness. Yet they also took pride in their
physical endurance, and in those experiences that set them apart, and that called upon
them to embrace a more modern concept of masculinity, one emphasizing physical
strength, risk taking, and virility. 222 In this emphasis on physicality they followed the
very public example of Theodore Roosevelt, who valorized the out-of-doors and who
held himself up as the very embodiment of the strenuous life.223 At a time when
222
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professional men chose safe, sedentary, interior livelihoods, mining engineers chose for
themselves a physically demanding profession that had them battling the elements more
often than not.224 This is in contrast to their peers in other realms of engineering, who did
not tend to work in quite such remote locations as most mining camps or operate under
such physical hardship, and in general spent a great deal more time in the drafting room
than in the field. As Timothy LeCain has noted, many mining engineers loved outdoor
life. They gloried in the beautiful vistas they saw when traveling to and from mining
sites, and considered their work to be respectful of the bounty of nature rather than the
violent extraction of the same. Indeed, many considered working in the rugged wild to
be chief among the benefits of their line of work.225
The desire of mining engineers to embrace a more virile concept of manhood was
apparent into the twentieth century, when mine investors were more likely to travel out to
mining sites to see the prospects for themselves. By this time, travel to remote mining
camps was no longer quite as daunting as it had been in earlier decades, although it was
still not without challenge. The physical risks that earlier regional mining engineers took
in the speech was to argue for a vigourous and engaged foreign policy – in particular, in
favor of war with Spain and the construction of the Panama Canal – a secondary thrust of
the speech was in support of individual action: “the highest form of success [comes]… to
the man who does not shrink from dager, from hardship, or from bitter toil, and who out
of these wins the splendid ultimate triumph.” Theodore Roosevelt, The Works of
Theodore Roosevelt, (New York: Century, 1901) 3-22.
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as a matter of course simply to reach mine sites were no longer necessarily a part of the
job. Rather, mining engineers now supported their adopted identity as virile outdoorsmen
by acerbically distinguishing the discomforts inherent to their work to the comforts
embraced by their more sedentary counterparts. Joseph Obermuller’s smug recounting of
a story about a group of investors he encountered near Nacozari, Sonora in about 1905,
who were unprepared for the difficulty of traveling around Mexico and had been obliged
travel to the Tigre Mine on mules, offers a good indication of how mining engineers
viewed these excursions:
Anyone that ever rode a freight mule can best understand what these men
must have endured, especially as most of them had never been in a saddle
– all being business, or one should say office, men not used to hardships....
Some of them were sore in mind and body. Others got a thrill and were
inclined to joke, while others resented anything funny.226

Obermuller paints a comical picture of a group of bumbling dandies, many of whom had
never ridden a horse let alone a mule, tramping through the Sonoran desert. This story
also implies that Obermuller himself was no stranger to the discomfort of riding a freight
mule – and, by extension, that this surely uncommon occurrence was something that most
mining engineers would have experienced at one time or another. Tales of the antics of
investors in the field, and the utter lack of physical confidence demonstrated by so-called
“office” or “business” workers were a trope of mining engineers’ storytelling. Such
mockery of investors asserted mining engineer’s physical superiority to their employers,
226
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and served a parallel purpose to the mockery of mining engineers practiced by working
miners – as comfort to men who had little control over the vagaries of their existences, at
least as related to the mining industry.227
With such a clear sense of themselves as physically tough, mining engineers were
particularly sensitive to the charge that they were unable to understand the needs of
ordinary miners. Their attempts to manage a labor force were intimately connected to
their understanding that they were sophisticated professionals with a distinctive western,
and thoroughly masculine, status.228 In management, mining engineers embraced the
suggestion that they were rugged western adventurers working in one of the most
physically demanding industries in nineteenth-century America. Mining engineers’
imagined identity as frontiersmen had particular resonance in the borderlands region in
the later decades of the nineteenth century, ultimately influencing the work of mining
engineers as managers and supervisors in the homosocial labor world of the mine.
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The internal contradiction of mining engineers’ embrace of the “frontiersman”
iconography is apparent. There is an anti-intellectual bias evident when mining engineers
presented themselves as frontiersmen, which is in notable contrast to the class
background of the vast majority of mining engineers noted by observers such as Mary
Hallock Foote. Historian Clark Spence described western mining engineers in the late
1870s and 1880s as “remarkably sophisticated men.... no other group in the West was as
well traveled and as well educated.”229 By virtue of their formal education and generally
broad experience in the world, mining engineers were members of the cultural elite at the
end of the nineteenth century. The erudition of educated mining engineers served them
well in the drawing rooms and social clubs of New York or San Francisco, where many
maintained permanent offices. But this same technical training, which assured mining
engineers of their status as technical experts and provided the social authority for their
work also implied a lack of hands-on experience which mining engineers strove to
combat.
Agreeing to take control of the day-to-day workings of a mine was a calculated
risk, one that could end poorly for both a mining engineer and the mine owner.
Experienced mining engineers were well aware that the culture of apprenticeship that
dominated western mining labor into the late nineteenth century valued length of service
over possible depth of theoretical knowledge. Although the complications of hard-rock
mining demanded the managerial and technical expertise of university –trained mining
engineers, any mining operation that relied on high-grade ore – which is to say, most
229
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heavy-metals mining prior to the turn of the century – also relied on skilled miners, who
knew first-hand when an engineer made a bad decision, because they were responsible
for searching for non-existent ore bodies.230 As one engineer explained, a skilled miner
could “find... out very quick whether his superior possesses the required knowledge, or
not, and if not, is impudent enough to criticize and ridicule him.”231
Exacerbating the anxiety many mining engineers felt about exerting their
authority over skilled miners in remote mining camps was their deeply conflicted sense
of masculine identity.232 Historian of engineering Ruth Oldenziel discusses the role of
class in the dueling notions of manhood that were present in canal-, rail- and bridgebuilding labor camps of the late nineteenth century. Oldenziel argues that such “labor
camps… were largely societies of men, where hard living, hard working, and hard
drinking were cherished values, reminding many an aspiring engineer of the kind of
proletarian manhood they were determined to avoid at all costs.”233 Aspiring civil and
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mechanical engineers worked cheek-by-jowl on these construction projects with both
skilled and unskilled immigrant laborers from around the world. These engineers set
themselves apart from the mass of manhood surrounding them through a variety of
markers, including, most obviously, their attire. Mining engineers favored wide-brimmed
hats, tailored shirts, jackets, and trousers, and tall laced boots. They considered working
as a laborer to be a “productive” form of physical exercise, but Oldenziel notes that
although aspiring engineers saw in the carousing and raucous society of labor camps a
form of working-class manhood that they sought to avoid, they were also drawn to the
proclamations of brotherhood and solidarity that formed the backbone of the culture of
working men’s lives in these places. The disjuncture in these images of masculinity,
Oldenziel argues, could only be overcome by seeking a professional career – one that
valorized practicality, physical fitness, and the fraternal world of working men – all of
which were component parts of the budding profession of engineering. 234
Mining camps were very much like the work camps Oldenziel describes: maledominated societies, replete with opportunities for men to prove themselves in contests
and competition. Yet unlike the civil and mechanical engineers of whom Oldenziel
writes, it is not clear that mining engineers were terribly concerned with setting
themselves apart from the performance of manhood as enacted in mining camps,
although they were instantly recognizable on-site by their sartorial choices. Mining
engineers placed much greater emphasis on the physicality of their work than did civil or
mechanical engineers; they were not front-office workers. They used their identification
with “pioneering” masculinity not only to counter their own discomfort with the more
234

Oldenziel, Making Technology Masculine, 57-58.

158

proletarian masculinity of working miners, but also as a way to understand ordinary
miners so as to inform their own labor management tactics.
Mining engineers adopted a discourse of physical valor when interacting with
their social peers, but they emphasized other aspects of their professional identity when
interacting with working miners, particularly when working as managers and in
circumstances with their role was to directly represent the interests of a mining company.
For instance, mining engineers agreed that it was important to spend time with miners,
not to learn about their work, but to get to know them as men. “The personal equation is
everything” one engineer stated, because “when you get a large number of men under one
management you obliterate that personal equation and so render the relations
unhuman.”235 It is evident that, in general, mining engineers did not socialize with
ordinary miners, nor did they, again in general, have much empathy for the plight of the
ordinary working man, so this exhortation to get to know miners as individuals should
not be taken literally. Rather, it speaks to a desire to keep relations on a human scale,
such that mining engineers and workers could interact “man to man.” One engineer
wrote a treatise for an investor on the skills needed to manage a mine in Mexico; chief
among them was the exhortation to “be just towards the common men” in order to “be
sure that the employees will work hand in hand with him, as they look at him as their
superior… in knowledge.”236 The ability to feel compassion, and to behave with fairness
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towards other people was a central facet of middle-class manhood in the late nineteenth
century, and mining engineers evidently embraced this ideology wholeheartedly.237
Such rhetorical focus on the importance of “man to man” interaction between
mining engineers was perhaps embraced by mining engineers to convince themselves that
their opposition to labor unions was due to disdain for the tactics, rather than the goals, of
organized labor. After all, the chief goal of an organization such as the Western
Federation of Miners was to improve the health and well-being of miners, a project which
directly benefited the work of mining engineers, who were well aware that a contented
workforce was better than a dissatisfied one. Contented miners both produced quality
mining work and experienced lower than average labor turnover, which could be as high
as one-third of the labor force each month in Arizona at the turn of the century.238 The
reasons mining engineers opposed unions are relatively self-evident: chief among a
mining engineer’s tasks was to improve the efficiency of a mine – in other words, to cut
expenses and raise production. By agitating for higher wages, labor unions also undercut
one of the primary ways to cut production expenses.239 Strikes, of course, were a
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particularly powerful tool for union organizers, and such industrial actions cut at the heart
of the work of mining engineers by destroying carefully calculated estimates of expenses
and production. In their opposition to unions, therefore, mining engineers embraced that
aspect of their professional identity noted by Edwin Layton – their professional selfinterest aligned with the demands of capital.
When the Western Federation of Miners tried to unionize mine workers in the
Southwest, for instance, many mining engineers were infuriated, considering that the
union created problems rather than solving them. “It was a fairly contented and happy
community,” William F. Staunton wrote of the Congress mine in Prescott, Arizona, “until
the Western Federation of Miners began to try to unionize it.” Staunton noted that even
in its formal petition to open shop, the Western Federation of Miners (WFM) issued “no
complaint whatsoever about wages, working or living conditions, which were specifically
stated to be satisfactory,” but that shortly afterwards there was a strike necessitating a
mine shutdown and pictures of Staunton’s foreman were run in the paper under the
heading “King Scab in Arizona.”240 Another managing engineer, after experiencing
threats on his life and uncovering a plot to dynamite his house, considered his best
weapon against the WFM to be what he deemed honest and open communication with the
working miners. He instituted a policy not uncommon in Arizona, of only hiring workers
who could be eligible for union membership – in other words, only white men – yet never
240
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explicitly forbade them from joining the union, because he believed that by offering them
what he called, “a day’s work for a day’s pay” he could undercut their desire to join the
WFM. Indeed, the mining engineer’s argument with the union was ostensibly not that it
existed, but that it demanded a closed shop, which he considered un-American.241
However, the evident vitriol that at least some miners felt towards this engineer belies the
engineer’s belief in the power of man-to-man interaction.
In addition to the knowledge claims that mining engineers were able to make if
they had “practical” experience as a miner, engineers also extolled practical experience as
a way to improve an engineer’s sense that he had the ability to speak to miners
effectively.242 L.D. Ricketts explained to an interviewer in the 1920s that
manual work gives... [a mining engineer] the opportunity to know the
viewpoint of the workman; and, if in the future he is called upon to handle
men, such an experience is immensely valuable to him. This is merely an
opinion, because I have not worked either as a miner or a smelter-hand;
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but I have always regretted that I did not have a little experience of the
kind, in order that I might be closer to the worker’s viewpoint.243
When he made those remarks, Ricketts was the superintendent of one of the largest
copper mines in the western hemisphere. He was known not only for his tremendous
successes building southwestern mines, but also for what might be described as an
ostentatious modesty. His appearance was described by peers as “common as an old
shirt” and “not much on clothes,” affecting rumpled, work-stained attire, scuffed boots,
and worn headgear — a dress code greatly at odds with his background as a Princeton
Ph.D. and his work as the chief engineer for Phelps Dodge. Despite, or perhaps because
of, Ricketts’ self-conscious realization that he did not fully understand the physicality of
mining, throughout his career he was known for shunning many external markers of his
success. In his professional work, this took the form of being well-known to be a
generous consultant, always seeking the opinion of others. In the words of the perennial
commentator on mining engineers, T.A. Rickard, Ricketts was “not cocksure, but
deliberate.” In Ricketts’ lack of sartorial style can be seen an attempt to blend in with the
more proletarian mining workforce rather than a visible exaltation of his status as a
mining engineer. Stories abounded in mining communities about people who were
confounded by Ricketts’ appearance, mistaking him variously for a miner, a vendor, or a
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hobo.244 Ricketts’ personal appearance garnered so much attention precisely because it
was at odds with what was normal among the fraternity of mining engineers.
Ricketts’ stated regret that he was unable to legitimately empathize with his
workers is further evidence that mining engineers had many reasons to embrace the more
rugged physicality of miners at the expense of flaunting their own status as social elites,
Such an assertion can readily be interpreted to be a gloss of Ricketts’ desire to
“understand” working miners so as to learn how to manipulate his workers, or, in a more
sinister fashion, subvert workers’ attempts to organize on their own behalf. To some
extent, of course, this is true – mining engineers did not like working with unions, which
they rightly understood to be powerful political forces that could easily disrupt mining
operations and destroy hairline budgets. Yet Ricketts was not completely cynical. The
prevalence of the discourse of identification with working miners in trade publications as
well as personal letters and memoirs; the critical importance of programs such as the
Columbia Summer School for getting budding mining engineers into the tunnels; the
continued need for skilled, apprentice trained miners through the early twentieth century;
all point to real practical advantages for mining engineers who could easily grasp how
their directives sounded to a working miner. An experienced miner was likely to have
spent time working with both good mining engineers and poor ones, and to have worked
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his share of successful and unsuccessful mines. He could tell when a mining plan might
fail, because he had seen it happen before.
The rationale behind the desire to empathize with working miners has been
overlooked by historians of labor, who tend to assume that as mining engineers were
structurally opposed to mine workers in labor disputes, they operated from a position of
cynical contempt for workers. A. Yvette Huginnie, for example, insists that mining
engineers used their “expert knowledge” to “gain leverage over the workers” in Arizona
towards the end of the nineteenth century.245 What leverage, precisely, did highly
educated engineers have over the average mine worker that less well-educated,
apprentice-trained, “up through the ranks” foremen and superintendents did not?
Working miners were not the audience for mining engineers’ displays of erudition; their
supervisors were. Whether or not miners felt a kninship with engineers who had
experience with manual labor is somewhat ambiguous, although it is likely that such
experience could generate respect. As Frank Crampton, a miner-turned-mining engineer
observed of his fellow engineers, “most of them were too far up in the clouds to have
truck with ordinary hard-rock stiffs. They would have done better and learned more had
they comedown [sic] the earth.”246 By this, Crampton meant that the miners thought that
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engineers did not understand how mining labor was organized, nor did they understand
the tremendous physical labor it took for miners to extract ore from the ground.
.Mark Wyman and Ronald Brown both argue that the introduction of mechanized
technology into western mining camps, attributable to the presence of engineers, led to
the de-skilling and proletarianization of miners. In turn, this led to the increasing
radicalization of the mining labor force, assuming engineers to be perpetually in
opposition to working men.247 Nineteenth century mining engineers, however, were
invested in the lives and experiences of both labor and management, and the pride many
mining engineers felt in the physicality of mining work was useful for them in
negotiating that liminal position.248 Although many mining engineers did serve as the de
facto face of the company in on-the-ground negotiations with working miners, they
tended to bemoan labor conflicts, not only because they lost money, but because they
gave voice to the inequities of mining camps which engineers, with their valorization of
247
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physical work and pioneering identity, would likely prefer to ignore. Trained to read
geographic landscapes, to extract ore from hard rock, and to build complex machinery,
mining engineers were poorly equipped by their education to handle labor management
issues. Courses in administration and accounting were not typically added to university
programs until the twentieth century, and even then took a back seat to math, physics, and
mechanics.249 As Louis Janin found at Concepcion, when mining engineers expressed
strong feelings about labor-management issues, their voices were likely to be ignored.
Thus mining engineers had a strong incentive to concentrate on technical issues rather
than issues of personnel, and the evidence is strong that they weighed in on the actual
question of which workers to hire, and how to treat them, only under duress.
A salient aspect of the class distinction in mining camps in the southwestern
borderlands that mining engineers ignored rather more successfully were racial and
ethnic divisions within mining camps. In general, mining engineers appeared to have
shared in the anti-Mexican sentiment common in the United States in the nineteenth
century. These beliefs consisted of a lazy and thoughtless stereotyping of Mexicans as
lazy, dirty, and/or unethical; Mexican food as gruesome; and a general sense that
Mexican mining was characterized by “indifference, waste and insufficient
machinery.”250 Given how closely many mining engineers worked with non-Anglo
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workers, however, they could be clear-eyed about the antagonism bred by such attitudes.
Raphael Pumpelly once observed that the Mexican workers “felt only hatred” towards
their American employers in the silver mines near the U.S.-Mexico border. He
acknowledged that this may have had something to do with the practice of the American
companies of “paying the Mexicans the greater part of their wages in cotton and goods,
on which the company made a profit of from one hundred to three hundred per cent” –
hardly a circumstance to warm the relationship between employer and employed.251 A
common sentiment among mining engineers was that “Mexican labor is cheap, and if
properly managed can be used to great advantage,” but that Mexicans always needed to
be trained to accomplish tasks that white Americans were already competent to fulfill.252
That sentiment, not surprisingly, was a canard, as many white mine workers were hired
as skilled workers – blacksmiths, furnacemen, or mechanics – and any unskilled workers,
Mexican or otherwise, would have to be trained to fill such positions.
What Pumpelly observed of the poor treatment of Mexican (and later, MexicanAmerican) workers by American companies was only the beginning of a clear practice of
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discrimination, one which mining engineers, as a group, failed to protest: the dual wage
system. This practice, of having one pay scale for white workers and another for nonwhite workers, was widespread, and was justified by the belief prevalent among mining
engineers that non-white workers were more ignorant than their white counterparts. One
mining engineer in southern Arizona summarized the prevailing attitude towards the
available workers when he fitfully complained that
we have found it exceedingly difficult to get competent labor of all classes…. We
find that the Mexicans we get here are of a very disreputable and tough class, and
on pay days generally cause riotous disturbances. We, however, employ them
where skill is not required…253
A particularly striking example of the income disparity was in place at the Longfellow
Mine in 1880, where Chinese miners were paid $40/month; Mexican miners $50/month,
and “American” [white] miners $75/month.254 The Chinese and Mexican workers were
underground ore miners; the Americans were on “dead-work,” or work that was not
directly profit-making, such as preparatory work of opening a mine, and, later, shoring up
the mine shafts and performing routine maintenance. Although the dead work is critical
to the functioning of a mine, it was usually held in low regard by mine owners and
operators. Indeed, the cost of dead work was often estimated out by mining engineers at
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approximately $1/ton of ore produced, while ore extraction cost three times as much.255
That the Longfellow management entrusted the usually higher-valued underground work
to non-white workers indicates that the company was probably in dire financial straights.
The ingrained nature of the dual-wage system is underscored at a mine where white
workers, doing work deemed of secondary importance were paid almost double the
wages of non-white laborers on operations considered critical to the management.256
Despite mining engineers’ reluctance to allow Mexican workers to hold positions
of responsibility, many engineers took small steps to make those workers on whom a
mine was dependent comfortable. As managers, engineers consistently looked for ways
to encourage workers to be more productive or to undermine their desire to unionize,
which many engineers considered to be the same thing. In 1889, for instance, William
Church established both English- and Spanish- language reading rooms for employees at
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the Phelps, Dodge properties in Morenci, Arizona. He believed that access to these small
libraries was critical to maintaining the morale of the workers, and wrote to his principals
requesting reading materials.257 As early as 1885, some mining engineers in Mexico
advocated hiring men for three eight-hour shifts, rather than for two ten-hour shifts, on
the understanding that underground work was simply too exhausting to be undertaken for
ten hours straight.258 The rumor circulated in 1900 that the United Verde mine at Jerome
raised wages 15% and put men on an eight-hour shift. In response, an engineer at the
nearby Ray Consolidated engineer told his Board of Directors “this is liable to cause
trouble to other mine owners,”259 and, by extension, to other engineers. Engineer John G.
Greenway, who as the president of the Arizona Copper Company was one of the
executives involved in the infamous Bisbee Deportation of 1917, and was not known for
generous policies towards non-white workers, established Sunday as a day of rest
throughout his mines in Arizona, a progressive action for 1910.260 Even if Greenway’s
decision was made for the most cynical of reasons, to undercut a strike effort and to
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police the leisure-time activities of the company’s workers – and there is reason to
believe it was – as a mining engineer who had spent considerable time underground, he
believed that a mandated day of rest materially benefited the lives of workers at the
Arizona Copper Company.
Although there is no evidence that engineers colluded, or even formally
discussed, wage scales or welfare provisions for working miners, the contradiction within
their labor-management goals – the need to placate workers and their need for keeping
labor expenses low – was difficult to overcome. Mining engineers had a practical desire
to stave off unionization without resorting to violence or other disruptive measures. The
rhetorical emphasis on middle-class decency was a weak attempt to assert a consistent
labor strategy over an aspect of mine engineering work that fell outside the parameters of
technical knowledge, yet was not as susceptible to manipulation via the vigorous
assertion of a frontier masculinity as were mining engineers’ peer-to-peer relations.
Among themselves, and to a lesser extent in the public sphere of the eastern
United States, mining engineers affected a distinctly western masculinity, one that
allowed them to feel comfortable among the men they supervised and interacted with in
the field. Nothing could be more damaging to a young engineer’s standing at the mine
than to be labeled a tenderfoot, and mining engineers worked hard to escape that
designation. Mining engineers gave themselves a means to empathize with ordinary
miners; in turn, this identification with miners as men provided mining engineers with
their primary way to understand how to manage workforce relations, and to understand
what it meant to be a “working stiff” in a hard-rock mining camp.
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During the most aggressive era of U.S. capital investment in Mexican and
southwestern mining projects, the 1880s through roughly 1910, mining engineers
negotiated a set of overlapping gender and class identities to legitimate themselves to an
audience of employers, employees, and other mining engineers. A mining engineer’s
ability to create a real or imagined empathetic bond with the men he supervised or
directed could make or break a mining enterprise. In the field, the popular image of
mining engineers as physically adventurous men was an asset for mining engineers. A
mining engineer’s elite status, however, could stand in the way of his relationship to
ordinary miners, both because of the resentment it engendered, and because it failed to
provide engineers with the tools they needed to be successful managers of labor.
Invoking western and masculine identities helped mining engineers in this region
overcome this “deficiency” in their training. Invoking a blandly middle-class morality,
with an emphasis on the importance of “man-to-man” interaction could help mining
engineers elide their own discomfort with the class divisions within a mining community.
The labor-management interaction in the mines of the borderlands can best be understood
by analyzing the complex interplay between competing notions of identity and expertise.
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Chapter Five
Corporate Capitalism:
Engineers and the Birth of Mass Mining

In 1913, an editorial in the Engineering and Mining Journal bemoaned the socalled “new miner” in the western mines who was no longer a “jack of all trades and
master of several.” Rather, the editorial lamented, the new miner lacked skill, industry,
and intelligence.261 Historians Logan Hovis and Jeremy Mouat argue that such perceived
decline in the quality of the mining labor force was caused by new engineering practices,
particularly the spread of so-called “mass mining.” The working lives of mining
engineers also changed with the adoption of mass mining. While this new system of
mining simplified the work of average miners such that companies could now hire less
expensive unskilled labor, the work of mining engineers became in some respects more
complicated. Technological change grew out of changes in the socio-technical system of
mining itself. The advent of electricity fundamentally altered the economics of copper
mining; as demand for copper rose – slowly through the 1890s and with increasing
urgency after 1900 -- it became profitable to mine the massive, yet relatively lowergrade copper deposits of the U.S.-Mexico borderlands.262 The interaction between the
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social world and technological change is at the heart of many scholarly debates
surrounding the agency of technology; the introduction of mass-mining techniques at the
turn of the twentieth century highlights how the mining industry functioned systemically,
as changes within society seemed to lead inexorably to technological change.263
Techniques of mass mining were developed by mining engineers in answer to a
newfound demand for copper, and in turn, the new technology had a profound impact on
the work of mining engineers. Not only was the daily work experience of mining
engineers and the work-flow (in general) of the mining industry changed by the new
processes, but the life experiences of mining engineers also altered as the profession
became less mobile -- both in terms of physical mobility (i.e. moving from job to job) and
in terms of professional mobility (i.e. advancing within the profession).
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Much has been written about the impact of mass mining on the average worker,
generally focusing on the effect on miners of the de-skilling of the workforce. Where
selective mining required skilled miners and mining foremen to operate pick-axes,
explosives, and hand-drills to burrow tunnels following underground ore veins, nonselective mining was just that: nonselective. Huge quantities of dirt, rock, and low-grade
ore were removed from the ground all together; once extracted, small quantities of ore
were separated from massive quantities of waste dirt. In selective mining, a mining
engineer might design a dig, but he generally left the quotidian operation of the
underground dig to the foreman and skilled workers, providing technical oversight, or
revising, important decisions regarding the progress of the dig. With mass mining, the
mining engineer or engineers designed the entire dig, and the miners removed the
resulting earth: dirt, rock, and ore. There was little need for individual expertise or
knowledge of ores and their properties on the part of miners or foremen. In Arizona,
which in 1910 produced more copper than any state in the nation, and throughout the
U.S. – Mexico border region more generally, the shift to mass mining meant mining
operations increased dramatically in size and number. An influx of immigrant workers
from southern and eastern Europe, and an increased number of Mexican workers, flooded
the region to attend to the labor shortage. Along with the new population of laborers, the
pressures of industrial organization increased on the mining industry, as a radicalized
workforce steadily gained a foothold in an industry already familiar with the
complications of labor actions. In addition to the extant division between the American
Federation of Labor and the Western Federation of Miners, miners were further distanced
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from one another by language, ethnicity, and nationality.264 By the early twentieth
century the regional industry became larger, more industrialized and more integrated into
the economic life of the nation than seemed possible just a few short decades earlier.
The shift to nonselective mining in the western metals industry was orchestrated
by a small cohort of mining engineers. Faced with a rising demand for copper in the
marketplace and the declining purity of subsurface copper deposits, mining engineers
were tasked to find new ways of extracting copper from the quartz in which it was
embedded through the southwestern United States. Far from being simply a new
technological approach to mining, the implementation of mass mining restructured the
mining industry. As a more technology-intensive than labor-intensive way of mining, it
favored large, capital rich companies over smaller organizations, speeding up the
consolidation of the mining industry.
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The image that comes to mind when we think of mass mining is the open-pit, but
the term encompasses a broad approach to metals extraction that pushed the industry
towards greater mechanization of the labor force. Environmental historian Tim LeCain
has aptly named non-selective mining “mass destruction,” as it constituted an inversion
and adaptation of the mechanized production being implemented by factory managers
elsewhere in the United States. In mining, the work being standardized was the
dismantling of the landscape as opposed to the construction of a Model T. LeCain’s
larger point is that techniques of mass destruction so heavily mediated the relationship
between mine workers and the environment that the conditions of labor became much
more dangerous, as technological solutions were sought for the environmental problems
caused by such large-scale earth-moving ventures.265 While such a full-scale embrace of
technology might seem, on the surface, to benefit the workplace status of mining
engineers, raising the value of their technical and technological expertise ever higher in
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the minds of mining capitalists and investors, for individual mine engineers the reverse
was often true. Rather than gaining power and leverage within mining corporations, a
growing number of engineers actually worked in engineering units, which permitted
much less vertical movement within the profession. Mass mining also reduced the
opportunities for mining engineers to travel extensively, a major feature of mineengineering identity in the nineteenth century that remained a critical aspect of the
“romance” of mine engineering that drew young men into the field well into the twentieth
century.
The story of the rise of mass mining often begins the way Tim LeCain begins his
narrative of the environmental history of Butte, Montana, with mine engineer Daniel
Jackling’s design of the open-pit mine at the Guggenheim-financed Bingham Canyon
mine near Salt Lake City in 1908. While the dramatic open-cuts at Bingham Canyon did
indeed presage a more aggressive era in copper mining, Jackling was not not the only
mining engineer experimenting with the new techniques. Rather, he was the most
successful of a cohort of mining engineers who were struggling to solve the problems
posed by the low-grade western porphyry coppers – not simply how to remove the ore
from the ground, but how to profitably process commercial copper once the ore was
removed from the ground.

Early Mass Mining
In the borderlands region, as in the rest of the western United States, mass mining
arose from the peculiar problems posed by mining copper. One characteristic of copper is
that it forms bonds with numerous other elements, and thus copper ores are rarely found
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in nature in a pure state. In the borderlands region in the 1890s, pure native copper ore
was present in quantities that were profitable for commercial production only at Santa
Rita, New Mexico.266 Far more typical of the rich mines in the southwest was the
Longfellow Mine in Clifton, Arizona, which was composed of veins of chalcocite, a
copper ore with a relatively high copper content, generally between 55% and 75%
copper, embedded within limestone. Still more mining districts in the southwest
presented completely or primarily within porphyry, or volcanic, rock. Sometimes veins of
chalcocite or another relatively rich ore were embedded within the porphyry -- for
example, the Detroit Mine had a porphyry vein that was over 100 feet wide at the surface.
Usually, such relatively rich surface veins quickly dispersed at lower levels into the
porphyry, and the lower rock could yield as little as .4%- 1% copper. Prior to the 1890s,
such porphyry deposits were considered unprofitably low-grade ore, and could not really
be extracted by tunneling through the rock. The most profitable regional copper mine in
the 1880s was Phelps, Dodge & Co.’s Copper Queen in Bisbee, Arizona, where the
copper yield averaged 10%.267
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The lack of purity of copper ores compounds the problem for miners of how best
to refine the metal for sale. Copper is found in concert with a host of other metals,
including silver, gold, lead, and iron; throughout the borderlands it frequently was found
embedded in limestone or quartz and alongside and within eruptive rocks such as
porphyry. The complexity of copper ores mean that copper could not be refined from ore
in a single process. The goal of smelting copper was to produce a highly concentrated
ore in a sulphide solution, called a matte, which contained as much of the copper and
other metals (often silver and gold) from the ore as it was possible to profitably separate.
Waste material from this process, which frequently contained significant amounts of
copper (almost always more than 2%) was called “slag” and was dumped.268 This matte
was then further refined to separate the copper from the other metals. The expense of
separating copper from the bulk of the ore, through roasting, concentrating or “ore
dressing,” and the two-part smelting process was a major hindrance to the regional
copper-mining community well into the 1890s, despite the higher demand for copper
caused by the market for electricity.
The Arizona Copper Company, founded in Edinburgh, Scotland, in the 1870s,
was one of the earliest companies in Arizona to turn a profit mining porphyry deposits.
The company got its start not by sending out its own prospectors, but by purchasing the
Longfellow, Humboldt, Yavapai, and the Detroit copper mines, all located in the Clifton
district in southern Arizona. At the time that the company began working the properties,
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in 1883, there was little ore of a quality appropriate for smelting. Frustrated by the lack
of high-quality ore in the ground, the head of smelting operations, a mining engineer
named James Colquhoun, turned to the slag left by an earlier generation of miners who
had worked the area using relativeley inefficient processes. He determined that there was
enough copper ore in the slag to successfully mine and smelt it, after first concentrating
the ore in primitive “jigs.” The success of this method of concentration kept the Arizona
Copper Co. in business, although without great profits, for about five additional years.
By 1892, just as the company considered closing down, Colquhoun (by this time the
general manager of the Company) devised a plan to concentrate some of the low-grade
oxidized copper ores that the company’s property contained, as Colquhoun himself
recalled, “in plenty.”269 He proposed to do so using sulphuric acid produced on-site from
a small vein of iron pyrites.
Since Colquhoun’s plan would require an expansion of the mine at a time when
the owners were seriously thinking of closing it down, they brought in an outside mining
engineer as a consultant – John Hays Hammond. After consulting Hammond, the Board
of Directors determined to build the leaching plant that Colquhoun desired. Colquhoun
himself traveled to New York with the chairman of the company to try to raise money for
this new construction. The two men failed to find investors, which was not surprising, as
Arizona Copper had a poor history as a dividend-paying operation and lacked any
valuable property to put up as security. But Colquhoun persisted, finally persuading the
Board to allow him to draw on the profits from the company’s rapidly diminishing ore
269
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reserves, while the Board president persuaded the company that held a mortgage on the
property to stop collecting payments until the new leaching plant was operational.270 As
James Douglas observed, “had not the shareholders [of the Arizona Copper Company]
been willing to accept hopeful promises in lieu of dividends,” the company would never
have remained in operation.271
In order to produce enough ore to run through the leaching plant, Colquhoun
engaged in “open quarrying,” a method of extracting the ore from the top down. After
scraping away the surface soil, the ore body was blasted open, and miners dug the ore out
by digging steps down through the ore body. This was an inexpensive way to extract
both low-grade and first-class ores.272 Colquhoun’s combination of inexpensive mining
and large-scale leaching facilities proved extremely lucrative for Arizona Copper, which
by 1895 was able not only to pay its mortgage, but was also able to pay its investors a
small dividend – a remarkable achievement for a company that was all but bankrupt three
years previous. Beginning in 1896, Colquhoun also began working a couple of bodies of
porphyry ores that the company had recently discovered, which contained between 1-4%
copper.273 The pilot concentrating plant that Colquhoun devised could process 100 tons
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of ore per day; No. 3, the first full-scale porphyry concentrator at Arizona Copper, came
on-line in 1898, and could process 700 tons of ore per day. That year, Arizona Copper
Company produced over 13 million pounds of copper, which was about 10% of the
refined copper produced in Arizona, making it one of the top producers in the United
States. By 1901 Arizona Copper was the eleventh largest producer of copper in the
world.274 Colquhoun himself pointed to some of these accomplishments in his modest
personal history of the Arizona Copper Company, to demonstrate that he was the first
mine engineer to successfully process porphyry copper, fully ten years before Daniel
Jackling and the Utah Copper Company began mass mining it at Bingham Canyon in
1908.
At approximately the same time that Colquhoun was experimenting with
porphyry copper deposits at Clifton, Phelps Dodge was in the process of constructing its
own mine to be excavated and processed on a mass scale. The level of communication
between Colquhoun at Arizona Copper, and L.D. Ricketts at Phelps Dodge is impossible
274
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to determine, but as Ricketts worked as a consulting engineer for the Arizona Copper
Company while holding a position as the manager of mine operations at Phelps Dodge’s
latest acquisition in Nacozari, Sonora, it is certain that Ricketts was aware of the
innovative concentrating methods Colquhoun was working on in Clifton. Although
engineers at rival companies rarely collaborated outright, there was somewhat open
communication between engineers. Naturally they read and regularly wrote about the
processes they implemented in trade journals such as the Engineering and Mining Press
and the Mining and Scientific Press. Mining engineers also made regular site visits to
nearby mines, as discussed in chapter four, both to talk to their professional peers and to
improve their knowledge of regional geology and to get a sense of the wealth of
neighboring mines. More casually, mining engineers were social peers and would often
hear of new techniques or experiments in passing as part of normal conversation.
L. D. Ricketts became the manager of the Moctezuma Copper Mine, the Phelps
Dodge property near Nacozari, in 1897. Unlike Colquhoun, whose innovations at Arizona
Copper were the result of necessary and expedient experimentation, Ricketts arrived at
Moctezuma with a vision for the mining camp. Although Nacozari was famous for the
wealth of its copper deposits in the 1860s, by the 1890s the area had a lot in common
with other borderland copper mines – plenty of low-grade ore, some in the ground, some
in slag heaps from earlier, less-efficient mining projects. Inspired by the mechanical
processes he saw being implemented in factories, Ricketts envisioned Nacozari as a fully
industrial mine, and he made it so.275 The mine began operation in 1901.
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The previous owners of the Moctezuma, the Guggenheim family, had attempted
unsuccessfully to smelt the Nacozari ores on-site. By installing a newly mechanized
transportation process at the mines, however, Ricketts was able to remove significantly
larger quantities of ore from the ground. He designed and built a much larger
concentrator and smelter out of steel, and connected the smelting works to the mining
works with mechanized conveyor belts. The whole mine was powered by a central
power station. Ricketts initially wanted the mine to run on gas, but the remoteness of the
location made that unfeasible, and so from 1901 until the 1910s, the furnaces at Nacozari
were powered by wood gathered from the surrounding forests. In its centralization of
power, mechanization of infrastructure, and use of structural steel, Ricketts’ mine at
Nacozari was innovative, and exemplified what the mass mines of the twentieth century
could look like. The size of the concentrator enabled the mine to process the larger
quantities of ore that was typical of the borderlands copper mines.
Nacozari proved to be extremely profitable, and the enhanced technological
system of the mine enabled still more centralization in the early years of the twentieth
century. From the time he took on the task of managing the mines at Nacozari, Ricketts
worked to persuade James Douglas, the head of Phelps, Dodge mining operations, to
build a train to Nacozari to more readily connect the mine to other regional PD
operations. The standard-gauge branch line to Nacozari, a spur of the line that stretched
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from Bisbee to El Paso, was finally completed in 1904.276 In the years following Rickett's
transformation of the mines at Nacozari, the landscape and economy of the border region
transformed dramatically. In order to cope with the vast quantities of ore now being
extracted from the ground, Phelps Dodge built a new smelter capable of processing over
fifteen hundred tons of ore per day, and a new town to serve the smelter, the border town
of Douglas, Arizona. Although Phelps Dodge already ran one of the largest smelters in
the country — the T. A. Ricketts’ designed concentrator of the Detroit Copper Co., a
Phelps Dodge subsidiary in nearby Morenci — the new smelter at Douglas had the
capacity not only to refine copper from the many Phelps Dodge properties, but also to
work with ores from other mining companies along the border.277 The technical and
economic problem of how to treat low-grade ore in a cost-effective manner inspired, and
perhaps demanded, the centralization of engineering work in the copper mining industry.
This, in turn, changed the regional mining industry, and the working lives of all those
associated with it.

Impact on Mining Engineers
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The technical solution to the problem of mining low-grade copper deposits had a
profound impact on the organization of the working lives of mining engineers. In
essence, mass mining sites are extremely complicated building projects. Such low grade
copper needed to be processed in enormous quantities. These mines required a
consulting engineer to suggest a strategy for the digging and refining to take place, and a
managing engineer to oversee operations. In addition, an entire engineering department
worked to determine where and how to dig, adopt or invent the best procedure for
procuring and refining the specific ores at the mine, and to draw up and implement plans
for linking the various parts of the mining operation together mechanically.278 The
engineers who worked in the engineering department at Phelps Dodge after the
methodological transition at Nacozari had a very different work experience from those
mining engineers of an earlier generation. Ricketts himself, for instance, worked
throughout his career primarily as an independent contractor. Yet rather than receiving
his instructions from the owners or supervisors of the company, an engineer in an
engineering department primarily interacted with other engineers in the engineering
department, solving problems and designing cuts as directed by the head of the
engineering department. His work was subject to greater oversight by people who
themselves possessed technical knowledge and the ability to effectively weigh the
judgment of a mining engineer.279
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The early career of Eugene Sawyer is illustrative of how changes within the
profession might affect the career of an individual mining engineer. Sawyer studied
mining at the Lawrence Scientific School, where he was a middling student, receiving an
A.B. from Harvard University, followed in 1907 by an E.M. – a mining engineering
degree – from Lawrence.280 In 1910, Sawyer moved to Arizona to take a job in the
engineering department of the Copper Queen mine. In Bisbee, Sawyer enjoyed all the
privileges brought by his status as a skilled white worker. He and his roommates, other
mining engineers at the Copper Queen, lived in a house on “Quality Hill.”281 Sawyer's
work at the Copper Queen was not all office work, and involved a certain amount of
independent engineering. He spent a considerable amount of time underground touring
the shafts, and when the company enacted a digging plan that he designed, he was
gratified to be “mixing in with the proceedings” to such a great extent.282 Unlike mining
engineers of previous generations who had done so much work alone in the office or in
the field in company with only one or two assistants or fellow engineers, he also spent a
great deal of time “mixing in” in the office with the other engineers. Fortunately for
Sawyer, the company struck ore at two of the locations where he recommended they dig;
he therefore impressed not only Walter Douglas, a son of James Douglas and the
280
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managing director of the Copper Queen at the time, but also L.D. Ricketts, whom
Douglas had hired as a consultant. Sawyer was awed by Ricketts, “the biggest mining
man in this section of the country,” and flattered by the senior engineer’s humble manner.
“[Ricketts] comes into my office nearly every day,” the young engineer wrote to his
mother, “[and] spends a good part of the afternoon sometimes over my maps and asks my
opinion on nearly every question.”283 For an early career engineer, work in this
engineering department threw him in with his professional peers on a daily basis, and
also brought him into contact with some of the biggest names in profession.
As companies consolidated and there were fewer “new” mining prospects for
engineers to work on, mining engineers experienced a contraction in their career options:
it was increasingly difficult to obtain the kinds of experiences that Ricketts, or Louis
Janin, or even James Douglas had early in life that would establish an engineer’s
reputation and provide a good background for a consulting career. But young mining
engineers also experienced gains from the increasingly automatized, centralized, and
industrialized operations. Mining engineers such as Sawyer benefitted enormously from
joining an established profession. Although relatively less adventurous, there were more
positions available for newly- credentialed mining engineers. When on the job, young
mining engineers were more likely to have the opportunity to come into contact with
senior engineers, who could serve as mentors – earlier mining engineers had entered a
field in which work experiences were far more atomized and geographically dispersed,
and more frequently than not worked alone. Eugene Sawyer clearly benefited from both
of these new aspects of the mine engineering profession: obtaining a good position
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shortly after graduating from Lawrence; working closely with L.D. Ricketts; and
developing a close relationship with Walter Douglas. Sawyer, of course, was particularly
fortunate in his position, as there were only a handful of engineers of Ricketts’ stature in
the United States, yet while the specifics of his position were remarkable, the general
trajectory of his early career was not.
Sawyer's eagerness to be involved, and his apparent talent as an engineer, led him
to advance up the corporate ladder quickly. In August 1910, after only a few months in
Arizona, he was asked by Walter Douglas to be the general manager for a new prospect
that Phelps Dodge was considering in the Catalina Mountains, near the town of Oracle
just north of Tucson. Although pleased to be entrusted with the new responsibility,
Sawyer was less enthusiastic about the work: “I was a little disappointed with the looks
of the ground up there,” he wrote. “If I had been doing it [the survey], I don't know as I
should have reported so strongly in favor of it as Grele [the surveying engineer] did.”284
Sawyer's work in Oracle, which consisted of surveying the ground at the mine site,
purchasing mining equipment and transporting it into the mountains, and hiring laborers,
was not remarkably different from that of James Douglas when Douglas first began
operations in Arizona for Phelps Dodge. The path Sawyer took to that work, however,
depended as much on his ability to work within the bureaucratic systems now in place at
Phelps Dodge as on his talents as an engineer and skills as a manager.
When the mine at Oracle failed to turn a profit, Sawyer thought it likely that the
company would move him back to the engineering office at Bisbee, although as a
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manager, rather than as a staff engineer. He had mixed feelings about this. The possible
promotion “set me ahead in my profession more than five years” yet the work at Oracle
spoiled him. “It has been a wonderful experience” he reflected, “… [and] I like the
exercise and all round work [of field engineering] best.” 285 Yet Sawyer did not consider
leaving his position at Phelps Dodge to find a field engineering position at a smaller
company. Despite his youth, he could likely have gotten recommendations from some of
the top engineers in the business had be decided to move on.
This demonstrates a degree of company loyalty that is profoundly different from
the attitude of Ricketts and his contemporaries, who changed company affiliations with
alacrity and apparently little professional ill feeling. At the time when Sawyer met
Ricketts, “the Doctor” was in fact salaried as general manager for the Cananea
Consolidated Copper Company, owned by William Greene, and a consultant for Phelps
Dodge, the local rival. Sawyer, however, left his professional advancement in the hands
of Phelps Dodge, and determined to take the next position the company offered to him.286
After all, he noted, “everyone kow tows to the Queen,” and he evidently determined that
the work in the engineering office at Bisbee was a better professional opportunity than
trying to find the “all round work” that he preferred elsewhere.287
As mass mining became more entrenched in the copper industry and mining
engineers had relatively less itinerant working lives, their family lives changed as well.
With few exceptions, nineteenth century mining engineers tended to live apart from their
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wives and children. The incessant travel, long hours, and in the southwest borderlands
region in particular, the lack of physical security and the amenities of town living did not
make for an appealing lifestyle for the elite eastern women who were often the wives of
mining engineers. Mary Halleck Foote, for instance, who had a successful career herself
as an author and illustrator of highly romanticized tales of life on the frontier and in the
mines of California, Idaho, and Mexico, relished the extent to which she flouted
convention by following her mining engineer husband all over the western hemisphere
because they could not afford to maintain two households. Although she occasionally
socialized with the wives of other mining engineers, in particular her sister-in-law, wife
of James D. Hague, she did not maintain a home in San Francisco or New York through
the 1870s and 1880s, and was self-conscious of her differences from her peers.
Engineers worried about working in places that were difficult to reach. When
discussing whether he would take over the on-the-ground management of the
Cusihuiriachic mining company in 1886, Ellsworth Daggett explained, “If the
inducements are sufficient and the locality such that I can take my wife I would go for a
year or some fixed time.” For Daggett, being on-site was only a possibility if it were for
a short period of time; clearly, Mrs. Daggett was willing to live at a mine site under
certain very specific circumstances; possibly Daggett did not get paid enough to maintain
two separate households.288 William F. Staunton met his wife, Mary Neal, in Tombstone
while he was working at the Tombstone Mining and Milling Company in the 1880s.
Mary was the sister of Annie Cheyney, the wife of the managing director of the company.
288

Ellsworth Daggett to James D. Hague 6 December 1885, Folder M-13, James D.

Hague Collection,

193

Although most mining engineers met their wives while in school or when visiting friends
and families back east, the trajectory of the Staunton’s married life together was probably
fairly typical. After their marriage, the Stauntons lived with the Cheyneys in a two-story
company-owned adobe near the mines in Tombstone. The sisters apparently spent most
of their time together, engaged in a variety of artistic pursuits that their husbands
regarded with indulgence if not admiration. When Staunton moved to superintend the
Congress Mine, near Prescott, Arizona, his wife and son moved with him, although the
question of where Mrs. Staunton was to live was a difficult one. The manager of the
Congress lived in Prescott with his wife in a house that was not large enough for two
families. Mrs. Staunton moved to Congress, instead. After a few years, other workers
brought their wives and children and the mine had a small community of families, of
which the Stauntons were the most prominent. After moving about within Arizona a
couple more times, Mrs. Staunton eventually moved to a property the couple bought in
southern California.289 The great distance between Staunton’s mining business in
Arizona and southern California was doubtless ameliorated by both the ease of train
travel by the 1910s, as well as by the Stauntons’ wealth.
The re-organization of mining business, however, gave more mining engineers the
opportunity to consider the possibility of bringing their families to the places they would
be working. At one time, the ability to send the family to live in Santa Barbara or Los
Angeles was an indication of the success of a mining engineer. By the early twentieth
century, the opportunity to work at a location where one might bring a wife, and possibly
children as well, proved important to many mining engineers as they considered which
289
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job to take. “I wish to take my wife to a district less isolated than this,” one engineer
wrote in an application letter, “and one [a district] where there may be more chances of
advancement.”290 Certainly this engineer wanted a better opportunities for himself, but
his primary impulse in seeking new work was to re-locate his family to a larger mining
camp. Another mining engineer, hoping to relocate from Alaska to Jerome, Arizona, was
more explicit about his wife’s needs:
I am writing fully not because I am dissatisfied with my present position
or its opportunities, but because the long Alaskan winters and great
distance from other large mine operations and from communication with
the states are conditions which preclude the possibility of an indefinite
stay in this district with my wife and baby.291
This engineer clearly did not think that being explicit about his wife’s
needs would in any way diminish his own chances of getting hired. Indeed, he
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may have had good reason to believe that being married would make him a more
attractive employee. Employers who had a vested interest in the job satisfaction of
their most expensive workers cared about the familial status of mining engineers.
Marriage was used as a marker to denote a man’s seriousness of purpose, and
likelihood of remaining on the job. One man recommended a mining engineer to
the manager of the Cananea Consolidated Copper Company by explaining that the
engineer, Charles Ratcliff, wanted a new challenge and “P.S.[:] Ratliff is a
married man, about 38 years old, and has a small family, I believe, who are with
him in San Pedro.”292 While Mary Halleck Foote, as an educated white woman,
had been so much an aberration in the mining community that her “salons” in
remote locations such as Leadville and Idaho were famous among a certain
generation of mining engineers, by the early twentieth century, the upper-middle
class wives of mining engineers were frequently found in the larger mining
camps.
With the shift to mass mining, the expertise needed by mining engineers also
underwent a change. Nineteenth-century mining engineers spent a great deal of their
time conducting surveys, assaying ore bodies, and construction plans of operation and the
technologies that would enable those plans to succeed. With the expansion of the
engineering department at ever larger mine sites, those particular skills were practiced by
fewer and fewer men. Rather, in addition to geology and surveying, mining engineers
needed to know more about metallurgy and chemistry than ever before, and to have a
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solid understanding of hydraulics and steam engineering.293 After graduation, mining
engineers needed to stay informed of the latest developments in mining techniques,
which began to change at a rapid rate. The membership of professional societies surged,
filled with engineers who wished to keep up with the new sciences, and new, more
regional societies were formed, often explicitly to share scientific and technical
knowledge among their members. As historian Kathleen Ochs demonstrated in her
quantitative study of the graduates of the Colorado School of Mines, “what [mining
engineers] actually did” encompassed a broad range of administrative and managerial
tasks, far greater than might be supposed by reading by the articles published in mining
journals.294 In their most ideal state, professional organizations, by providing a forum for
face-to-face meetings between mining engineers, facilitated discussion within the mine
engineering community about how to approach these new tasks.
The larger and older organizations, most notably the American Institute of Mining
Engineers, remained critical as the instigators of major networking events. In 1901, led
by then-president of AIME Eben Olcott, who had spent his formative years as a young
engineer working in Sonora, AIME sponsored a trip to Mexico. The mission of the trip
was ostensibly to forge strong ties between Mexican engineers and American engineers;
as the Engineering and Mining Journal phrased it, “Mexican engineers surely have lots to
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learn from US mining.” In reality, of course, the primary accomplishment of the journey
was to function as a networking opportunity for the American engineers, 160 of whom
gathered in two specially chartered Pullman trains, fully equipped with sleeping
compartments, multiple drawing rooms, and a two private cars, one of which was for
James Douglas, president of Phelps Dodge, to travel from New York to Chihuahua,
making stops at a number of mines both large and small, and at the new ASARCO [later
Guggenheim]-owned smelter in Aguas Calientes.295 The American engineers were
impressed by what they saw, and also by what they learned of mining conditions in
Mexico, which included (they were told) no labor strikes, and laws more favorable to
mining, in particular with respect to the law of the Apex. The trip, which to modern eyes
is indistinguishable from a corporate junket, concluded with a dinner with Porfirio Diaz,
about whom the Engineering and Mining Journal gushed, “This opportunity to see and
grasp the hand of one of the greatest men in modern history was fully appreciated by
all.”296
Smaller, more regional organizations than the AIME also played a critical role
connecting mining engineers to one another for social and professional reasons. One
example is the “Society of Engineers and Metallurgists of the Republic of Mexico,”
established circa 1907. Membership numbers are difficult to determine, but the Society’s
pamphlets, which were published in English and in Spanish, contain essays by several
English-speaking engineers in Mexico City and Chihuahua, suggesting that the Society’s
writings circulated throughout the nation and that working mine engineers were
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interested in supporting such an organization. The avowed aims of the Society were to
promote the exchange of professional expertise among members, to investigate matters
“having some bearing… upon the condition of the mining industry of Mexico, or the
professional workers associated with it,” and more generally to liaise between the
community of mining engineers and the government of the Republic of Mexico, so that
the community of mining engineers could present a united front in a nation that “stands in
the very front rack in a comparison with the other mining countries in the world.” As one
pamphlet explained, the co-operation between members of the Society would address
instances
in which two or more men are working on the same problem, though in
districts several hundreds of miles apart. One may find a ready solution...
but the others may be less fortunate, and being in ignorance of the fact that
there is a solution they may finally give the fight up in despair, or their
work may result in dire failure.297
The stated goals of this Society point to the persistence of the concern within the
community of mining engineers that as a profession they be considered the
honest, and final, arbiters of mining valuation and practice.
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The mass-mining techniques that spurred these professional and social
rearrangements throughout mine engineering occurred as engineering institutes were
turning out more and more mining graduates, as discussed in chapter 2. These changes
within mine engineering also stripped the profession of those tasks that had made mining
engineers into romantic western figures in the nineteenth century. Mining engineers, in
general, no longer ventured into unknown territory as part of exploring parties, as Louis
Janin had in the 1860s as part of the Butterfield Expedition. They no longer necessarily
lived in relative isolation, on contested territory and without the protection of the U.S.
government, as Raphael Pumpelly had in Tubac. They no longer had to prospect in the
open countryside on horseback for days, searching for outcroppings that might suggest
the presence of a large deposit of gold, silver, or copper. When mining engineers did
undertake relatively isolated work, as did Eugene Sawyer, it was under the auspices of a
large company, with ample capital investment and a relative ease of communication with
the outside world. Although it still took Sawyer two weeks to haul a boiler from Tucson
to Oracle, he himself was able to ride into Tucson, twenty miles away, with great
frequency (although he was somewhat at the mercy of the stagecoach schedule), and
Oracle was equipped with a phone line to Tucson.298
Despite these changes within the profession, in the early 1900s the public still
perceived a mining engineer’s life as one of romantic adventure. In part, this is because
of the social and political prominence of a small handful of mining engineers, such as
John Hays Hammond or Herbert Hoover. Hammond, who spent a considerable amount
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of time in the southwest and northern Mexico, was a heroic figure in the eyes of many, on
account of his exploits in Africa with Cecil Rhodes. Hoover, who was to rise to worldwide prominence and an enduring domestic popularity during WWI for his role
organizing the relief effort for Belgium, was already well known in mining circles as a
young engineer who made a fortune mining in Australia and working in China just before
the Boxer Rebellion.299
Another indication that the cultural status of mining engineers remained firmly
embedded in the world of adventure is the relative popularity of H. Irving Hancock’s
series of action books for boys, The Young Engineers, published in the 1910s. With titles
such as The Young Engineers in Mexico, or, Fighting the Mine Swindlers, and The Young
Engineers in Arizona, or, Laying Tracks in the Man-Killer Quicksand, these books
chronicled the adventures of two young men who, after high school, gained experience
working as surveyors in diverse and exotic locations out west.300 The young heroes
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started out as civil engineers working on railroad projects, working their way into the
unknown deserts, caverns, and mountains of the southwestern U.S. and northern Mexico,
while amassing technical experience along with frontier credibility. In the mythology of
the series, Tom and Harry got involved in a gold mine that went into bonanza (The
Young Engineers in Nevada, or, Seeking Fortune on the Turn of a Pick) and, having
learned from that experience all there was to know about mining, were full-fledged
consulting mine engineers by the time they uncovered a tremendous mining fraud in The
Young Engineers in Mexico. Although obviously stylized juvenile fiction, the Young
Engineers series nonetheless encapsulates many of the tropes of mine engineering first
expressed by both travel writers such as journalist J. Ross Browne, and fiction writers
such as Mary Halleck Foote who wrote about western mining between the 1870s and the
1890s.
Although this romance persisted in the popular imagination, and at least one
mining engineer admitted that it was a key component of his decision to pursuing the
profession, it was at odds with how a number of mining engineers, both elite and rankand-file, were beginning to think about their careers.301 Increasingly, mining engineers
observed a distinct lack of opportunity for their younger colleagues to gain access to the
kinds of consulting work that could prove both interesting and lucrative. When Theodore
Roosevelt solicited the advice of his old friend, John Greenway, the president of the
Arizona Copper Company, as to whether his son Kermit should pursue a degree in
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mining, Greenway responded with caution. To succeed, Greenway noted, Kermit needed
to get a degree, as “entering the business Kermit with a Mining Engineer’s Degree…
Will have a better chance to win out than Kermit without the training such a Degree
means.” Clearly, Greenway believed that all the connections in the world could not help
a man who wished to advance in the profession without a degree.302 However, before
entering university, Greenway strongly suggested that Kermit spend a year in
underground work to get a feel for what mining entailed. He offered to take Kermit on
himself or to recommend Kermit to “our mutual friend, Cleveland Dodge [of Phelps
Dodge],” who ran the Copper Queen Mine. What Greenway somewhat equivocally states
to Roosevelt regarding the significance of a mine engineering degree was in fact
becoming a hard-and-fast rule within mine engineering.
In the early twentieth century, an early-career mining engineer, whether in
Arizona or Sonora, had a very different career trajectory than did a mining engineer
starting out only a generation earlier. One manager at a Phelps-Dodge property kept a
journal clipping that addressed this circumstance: “frequent attempts have been made to
arrive at a satisfactory definition of an engineer with more or less varied success” the
clipping noted,
An engineer is one who, through application of his knowledge of mathematics,
the physical and biological sciences, and economics, and with aid, further, from
results obtained through observation, experiences, scientific discovery, and
invention, so utilizes the materials and directs the forces of nature that they are
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made to operate to the benefit of society. An engineer differs from a technologist
in that he must concern himself with the organizational, economic, and
managerial aspects, as well as the technical aspects of his work.303
The breadth of the alleged scope of an engineer’s realm speaks to some extent to
the importance that mining engineers – justifiably by this point in time -- placed on their
own work within the mining industry. The introduction of the mass-mining techniques of
mechanized transportation and exceptionally large smelting facilities required knowledge
of math and physics; establishing operations to treat the low-grade copper ore that made
up a high percentage of the ore mined in the borderlands regions required knowledge of
chemistry; adapting these processing techniques to handle the range of ores processed in
centralized treatment plants in places such as Douglas required a flexible inventiveness;
and drawing a budget for all this rather expensive work that could still pay dividends to
investors required a basic understanding of economics. Although the breadth of work
that a single engineer undertook was no greater than in previous generations (and in many
cases was much more narrow), no engineer could do his work without working closely
with engineers who oversaw or designed other aspects of the mine, and thoroughly
understanding their work and the pressures under which they operated. That this Phelps
Dodge manager kept a definition of “engineer” in among his notebooks is indicative of
the transition underway within the profession of mine engineering.
The early twentieth century is the time historian Edwin Layton identifies with
“the revolt of the engineers,” a moment when certain branches of the engineering
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profession recoiled from over-identification with capitalists, and embraced the rhetoric of
the Progressive reform movements. Layton’s engineers recognized that as technical
workers, engineers were uniquely placed to be reform-oriented political actors. He points
out, however, that the ‘reform” attempts of AIME ended before World War I, and chiefly
consisted of amending the membership rules to be more friendly to business.304 This
change reflects the new subservience of mining engineers to the needs of the large
corporations. Mining companies were powerful local entities in economic matters – recall
Eugene Sawyer’s succinct summation “everyone kow-tows to the Queen.” The mass
mining companies were also powerful forces in the lives of up-and-coming mining
engineers, who for the sake of professional and personal stability sought positions in
successful mining companies. The mining engineers of the early twentieth century were
a far cry from the “westering” engineers who headed into the silver mines of Tubac, or
Alamos, forty years earlier. The mining engineer’s “dilemma,” as Layton observed, had
become “at base, bureaucracy, not capitalism.”305
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Chapter Six
Mining Connections:
Engineers and the Technocratic Landscape

Mining engineers were crucial actors in the development and expansion of mass
mining by large and powerful U.S. mining companies in the borderlands. Such
corporations were not, however, the only companies for which mining engineers worked.
Mining engineers were also employed by development companies and exploring
companies, two types of mining investment companies that arose in the late nineteenth
century and operated in a distinctly different way than did traditionally established
mining companies. These kinds of companies viewed the mining industry and the mining
landscape through more broad-based lens than that of traditional mining companies,
which tended to focus, rather narrowly, on the extraction of a single kind of mineral.
Although quite different from one another and from traditional companies, development
and exploration companies had an expansive, regional perspective, and relied on mining
engineers both to map that region and to act on the promise of the resources they
highlighted.
For a company such as Phelps Dodge, all decisions revolved around the principle
mine site. All of L.D. Ricketts’ innovations, for instance, were designed to increase the
efficiency and productivity of the company’s copper mining project. In buying property,
as in Nacozari, the company looked for copper mines; in constructing equipment, as at
Douglas, the company looked to maximize its ability to process the ore from different
locations. The goal of Phelps Dodge was to process copper for the market. Development
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companies, by contrast, sought to find underperforming or abandoned, ignored, or poorly
managed mines, and to rehabilitate them using the latest extraction and processing
technologies and engineering methods. An exploration company, although similar to a
development company, operated on a different principle, seeking and surveying for new
mining opportunities, usually as a contractor for interested investors rather than as a
developer in its own right. Both development and exploration companies took a broadbased view of an entire region, considering all the different types of minerals present, and
strategized how to create financial returns. Although financed differently – with
development companies, as their name suggests, raising money for developing resources
and exploration companies serving as contract consultants for investors, both kinds of
companies viewed the mining landscape with a level of abstraction that was quite
different from that of more traditional mining companies – even the increasingly large
mass-mining corporations. Both exploration and development companies were dependent
upon the professional credibility and technical expertise of mining engineers.
Mining-development companies are not often analyzed by historians as unique
operators in the mining world. Yet they occupy an important niche in the expansion of
the U.S. economy at the turn of the twentieth century. Historians tend to locate the
massive expansion of the U.S. economy in the twentieth century in a concerted push
among policy-makers and intellectuals to seek new markets for American goods and
services.306 Yet mining-development companies operated on a different model, bringing
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greater efficiency to an extant extractive industry by investing in building infrastructure
and exploiting local labor and industrial resources. Connecting financiers and industrial
technology to aggressive infrastructure development, development companies, no less
than the more traditionally structured mining corporations, helped to turn mining industry
into a truly transnational industry, linking labor, expertise, finance, and profits across
national lines.307 They did so by treating the mining districts of the southwest and
Mexico as a coherent technocratic landscape, rather than as a set of discrete sites in
competition for resources and market share. Mining engineers were critical actors in
development companies, without whom the companies could not function. However, the
position of mining engineers within development companies varied dramatically. These
distinctive roles illuminate an important shift in the role of mining engineers throughout
southwestern and Mexican mining districts, as they changed from the instigators of
exploitation they had been in the mid-nineteenth century into enablers of broad-based
corporate expansion. A brief examination of the work of mining engineers in a
development company and in a large exploration company illustrates the central
importance of technical workers in these diversified companies. It further illuminates the
establishment of a technocratic mining landscape through the mining districts of the
southwestern U.S. and northern Mexico.
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The Development Company of America
When William F. Staunton was growing up in Ohio, he was inspired to become a
mining engineer by the example of his neighbor, John A. Church. After obtaining a
degree in mine engineering from Columbia School of Mines in the early 1880s and
gaining varied experience in east coast mining ventures, Staunton ventured out west,
finally settling in Tombstone, Arizona, thanks to the assistance of his erstwhile neighbor,
now an established and well-respected engineer working the mines of the Tombstone
Mill and Mining Company.308 As he recalled in his memoir, Tombstone in 1883 was a
boomtown, and appeared to the young engineer to be a mining camp with a future.
Unfortunately for Staunton, he was mistaken. Tombstone was peaking; the mines tapped
out almost as quickly as they boomed. By the time Staunton was promoted to
superintendent, in 1887 the rapidly dropping value of silver on the American market
mired the company in debt, and Staunton was forced to close the smelter and to ship the
small quantities of ore the mines produced off-site for processing, a move that
dramatically reduced the likelihood that the company would earn dividends. At around
the same time, the Tombstone miners struck water just below the 500' level of the mines.
For a few years, several companies, including the Tombstone M&M Co., struggled to
drain the basin under the mines, but a fire at the Contention Mine destroyed all the most
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valuable pumping equipment, and with it the ability to mine at depth.309 The rising water
levels in the Tombstone mines, the weakening value of silver on the market, and the
failure of the pumping system combined to end the project of mining Tombstone ore.
Around the same time as the Contention fire, Staunton was offered the position of
superintendent at the Congress Mine, a gold and silver mine located in Yavapai County
near Prescott, Arizona. The Congress was successful in all the ways the Tombstone Mill
and Mining Company was not, producing five million dollars in gold profits through the
1890s. By 1900, Staunton was a wealthy man, superintendent and part owner of one of
the most profitable precious metals mines in the region.310
One of the owners of the Congress Mine was Frank Murphy, who has been
described by one historian as “the Southwest's greatest financier.” The brother of the
governor of territorial Arizona, Nathan Oakes Murphy, Frank purchased his first mining
claim in Prescott in the 1880s. He used the profits from its sale to establish himself as a
player in southwestern finance, and had a hand in funding many infrastructure projects in
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Arizona and northern Mexico, particularly railroads. Murphy was the primary developer
of the Santa Fe, Prescott, and Phoenix Railroad (SFP&P), and the El Paso and
Southwestern branch line to Tombstone. He also eventually negotiated the sale of the
SFP&P to the Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe (ATSF), and of the Phoenix and Eastern to
E.H. Harriman of the Southern Pacific, connecting significant southwest mining sites to
major transcontinental rail providers and thus to the rest of the country. Murphy's interest
in the Congress Mine was almost certainly the reason that despite its hard-to-reach
location at the foot of the mountains west of Prescott, the Congress was connected to a
rail line early in its operation.311
In 1901, Murphy and a few other men involved in the Congress, including
Staunton, the president of the Congress Mine, E.B. Gage, the lawyer Henry Robinson,
and Benjamin Cheyney, a Boston financier and part-owner of the SFP&P, formed the
Development Company of America (DCA), a corporation devised to run development
schemes in the southwest, principally Arizona, and funded via the public sale of 6%
bonds. Frank Murphy was the vice-president, and maintained an active managerial
interest in the operation. The initial investors retained a 51% ownership stake in the
DCA, and held 20% of the company's dividend profits as an operating budget. The first
action of the Development Company was to purchase the Congress Mine and all the
mines in the towns of Tombstone, and Poland, Arizona. The DCA later purchased the
Silverbell mines of the Imperial Copper Company located near Tombstone, and in
conjunction with the Southern Pacific built a rail line from Silverbell to the new Phelps
Dodge smelter at Douglas. By 1906, the DCA was the largest holding company in the
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southwest, ranked as the seventy-sixth largest company in the United States, with capital
assets in excess of $34.4 million.312 Staunton, who continued to superintend the
Congress, was also given responsibility for the management of mining Tombstone, where
the DCA united all the mines under the aegis of the Tombstone Consolidated Mining
Company. He soon assumed the superintendency of Silverbell.313 Staunton's role in the
company was of technical manager, overseeing the engineering and mining decisions of
three fairly large mining operations. The DCA’s expansion at this time was qualitatively
different from the contemporaneous expansion of Phelps Dodge. Where the growth at
Phelps Dodge was diven by technical and engineering problems – processing ore from
site X will be expensive, but it can be made more efficient by mixing it with ore from site
Y – the expansion of the DCA was an end in and of itself. As a development company,
its resources were necessarily diversified, and the acquisition of new property was driven

312

In size, the DCA was roughly equivalent to that of other mining companies in the

region, including Greene-Cananea and the Guggenheim Exploration Company, although
it remained somewhat smaller than Phelps Dodge. All the southwestern and Mexican
companies were tiny compared to Anaconda, the company that controlled the mines in
Butte, MT, and had assets of over $170 million. Norman R. Collins and Lee E. Preston,
“The Size Structure of Large Economic Firms,” American Economic Review 51:5
(December 1961): 1005; 1008.
313

[Memoir], 105; 107-109; V.L. Mason to William F. Staunton, 11 November 1905,

folder 6, box 3, both WFS, UASC; Spude, “Frank Morrill Murphy,” 156-157.

212

by a quest to always be able to offset losses, rather than by the need to streamline a
technological system.
The fate of the mines at Tombstone, and of William Field Staunton as the
superintendent of DCA mining operations, offers a clear example of the role of mining
engineers such as Staunton in a diversified development company such as the DCA.
Despite the failure of the Tombstone mines in the late 1880s, they were widely
considered by mining experts at the turn of the century to contain plenty of silver and
gold, albeit in quantities that needed modern methods and great patience to extract.314
The difficulty of working the Tombstone mines on a mass scale became apparent after
the Tombstone Consolidated took over production in 1901, and quickly sunk the bulk of
its resources into draining the underground reservoir. The quantities of water removed
from Tombstone were remarkable for the arid southwest, exceeding one million gallons
per day by 1909.315 In the best of circumstances, pumping water out of mine shafts was a
difficult and expensive proposition, but the DCA had enough money to purchase heavyduty pumps, and enough men to run them and to fix the technical problems that
inevitably occur at an industrial site.316
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By financing the work of the Tombstone Consolidated Mining Company, in
particular the pumping of water, the DCA enabled Tombstone to exist as a mining camp
for several years beyond the time when a less diversified company would have had to
pull out. In addition, the DCA brought into Tombstone large quantities of heavy
industrial equipment, including four boilers weighing twenty-five tons apiece, which
required a team of thirty-four horses to haul up the road from the nearby rail depot at
Fairbanks; all new steam pumps capable of pumping over seventeen hundred gallons of
water per minute, and a non-flammable steel pump house, enabling the Tombstone
Consolidated to mine ore bodies located below the water table without risking a fire. As
mining engineer W.P. Blake noted in a report on the property prepared shortly after the
DCA began setting up in Tombstone, “the great advantages resulting from the
consolidation of interests... are evident.”317 By centralizing the administration of the
mine-draining operation, the cost of staffing the boiler-and-pump system was
dramatically reduced. Such economy of scale was possible because the Development
Company of America absorbed the high start-up and operating costs. The DCA, with its
diverse holdings, was further able to stave off the expense of running the mine at
Tombstone as profits at its other mine sites could offset the expenses at Tombstone.
As general manager, mining engineer William Staunton was pleased to have
centralized authority over the work at Tombstone, Congress, and Silverbell, but he was
less enthused by the fact that his own work at each locationwas also subject to significant
oversight. Staunton was accustomed to having the last word, and the excellent
relationship he had with the president of the Congress mine, E.B. Gage (also the first
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president of the Development Company), predisposed him to think relations with the
DCA would be equally friendly.318
Staunton's relationship with Frank Murphy, however, was plagued by mutual
recriminations and misunderstandings. Although Staunton was a powerful, wellconnected, and remarkably successful mining engineer, within the DCA Staunton's
position was less comfortable than it appeared. The radical centralization of DCA
management -- in which one board of directors had oversight of several distinct mine
sites -- meant that it was easy for the corporation, in the person of Frank Murphy, to call
Staunton to task when there were technical or operational problems, rather than relying
on Staunton’s engineering and managerial expertise. Murphy micromanaged Staunton,
insisting that the engineer allocate his time at the various properties according to
Murphy's wishes. In the early years of the DCA, when they had a fairly respectful
relationship, Murphy cloaked his directions in Oxford sandwiches of praise. To a
suggestion from Staunton that the workings at the Congress be slightly rearranged, for
instance, Murphy responded,
Situated just as we are, all things considered, I am inclined to feel as stated
in my telegram that it is going to be necessary for you to give considerable
personal attention to conditions at Congress... While I realize that you
have a first class organization there, I cannot help but feel it was so that
you could spend a little more time on the property, that better results
would be obtained, – although I may be entirely mistaken. I don't think
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you can blame me for feeling this way, having as I do implicite [sic]
confidence in your ability to meet and overcome difficulties319
Surely, as technical director, Staunton had hired “a first-class organization” to oversee
engineering details precisely so that he could spend less time at the Congress Mine rather
than more? As the major problem for the Development Company was the Tombstone
Consolidated Mining Company, surely Murphy would want his chief engineering officer,
in whom he had “implicit confidence,” to allocate his time according to technical
necessity? Despite Staunton's ostensible authority over the engineering details of the
workings at the DCA's mining operations, Murphy always had his eye on the bottom line,
quibbling with Staunton's every move, and Staunton felt perpetually disrespected. “[A]n
expression of dissatisfaction with the way the work has been managed,” Staunton
complained about Murphy's telegraphic griping, “can only tend to discredit a manager in
the eyes of his subordinates, who necessarily see them, and this is advantageous neither
to the company nor the standing of the manager.”320 This dispute between Staunton and
Murphy was not so different from that of Louis Janin and the Board of Directors at
Concepcion. Where Janin’s conflict stemmed from differing interpretations of mine
engineering expertise, however, Staunton’s conflict with Murphy was rooted in their
disparate sense of purpose. The DCA turned a profit because it was diversified, but
diversification made the technical oversight of each project more complicated. While the
large copper companies built integrated systems for the efficient extraction of copper,
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development companies such as the DCA were principally about the efficient extraction
of profits. Staunton continually raised questions about the efficiency of the DCA’s
engineering projects, while Murphy was concerned with the efficient working of the
DCA as a whole.
The work at Tombstone did not proceed smoothly, which undoubtedly made
Murphy's de facto dismissal of Staunton's engineering expertise particularly galling to the
engineer, who was, as he put it, “ambitious to join the charmed circle” of the elite mining
engineers of Arizona such as James Douglas, T.A. Ricketts, and John Greenway.321 Yet
those men oversaw integrated mining operations that focused on the engineering of
copper; the technical focus of the DCA was never so clear and that ambiguity put
Staunton, as technical manager, in a difficult position. Adding to the conflict, Staunton
and Murphy were tripped up more than seems usual by continued miscommunication
about the financial situation at the different mines, which exacerbated their already tense
relationship.322 The telegraphic codes employed by all mining operators at the time did
not help matters, as an incorrectly translated transmission could cause considerable
distress, as on the occasion when Murphy understood Staunton's telegraph that he was
unable to estimate the ore-body at Silverbell with enough exactitude to “stand verification
by possibly hypercritical examining engineer” to read “by possibly hypocritical
examining engineer” and had a fit, presuming an offense to the examining engineer he
had hired as a consultant. In this instance, as in countless others, Staunton begged
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Murphy's forgiveness, stating that he “guess[ed he] was unfortunate in choice of
words.”323
Matters came to a head in 1910, over the purchase of approximately $40,000 of
new pumping equipment, the installation and maintenance of which would cost an
estimated $200,000. The new equipment was needed because an accident, coupled with
the heavy demands placed on the pumps, had rendered five of the Tombstone
Consolidated pumps unworkable. Staunton declared that the value of the mines at
Tombstone did not “warrant one in advising such an expenditure” of new pumping
equipment, and, furthermore, “we have reached a time when we ought to stop putting
money into Tombstone until we get into a position from other operations to afford to
carry on the work.” He suggested that Murphy call in one or two consulting mining
engineers to inspect the Tombstone operations, to get an outside opinion on the viability
of the mine.324 Murphy castigated Staunton for his lack of faith in the Tombstone mines,
asserting that Staunton bore sole responsibility for the failure of the pumps. The mining
engineer resigned his position in the DCA. “Further consideration of his [Murphy's]
letters seemed to me to make it practically necessary,” Staunton observed shortly
afterwards. “I have never been able to discuss our affairs with him in the plain way that it
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seems to me should be done without raising a storm and having my motives misconstrued
and I am tired of it.”325
What is remarkable about Staunton's conflict with Murphy is not that it occurred,
as mining engineers often clashed with overly engaged financiers and company officials.
But Murphy's dismissal of Staunton's opinions and concerns was remarkable, and
suggests that Staunton's technical expertise was of secondary importance to his success at
the DCA. Despite the reliance of the DCA on the work of Staunton and other engineers,
the vision of Murphy, and therefore of the company, was not of an efficiently run mining
operation, but of a fully integrated system with the primary goal of making money and
the secondary goal of mining ore, an inversion of the general work of mining engineers.
As Staunton’s superior, Murphy was able to undermine Staunton’s expertise at will and
to determine what of Staunton’s work was worth implementing and what was simply
“expert advice,” which Murphy could ignore as, well, it was only advice.

The Guggenheim Exploration Company
The Guggenheim Exploration Company, which operated throughout
Mexico with occasional forays into mine sites such as Utah, Colorado, and
Alaska, had a similar impact on the development of rail infrastructure in Mexico,
particularly in the north, as the DCA had in Arizona. It was, however, a
fundamentally different kind of development organization. The Guggenheim
family at the turn of the twentieth century has sometimes been called “The
325
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Copper Kings.” Although this appellation suggests a greater control over the
world copper market than the Guggenheims possessed, it indicates the influence
the family wielded over the copper extraction and refining industry in the
Americas. Meyer Guggenheim, the family patriarch, made his second fortune
mining silver in Leadville, Colorado, in the 1860s (his first wildly successful
business was importing coffee to the U.S.). With his sons – there were seven
Guggenheim sons active in the family business – Meyer soon capitalized on this
initial success in ore extraction, establishing a smelter in Pueblo, Colorado,
managed by a company named, somewhat confusingly, Philadelphia Smelting and
Refining. M. Guggenheim Sons intended to use this smelter not only for
processing local silver ores, but also for working the rich silver-lead ores being
mined south of the border. This plan was derailed in 1890 by the passage of the
McKinley Tariff, which taxed imported silver-lead ore in an attempt to stabilize
the price of silver in the U.S., essentially excluding Mexican ore from the U.S.
market.326 Undaunted, M. Guggenheim Sons took the next logical step, and at the
suggestion of mining engineer Edward Newhouse, built two smelters in Mexico
with the full cooperation of the Diaz administration, thereby bypassing the

326

Irwin Unger and Debi Unger, The Guggenheims: A Family History, (New York:

Harper, 2005), 39-40.

220

provisions of the tariff. The first, in Monterrey, opened in 1892; the second, at
Aguascalientes, in 1894.327
Between the cost of labor in Mexican smelting, approximately one-fifth of
that in Colorado, and the concessions the Guggenheim's received from the
Mexican government in the form of duty-free importation of construction
equipment for the smelters and low taxes, these two smelters were extremely
profitable from the start, and became more so as they began treating the copper
ore that was also present in northern Mexico in large quantities.328 Including the
Guggenheim refinery in Perth Amboy, New Jersey, which refined the copper
treated in Colorado and Mexico for sale to the emerging electrical industry, the
family was responsible for smelting, transporting, and finishing a large percentage
of the copper produced in the southwestern United States and Mexico through the
1890s.
This dominance was recognized by other smelter operators in the United States,
who joined together to organize the American Smelting and Refining Corporation
(ASARCO) in 1901. Invited to join in, the Guggenheim family declined, choosing to
focus instead on their new mine exploration business, the Guggenheim Exploration
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Company (Guggenex). The reasons the family made this decision are not entirely clear.
Possibly they believed that absent a major technological breakthrough in ore processing,
current metallurgical practice was unable to satisfactorily process the lower-grade copper
ore increasingly being mined through the southwestern Rocky Mountains and Mexico.329
Possibly the family simply did not want to be involved in any business in which they did
not own at least 51%. Regardless, without the participation of the Guggenheims,
ASARCO folded, and the owners had to beg the Guggenheim family to buy them out.
After 1907, the Guggenheim's controlled not only Guggenex and their own smelter
operations, but also a controlling interest in ASARCO.330
The Guggenheim Exploration Company was capitalized in 1899 at $6 million, in
order “'to prospect, explore, improve, and develop mining properties in any part of the
world.'”331 Under the leadership of the extremely energetic second son, Daniel
Guggenheim, Guggenex hired John Hays Hammond, a mining engineer already famous
for his exploits in Africa with Cecil Rhodes, to oversee the surveying operations, paying
him a base salary of over $200,000, reportedly the highest in the world, plus a significant
329
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share in any mines the family decided to develop on his watch.332 Guggenex was
modeled after the London-based, Rothschild-financed Exploration Company, which
began exploiting mine sites principally in Latin America, Africa, and Australia in the late
1880s. Like a development company, the Exploration Company used its capital to
finance site inspections, but then rather than holding properties itself, it sought other
investors and expertise to develop the most promising locations. More traditional mining
companies were formed in the wake of significant finds explicitly to exploit particular
veins and ore deposits – the Exploration Company was formed to systematize the process
of finding mining sites with potential. Many of the mining engineers who were closely
involved in the Exploration Company were American (including Henry Janin in his postdiamond-fraud career), and its work was well-known in the United States.333
Daniel Guggenheim, the family member most closely associated with the
Guggenheim Exploration Company, was widely believed to have placed great trust in the
expertise of his technical employees, and to have relied on the advice of experts rather
than on his own knowledge of the industry when making investments in mining – the
opposite of Frank Murphy's relationship to William Staunton in Arizona.334 It is certainly
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the case that the Guggenheims hired many of the most well-known and heavily
credentialed mining engineers in the business, and paid their technical experts – known as
“Guggies” to other mining engineers -- extremely generously. The high wages were
possible due to the low overhead costs of running the Guggenheim Exploration
Company, which had to pay for engineers and their assistants, but did not have the
equipment and labor expenses with which companies such as the DCA or Phelps Dodge
had to contend.335
In the past, consulting engineers were hired directly by a board of directors or a
set of investors to survey specific mine sites. Even before hiring the engineer, these
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investors were somewhat committed to the mine; they were interested enough to invest in
hiring an expert, after all, to scope out what was there already and to plan for the future.
Although the Guggenheim Exploration Company sometimes surveyed extant mine sites
for specific clients, it frequently worked on a completely different model. The firm
decided where to send its engineers. These engineers worked for their manager, and
reported back to him, rather than to a set of investors or an outside company. These
managers were experienced engineers who themselves had many ideas as to where the
best mines might be located, sent teams of surveyors and assayers to those locations, and,
if the results were promising, sought investors.
Guggenex thus upended the traditional expert-client relationship. The examining
engineers they hired only had one employer – the Guggenheim Exploration Company –
which should have established very specific requirements for what constituted a good
prospect. Having such clear standards, in turn, should theoretically have eased the strain
of writing mine reports, as the consultants knew exactly what information was required,
and how the recipient of the report would interpret it. However, the engineers were no
longer writing reports for their clients. They were writing reports that would be read by
their corporate supervisors. That supervisor, A.C. Beatty, passed the information up to
Hammond and then Daniel Guggenheim as to whether or not a mine was a worthwhile
proposition. This bureaucratized and streamlined a decision that had previously been
negotiated directly between the consulting engineer and the investor or investors.
Logically, working directly for a manager such as engineer Alfred Chester Beatty
ought to have made the everyday workload of Guggenheim engineers easier. After all,
there were no conflicts of interest in this relationship as there were in the relationship
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between consulting mining engineers and an investment company, where the possibility
of corruption – of the mining engineer simply finding the information that his employers
wanted him to find – was high. Yet the pressure to find previously untapped mining
resources, or to discover clever new ways to mine extant-yet-undervalued mining
deposits was extremely high in Guggenex. Beatty, in turn, was not an easy man to work
with, and he had strong opinions about personnel deployment, and he attempted, from a
distance, to regulate very precisely how each engineer ought to divide his time and use
his team of assistants.336 Directives from Beatty could upend an established hierarchy by
ordering an engineer to report to a man he thought of as his collaborator, or by
dispatching a mining engineer's assistant to a mine a few hundred miles away, leaving the
field operatives perplexed and not a little infuriated. Engineer Ross Hoffmann once
received a telegram instructing him to immediately forward a report, the result of assays
on a property in Chihuahua to Beatty. Hoffmann told Beatty that it was with “great
surprise... [I learned] that I am expected to report on any of the properties. I understood
definitely that Mr. Gemmel was in charge of the work and I was under his orders.” Being
asked to write a report he did not expect to have to prepare was of serious concern to
Hoffmann, who was pressed for time and money. In this instance, Hoffmann had turned
over his original and duplicate assays to Gemmel, a more senior and well-regarded
mining engineer. The originals were sent to Monterrey to be assayed; the duplicates
were in an unsealed sack in Gemmel's room, a circumstance Hoffmann thought might
indicate that they had been tampered with. Hoffmann further complained to Beatty about
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rushing his work; he felt overextended as it was, and resentful of Gemmel's authority,
frustrated by almost every aspect of his survey work in Mexico.337
When combined with the challenge of getting American dollars to Guggenex
employees working at mine sites in remote villages, and the exhausting pace of mine
inspections Guggenex consultants maintained – in his initial letter to Beatty, for instance,
Ross Hoffmann noted that if he did not write his report in about half the time he thought
he ought to take, his schedule would be derailed and he and his fellow mining engineers
would be unable to complete the work they had to before the end of 1903 – it is clear that
mining engineers frequently experienced the radical centralization of the Guggenheim
exploring method as a mixed blessing.338 Although their work was salaried, a luxury
unknown to mining engineers who worked for less-solvent development companies,
Guggenheim engineers had very little autonomy. Just three weeks prior to the telegram
requesting Hoffmann's assays, the engineer drafted a letter of complaint to Beatty:
I am acting now entirely under Gemmel's instructions according to your
advice to him – in a recent letter[,] a portion of which was read to us... As
I am now in a position which requires very little responsibility.... it will be
a great relief and favor to me if you will send some-one to take my place –
I feel that I need the rest + don't want to sacrifice my health under the
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circumstances + ought not undertake this extended work under the
circumstances.339
Hoffmann remained in Mexico for some time after writing this letter, and we can
only speculate as to whether his complaints may have had the opposite result to
that intended, or whether on further reflection he decided not to ask Beatty to
move him to another assignment.
That Ross Hoffmann was exhausted from his work in Mexico should not
be surprising. Mine inspections were of course hard work with or without
bureaucratic frustrations. Mining engineers were expected to scrutinize the full
extent of a property. In general, this meant that an engineer, along with his
colleagues and assistants, walked or rode on horse or mule-back over the entire
property. A well-planned mine inspection provided a map of accurate
correspondences of surface and underground points, and elaborated, with specific
suggestions on how future work on the mine should proceed.340 To achieve such
a comprehensive survey of a mine, engineers had to find and record each
outcropping, waterway, and elevation change, and to accurately depict the latitude
and longitude of neighboring claims in order to map the direction, depth, and
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breadth of the ore body. There were many means for determining the direction
and extent of the ore body, as well as the composition of the ore itself, but when
Guggenex was founded the most common method was still to collect samples of
the ground at regular intervals and send them to a chemist for assay.341 The
largest mine survey undertaken by the Guggenheim Exploration Company, of a
property belonging to the Utah Copper Company, required sixteen engineering
assistants, took seven months, and cost $150,000, a staggering sum in 1903.342
The reports that the mining engineers of the Guggenheim Exploration
Company submitted were extremely detailed, containing descriptions of mining
properties and of extant mining technology, analyses of local labor availability,
and evaluations and estimates of possible future productivity. Many mine reports
also contained exceptionally long introductions into both local culture and into the
history of the particular mining site being studied. In conjunction with the
economic and productivity analyses conducted by the mining engineers, and the
personal letters to Beatty, Hammond, and each other that accompanied these
reports and their frequent progress updates, a comprehensive vision of the mining
borderlands emerges, as “seen” by mining engineers on behalf of the Guggenheim
family.

The Technocratically Legible Landscape
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The landscape that emerges from engineers' reports of mining districts in
Mexico and Arizona is not quite a terra incognita, but rather a region that lacked
vitality, as evidenced by the engineer’s constant efforts to suggest new ways to
increase productivity. There is a broad jingoism and ethnocentrism underlining
the observations of slack management in these reports, mirroring ethnic, class,
and racial prejudices common among elite white Americans at the turn of the
century.343 A recurring trope in engineer's reports from Mexico, for instance, was
the narrative of a landscape that was gradually coming under the influence of a
rationalizing force, but that periodically spun out of control. A mining district
might have been worked by the Spanish and then by Mexicans, “in a very
unsystematic and unscientific manner” albeit with great “clever[ness] at following
ore bodies . . . cheaply.”344 A copper mine was referred to by its inspecting
engineer as having been “worked by the Mexicans in a desultory manner for the
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past 25 years.”345 The labor of Mexicans was thus trivialized or dismissed,
although its existence served as an important marker of a mine's potential
productivity. Engineers well understood that a mine that had produced significant
ore when excavated by hand and treated using the patio process had the potential
to produce considerably more when excavated with machinery and treated using
the latest smelting technology, and they said as much in their reports.346
Of greater significance than the condescension of American engineers
towards Spanish and Mexican mining methods was the quantification and
abstraction of the landscape that was the consulting engineer's primary
methodological device. A 1905 report by a Guggenheim engineer on the Copper
Chief Mine in Jerome, Arizona, for instance, consists of little more than a line
sketch of a vertical section of the mine coupled with a computation of the quantity
of developed ore in the main ore-body plus the probable quantity of ore in an asyet undeveloped ore-body, divided by an estimate of the cost of extraction, per
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ton. In this case, the estimated net value of the mine was $900,000.347 Such
quantification of mining terrain was the reason mining engineers were sent into
Mexico; these were numbers that only such technically trained men could
produce. The reports contained data points that were of tremendous utility, not
only for the Guggenheims as they determined which mines to purchase, but also
for those mining engineers, Wall Street bankers, and reporters who watched the
actions of the Guggenheims and their several businesses with interest, gleefully
noting the incursions of American-backed finance into Mexico.348
James Scott famously described the use of highly quantified and
rationalized maps and grids to promote the “legibility” of landscapes and
populations in the twentieth century as an attribute of “high modernism,” a
technocratic worldview Scott identified as a precondition for control of a subject
population. Scholars of engineering have argued that engineers embody the
ideology of high-modernism as described by Scott, possessing a “self-confidence
about scientific and technical progress, the expansion of production, the growing
satisfaction of human needs, the mastery of nature... and, above all, the rational
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design of social order commensurate with the scientific understanding of natural
laws.”349 The Guggenheim mining engineers obviously conform to this standard:
they were agents of rationalism, scanning the landscape to bring technical
progress to places that by virtue of their inaccessibility had previously escaped
industrialization. Mining, particularly on the scale undertaken by Guggenheim
interests in the twentieth century, is ultimately and horrifically about human
mastery over nature.350 The ores that the Guggenheim's were interested in,
principally silver and copper, are two metals that certainly contributed, through
their monetary value and, in the case of copper, significance to the new electrical
industry, to “the growing satisfaction of human needs.”
Yet Guggenheim mining engineers lacked two key elements of the “high
modernism” cited by Scott and others: they were not agents of a state; and
although cognizant that a large mining project supported by the Guggenheims
would lead to a reorganization of the local labor force and probably the relocation
of many workers, the mining engineers of the Guggenheim Exploration Company
were not interested in social re-organization. Robert Vitalis argues in his account
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of the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO) that the history of large
corporate firms and the history of states are not dissimilar. Discussing the
racialized division of labor common in the mining industry at the turn of the
twentieth century, Vitalis notes that large corporate firms in the southwestern U.S.
such as Phelps Dodge “organized production in the way that the postReconstruction South organized society.”351 An exploration and development
company, Guggenex was not as deeply enmeshed in building racially stratified
mining enclaves as Phelps Dodge or the Arizona Copper Company, but company
engineers were practiced at cataloguing the information that enabled such
stratification: population; proximity to towns and major roads; access to resources
such as water and timber. Guggenheim engineers performed a job similar to that
of the Corps of Topographical Engineers, dispatched westward to survey new
U.S. territory in the wake of the U.S. Mexico War, or to John Russell Bartlett's
survey of the U.S. Mexico border, during which the cataloguing of the mineral
resources of the new territory was almost as important as the survey of the

351

Robert Vitalis, America's Kingdom: Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Frontier, (Stanford:

Stanford University Press, 2007), 19.

234

international boundary line.352 Guggenheim mining engineers produced a
quantified and particularist reading of the mining landscape that clarified
logistical and technical needs, enabling future exploitation.
The scale of the Guggenheim Exploration Company was extraordinary,
easily dwarfing the contemporaneous work done by more traditional mining
companies. According to mining historian Clark Spence, in 1910 Guggenheim
engineers conducted over 1600 mine inspections, including preliminary
examinations of 268 mines, and full surveys of 74 mines.353 By 1910, the
Guggenheim Exploration Company had been in operation for a decade; the
accretion of information on the landscape of the mining districts of the
southwestern U.S. and northern Mexico during this time was phenomenal. A
small army of engineers and assistants was required to work at a frantic pace to
accomplish all these surveys. No wonder Ross Hoffmann worried that he would
fall behind in his inspections. As comprehensive as was the information gathered
through mine inspections and surveys, encompassing at even the most cursory
level information about the transportation infrastructure, the availability of local
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labor, and the location of timber and water resources, Guggenheim mining
engineers paid surprisingly little attention to local or regional politics – indeed,
this lack of attention was fairly anomalous in the mining industry. It is impossible
to believe that businessmen as practiced and knowledgeable as the Guggenheims
did not consider the legal and political implications of every given investment;
U.S. tax laws and the concessions granted to foreign investment were important
reasons that the Guggenheims invested in their first smelter in Mexico. As noted
by historian Mark Wasserman among others, engineering impresario John Hays
Hammond counted Porfirio Díaz among his personal friends, and smoothed the
way for many Guggenheim ventures in Mexico.354 Yet it is also notable that
considerations of politics and legislation seem to have been beyond the purview
of their workaday consulting engineers. Indeed, the narrowness of the Guggies’
consideration of mining sites almost amounts to a willful attempt on the part of
individual engineers to ignore the significance of the vast infusion of finance
signified by the interest of the Guggenheim Exploration Company.
As the borderlands mining industry matured and expanded in the early
years of the twentieth century, companies such as the DCA and Guggenex
bureaucratized the work of mining engineers as managers and consultants on a
much larger scale than was conceivable in the 1870s and 1880s. Although these
companies were utterly reliant on the expertise and professionalism of mining
engineers, they served to narrow the workload of individual engineers, much as
354
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did the consolidated mass-mining companies. At the same time, development and
exploration companies helped to produce a legible technocratic landscape that
served as a blueprint for future exploitation, thus providing work for future
generations of mining engineers.
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Conclusion

As the head of the joint U.S.-Mexico Boundary Commission in the early 1850s,
John Russell Bartlett took it upon himself to make a study of the natural resources of the
deserts and mountains in the territory so recently acquired by the United States. “The
time is not far distant,” he observed, “when crowds as large as those now pressing on to
California and Australia will be ‘prospecting’ among the mountains of Texas, New
Mexico, Chihuahua, and Sonora, attracted by similarly rich deposits, and probably with
the like splendid success.”355 When American entrepreneurs took up Bartlett’s implicit
challenge in the southwestern borderlands, they certainly brought with them dreams of
wealth shaped by tales of the California gold fields. What they found were rich mining
opportunities that would nonetheless require significant work to make them pay. For the
next sixty years, mining development appeared to follow a relentless trajectory: mining
prospects replete with refractory, low-grade ores were exploited using ever more
technologically sophisticated equipment and processes. The profession of mine
engineering developed in tandem with these new opportunities, as mining engineers were
responsible for identifying these mining prospects as workable and for devising the
processes that could exploit them.
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The development of the borderlands mines, did not follow the pattern of the
California gold rush, nor was it the foregone conclusion that Bartlett suggested. In 1864,
when journalist J. Ross Browne travelled across southern Arizona, he had quite an
adventure, but he was disappointed in the mining:
the great drawback to mining [here] is, that the owners of feet have no money to
expend in extracting their wealth from the ground; and when people who have
money desire to invest, the men of feet demand extraordinary sums, because they
think claims that attract capital must be of extraordinary value.356
In Browne’s assessment, the borderlands mines lacked owners who were knowledgeable
about finance, as well as regular access to capital, and therefore little development
occurred, an observation in keeping with what mining engineers such as Raphael
Pumpelly and independent prospectors such as John Denton Hall experienced in the
region in the late 1850s and 1860s. Through the 1870s and 1880s, with the exception of
a handful of booms such as the silver strike at Tombstone, only companies with deep
financial pockets were more than marginally successful at working the precious metals of
Arizona or Sonora, while the independent “men of feet” continued to prospect around,
occasionally getting lucky. But the advent of electricity in the 1890s changed the market
for copper ore and the economics of the region were altered. Copper mining required a
massive up-front investment; the financially naïve mine owners described by Browne
were bought out by well-connected investors and corporations from New York and San
Francisco.
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The development of the U.S.-Mexico border region, and the development of the
profession of mining engineering occurred in tandem, and mining engineers were crucial
in shaping the economy of the border. Mining engineers rendered the borderlands legible
to investors, by means of their underground surveys; persuaded investors of the critical
importance of building infrastructure to aid in mineral extraction; and brought heavy
technology to mining sites, building the industrial landscape characteristic of the region.
Mining engineers did not merely change and exploit the landscape. They proved more
than willing to bend their careers to fit the needs of the regional economy. From the time
the earliest mining engineers travelled to the Santa Rita, Mowry, and Heintzelman mines
at Tubac, through the Mexican Revolution, the career trajectory of mining engineers
changed dramatically. Early engineers, members of an elite and cosmopolitan class of
eastern and European men, travelled extensively through their careers, working as
consultants or managers as it suited them or as the opportunity arose. Following the
democratizing trend of the engineering profession in general, scores of mining engineers
took advantage of the educational opportunities brought by the establishment of landgrant colleges, and college-trained mining engineers flooded both the field and the
mineral districts of North America. By the 1910s, mining engineers in the borderlands
were more likely to work for the large copper corporations such as Arizona Copper,
Phelps Dodge, and the Cananea Consolidated Copper Co. than they were to manage onsite business for smaller companies. In the 1920s, mining engineer Ralph Ingersoll was
sent by Phelps Dodge to be on-site engineer at Nacozari, the mine that engineer Louis
Ricketts so carefully automated at the turn of the century. Ingersoll’s responsibility, as
engineer, was to measure the work done by each team of miners each day to determine
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their pay rating. Decisions regarding the actual mining, or the processing of the ore, were
made by other people; Ingersoll’s mathematical and technological skills were needed to
surveille the Mexican mine workers, rather than to design a dig or read a landscape.357
The success of some mining engineers in constructing technologically sophisticated
mining systems had the effect of narrowing the scope of the profession for generations of
mining engineers who followed them.
The corporatization and bureaucratization of mining affected the lives of mining
engineers in the southwestern U.S. and in Mexico in other ways as well. When mining
engineers headed out to Arizona or Sonora in the mid- to late- nineteenth century, they
found a place and a society that had little in common with the cities and towns of the
northeastern U.S. and Europe to which they were accustomed. Prior to the 1880s, neither
the U.S. nor Mexican governments were able to adequately protect their citizens from
Apache raiding parties, who quite understandably viewed the encampments of foreigners
as incursions into their sovereign territory. The immense distances between mining
settlements; the heat; and the small American population combined to give mining
engineers a sense that they were out on their own, and that they could rely only on
themselves for protection. As Raphael Pumpelly’s memoir demonstrates, the high
adventures to be found working in such circumstances were not always comfortable, and
the political and social circumstances of the early borderlands did not facilitate great
advances in the mining business or mining techniques. But the experiences of a few men
357
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in the 1860s, and of rather more mining engineers in the 1870s and 1880s, served to
provide mining engineers with a critical rhetorical device through the end of the
nineteenth century: the ability to call upon a self-professed, hyper-masculine identity as
westering pioneers in support of their claims of technical expertise and scientific
knowledge. Despite the extraordinary changes in both the mining industry and the
careers of mining engineers, this “frontiersman” identity proved remarkably persistent,
and did not really change over time.
However unlikely the adoption of a self-consciously pioneering masculine
identity might have been for a profession of mostly elite white men from the eastern
United States, it stands to reason that they would work to find ways to buttress their
authority in the field. Despite the undoubted mineral wealth of North America, the
profession of mine engineering was slow to take hold in the university system, relative to
its sister fields of civil or mechanical engineering. Perhaps because of this, the position
of mining engineers as “experts” was tenuous through the late nineteenth century.
Whether conducting a mine survey, or working as the resident mine manager, mining
engineers had to position themselves as authoritative technical workers vis-à-vis working
miners when out in the field—mere credentialing did not hold much sway when the
workers were experienced Cornish miners, and was even harder to assert to a population
of immigrant miners who did not speak English. Embracing an identity as westering
pioneers enabled mining engineers to assert themselves with a distinctive regional
authority. When interacting with eastern capitalists, as well, mining engineers found that
they established confidence if they could make it clear that they were equally at home in
rugged mining camps as in the social clubs of Manhattan or San Francisco.
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The emphasis mining engineers placed on rugged living also stemmed from the
fact that through the early twentieth century it was difficult to get to, and uncomfortable
to remain at, most mining camps in the borderlands. Yet by the 1920s, largely as a result
of the industrial push of copper mining, engineer Ralph Ingersoll was able to travel by
train to his position in Pilares de Nacozari in great comfort, particularly once he crossed
into Mexico where was permitted to smoke on the train and put his feet up on the seat in
front of him.358 At Nacozari, he found a robust community of fifty Americans, including
two female schoolteachers and some extremely enthusiastic golfers. This is a tremendous
contrast to the experience of Morris Parker, merely twenty years earlier, who suffered,
with his wife and three small children, through an uncomfortable, multiday trip involving
a couple of different trains and a difficult wagon journey to reach Nacozari. He left the
position in under eighteen months because there were only five Americans in the camp
and nobody with whom his wife could carry on a conversation. Mining engineer George
Kingdon and his family lived for years in full middle-class comfort in Cananea, Sonora,
in a white house, with a lawn and a Chinese cook, before his wife and children fled to
escape the violence of the Mexican Revolution.359 As privileged members of the Anglo
middle class, the lifestyles enjoyed (or not) by mining engineers at mining camps through
the years is a superb signifier of the extent to which the regional economy had been
reshaped in the image of the metropolitan United States.
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By the turn of the century, the value of the education that set mining engineers
apart from both mine investors and working miners was more apparent throughout
southwestern mining camps. The new demand for copper wire from the electric industry
drove mine exploitation, and mining sites such as Bisbee and Cananea were poised to
take advantage of the new market. Although the ore deposits along the U.S.-Mexico
border were enormous, the low-grade of the extant copper required new mining
techniques, and a knowledge of chemistry and metallurgy better learned in a classroom
than on-the-job. Under the aegis of a handful of mining engineers, mining itself changed,
from an activity that required skilled workers into one in which nonselective mining
predominated. In these new, heavily industrialized mines, mining engineers worked in
teams as surveyors and technicians, developing ever-more efficient machinery and means
of extraction. Although the more independent aspects of the profession did not
disappear, fewer mining engineers were called upon to utilize the breadth of their skill
set; they more often spent their careers as corporate functionaries, interacting with other
engineers. Even those engineers who remained the most mobile, such as those who
worked for the Guggenheim Exploration Company, worked as part of an army of experts
rather than as individuals forced to assert their own credentials and professional worth.
The complex identity work undertaken by nineteenth-century mining engineers was no
longer as important, except as a recruiting tool for new members of the profession – the
romance of the old west proved enticing. With the industrialization of mining through
the borderlands, and the corporatization of mining companies, mining engineers no
longer had to prove they were worth the expense – rather, they were fully integrated into
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the corporate industry, an industry that could not have been established without their
work.
The remnants of the major mining corporations of the early twentieth century
such as Phelps Dodge, Cananea Consolidated, and Arizona Copper are self-evident in the
borderlands today, in crumbling industrial buildings, polluted rivers, and the monstrous
open pits and tailings piles that dot the terrain. The impact of these companies on the
landscape of the mining borderlands remains visible and impressive, both in physical
terms, and in the prevalence of place names that refer to the mining industry and mining
corporations that dominated the economy from the late-nineteenth century onwards.360
Such industrial detritus resulted from the mediating work of mining engineers in crafting
a technocratic landscape which enabled the explosive capitalist expansion in the
borderlands.
As industrial operators in the U.S. Southwest and into Mexico, mining engineers
were successful innovators, devising new and ingenious ways to extract mineral wealth
from the region. Yet more significant than their technological prowess was the impact of
mine engineering work on the organization of American business. The revolution in
mining methods both encouraged the growth of large mining corporations and drew the
360
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engineers closer than ever to their corporate sponsors. Mining engineers were the critical
workers instigating growth, bureaucratization, and corporate consolidation in the mining
industry, which in turn modeled the trajectory of American business through the
twentieth century.
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